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In 1967, the statement was made correctly that "[s]uits
against accountants by persons other than their clients have been
almost uniformly unsuccessful."' Since the assertion of too much
independence from clients could result in the accountant's dis-
missal,2 his choice was clear; he knew the hand that fed him was
also the only one which could beat him. It therefore is not surprising
1. Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 1437 (1967).
2. Sterling, Accounting Power, 136 J. OF AccouNTA cy, Jan. 1973, at 61, 63 and Johnson,
Management and Accounting Principles, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 690, 700 (1965) suggest
that it is not uncommon for some companies to shop for agreeable auditors.
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that "creative accounting" 3 should thrive in such an environment.
The unchecked excesses of some managements in financial re-
porting, however, resulted in the rude jolts of the Westec, Yale
Express, and Continental Vending scandals, causing prosecution
and plaintiffs' lawyers to develop a small bit of creativity of their
own. This resulted in the unprecedented imposition of professional
liability in the seminal decisions in Fischer v. Kletz4 (Yale Express),
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.' and United States v. Simon6
(Continental Vending) in the late 1960's. This trickle of cases has
swollen to hundreds of pending suits against accountants.7 Because
the reaction has now set in, and legislation aimed at countering the
3. "Creative accounting" is the corruption of accepted accounting principles to present
an overall misleading impression as well as the structuring and implementation of transac-
tions primarily for the sake of presenting an attractive financial picutre with little or no regard
for business goals. See, e.g., STAFF OF SEcuRITEs AND EXCHANGE COMISsION, REPORT TO
SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HousE CoMMrrrE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE ON THE FINANCILs COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
33-83 (1972); A. BROFF, UNAcCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING (1972).
4. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (accountant may be liable for failure to disclose
after-acquired information to correct prior audited statements).
5. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (accountant has duty to exercise high degree of
diligence).
6. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (conformity with
GAAP principles no defense to criminal prosecution if financial statements do not "fairly
present" condition of corporation). The extent of litigation in the Westec case, also referred
to, is described in Schneider v. Sears, 265 F. Supp. 257, 259-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
7. Arthur Andersen & Co. 1973 Ann. Rep. 4 estimated 500 suits or claims in progress
involving auditors in March 1973; Liggio, Expanding Concepts of Accountant's Liability,
CALIF. CPA Q. 18, 19 (Sept. 1974) estimated 500 to 1,000 pending actions and over 200
decisions. In this process, the struggle to harness corporate abuses has recently taken a new
turn as the SEC and the courts have begun to look to corporate advisors to assume new
responsibilities. Commissioner Sommer has listed the reasons why the Commission has fo-
cused especially on lawyers and accountants:
(1) They are in a strategic position to influence management because without their
active cooperation, many harmful transactions will not be feasible;
(2) They have high standards of ethics both personally and institutionally made mean-
ingful through Codes of Ethics and state and federal licensing;
(3) They generally are independent of the economic fate of the client;
(4) Society has accorded pre-eminence to both professions and the public's expecta-
tions should be met. Unpublished Address by Commissioner A. A. Sommer, American
Bar Association, National Institute, Advisors to Management, Responsibilities and Lia-
bilities of Lawyers and Accountants, in New York City, Oct. 3-5, 1974.
This approach, drafting accountants and lawyers into the public service, in preference to
client interest, is not too great a change of the publicly stated role of accountants although it
is a great shift for lawyers. But even for accountants, there is some difference between the
claim that they represent investors and the new vision of the SEC and the courts.
For expressions of this policy, see SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir.
1973); In re Emanuel Fields, S.E.C. Rel. 33-5404 (6-18-73) in [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,407, at 83,172; Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of
Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of
Duties, 74 CoLuIn. L. REv. 412 (1974); Sonde, The Responsibilities of Professionals Under the
Federal Securities Laws-Some Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1973).
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judicial onslaught can be expected,' it is timely to review the recent
developments in the area of accountants' responsibilities with a
view to providing suggestions to federal and state legislatures and
courts.
A first step is to understand the activities of accountants and
the standards that guide them. Next, three as yet unresolved but
fundamental difficulties of accounting that perhaps are the root
causes of much of the current litigation will be considered. Lastly,
some of the significant current problems of accountants' liability
will be reviewed.
I. ACCOUNTANTS' FUNCTIONS
What is it that accountants do?
Their most common activities may be listed as:
(1) The audit function and other activity involving published
and unpublished financial data ranging down to "write up" work
(2) Tax services.
(3) Management advisory services of all types, such as devel-
oping data systems or recruiting executives.
Although our concern here will be only with accountants' liabil-
ities involving published financial data, it is necessary to know a
little more of the nature of the other services listed in order to place
in perspective some of the later discussion.
A. Functions Other Than Audits
Large and small businesses retain accountants to prepare tax
returns and to plan for local, state, national and international tax
matters in business transactions. In this area, the accountant's
function frequently substantially overlaps with that of legal counsel,
even extending to representation of clients in dealings with govern-
mental agencies and in adversary proceedings before them, such as
in the United States Tax Court." The resulting disputes between
8. The American Law Institute is currently engaged in the drafting of a proposed
Federal Securities Code with Professor Louis Loss of the Harvard Law School as reporter. See
ALI, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE Tent. Draft No. 1 (1972); Tent. Draft No. 2 (1973); Tent. Draft
No. 3 (1974); Reporter's Revision of Text of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3 (1974).
Generally, the civil liability provisions contained for the most part in Tentative Draft
No. 2 would diminish exposure of accountants substantially below the present level. See id.
at §§ 1402-06 especially. The most obvious such change is the limitation of damage liability
in § 1403. But the Code's other provisions would reverse numerous existing decisions. The
analysis of the Code provisions will be the subject of another paper and will not be of central
concern here.
9. See note 13 infra and accompanying text for a brief description of "write up" work.
10. Under the Internal Revenue Code, accountants may be licensed to practice before
the Tax Court. 26 U.S.C. § 7452 (1970).
[Vol. 28
A CCOUNTANTS RESPONSIBILITIES
the two professions are based on considerations ranging from eco-
nomic self-interest to the adequacy of service to the client and have
been the subject of a discrete history that need not be reviewed
here."
Frequently, perhaps because the parties feel the tax considera-
tions are the only considerations, accountants negotiate business
transactions and draft documents without legal advice. Some ac-
countants, who also hold law degrees, purport to be able to function
in both capacities simultaneously. These activities are not condoned
by either profession, and most knowledgeable practitioners in each
field recognize the need for symbiosis of two professionals in these
matters.'
2
Many large and small accounting firms act as marriage brokers
in corporate acquisitions. Their activities include finding, evaluat-
ing and recommending suitable merger candidates to prospective
acquiring companies. Some promote tax shelter opportunities for
their clients' employees as a part of compensation planning. Other
advisory functions are performed by many firms as a substantial
part of their business; management consulting services range from
advising on record-keeping and data processing systems analysis
through actuarial services, budgeting, forecasting, employee effi-
ciency studies, production planning and marketing. Some firms
even provide executive recruiting services-evaluating and recom-
mending employment of top officers.'3
Many small firms perform "write up" work, which is a very
substantial segment of their practices. Write up work ranges from
complete record-keeping services to making adjusting entries and
drafting statements.
Nevertheless, the primary reason for the existence of the ac-
counting profession and the accountant's predominant activity is
the audit function and its related activities." What is an audit?
B. The Audit Function-A Thumbnail Sketch
In essence, like most communication tasks, an audit consists of:
11. See 2 J. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION, ch. 9 (1970).
12. See, e.g., Loeb & Leete, The Dual Practitioner: CPA, Lawyer, or Both?, 135 J. OF
AccouNTANcy, Aug. 1973, at 57.
13. See generally A. BRmOFF, THE EFFEcrIVENESS OF ACCOUNTING COMMUNICATON, ch. 6
(1967); 2 J. CAREY, supra note 11, at 191-203; MONTGOMERY's AUDITING 535 (8th ed. N. Lenhart
& P. Defliese 1957) [hereinafter cited as MONwrOMERY's AuDrrING]-.
14. Authur Andersen & Co. in 1973 received revenues from its various activities in the
following proportions:
Accounting and Auditing 69%
Tax Practice 18%
Management Advisory Services 13%
Arthur Andersen & Co. 1973 Ann. Rep. at 32.
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(a) Investigation and collection of data;
(b) Drawing of inferences from the findings; and
(c) Presentation of conclusions. 5
Many variations of an "audit" are possible, ranging from a
complete, transaction by transaction reconstruction and investiga-
tion of everything done by the client's recordkeepers and other em-
ployees, to the opposite extreme of merely reading a statement of
accounts receivable." Of necessity, practical limitations and the
purpose of the examination will dictate the scope of the audit. And,
because the environment changes with time and other conditions,
including the general state of the economy, existing technology,
habits of thought, the particular company and industry, and even
morals, no two audits are identical. Because of the many variations
possible, good practice calls for a written agreement defining the
scope of the engagement.'7
For large accounting firms, the hierarchy of auditing personnel,
in descending order, comprises "partners," "managers" (or "super-
visors" or "principals"), "seniors," "semi-seniors" and "juniors."
The partner is usually in charge of several simultaneous audits and
may or may not participate in the field work at the client's premises.
The manager will participate in the field work although he too has
15. Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. Rv.
797, 803 (1959). The following textual description of the audit process is taken largely from
MONTGOMERY'S AuDrrNG ch. 4.
16. MONTGOMERY'S AUDIMTNG supra note 13, at 9-10 states:
Classification of Audits.-The work of the independent public accountant in examining
financial statements has long been referred to as an audit. Since the word "audit" is a
general expression, there have been many attempts to classify the various activities of
public accountants by more descriptive terms, such as "detailed audit," "complete
audit," "continuous audit," "test audit," "protective audit," "balance sheet audit," and
others. None of these expressions has proved satisfactory, and they are more and more
falling into disuse.
It is logical to classify audits into two general divisions: (a) examinations of financial
statements for the purpose of expressing a professional opinion whether they present
fairly the financial position of a business at a given date and the results of its operations
for a stated period, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles consis-
tently applied, and (b) examinations for various purposes, as a result of which it is not
expected that the public accountant will state his opinion regarding the financial state-
ments as a whole. The former examination is often referred to simply as an 'examination
of financial statements.'
17. MONTGOMERY'S AuDrING, supra note 13, at 36; see 1136 Tenants' Corp. v. Max
Rothenburg & Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 830, 277 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1967), afl'd, 21 N.Y.2d 995, 290
N.Y.S.2d 919 (1968) (evidence raised issue of fact as to nature of engagement), 36 App. Div.
2d 804, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1971) (affirming trial court's finding of engagement to audit),
aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 585, 281 N.E.2d 846, 330 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1972), in which a failure to follow
this practice resulted in a dispute as to whether a full audit was agreed to (although the court




multiple engagements at most times. As part of the engagement,




(i) The preliminary survey of facts.
The first stage undertaken is planning the audit in conformity
with the scope of the engagement. When an accountant is employed
for a full audit of a client for the first time, usually the partner in
charge will make a preliminary survey of the business, gleaning
information about the nature of the business, sales trends, manufac-
turing and marketing techniques, sources of raw materials, condi-
tions in the industry, major customers, products, personnel, budget-
ing and accounting systems, characteristics of management, affilia-
tions and the like. In this process, he will collect and review both
oral and written data such as organizational charts, annual reports,
prior tax returns and financials, accounting manuals, and market-
ing literature. Either at this point or later, an on-site inspection of
major plant and facilities also will be made.
At this stage he should make an intensive analysis of the prior
financial statements, studying ratios and trends to determine unu-
sual variations, sluggish turnover of inventory, manipulations, etc.
Also, the basic accounting policies being followed by the client will
be ascertained. These policies may be contained in company man-
uals and minutes or no consistent policies may be followed. The
auditor also now must become familiar with the company's account-
ing procedures-including charts of names of accounts, journals and
ledgers used, and the like.
The reason for this preliminary survey is clear: sound planning
of the audit dictates that the auditor understand the nature of the
client's business, its operations and organization.
(ii) Planning the "audit program."
After this preliminary survey, the next step in the planning
stage is development of the "audit program," the guide to the audit
describing the "audit procedures:" the what, how and when to do
certain things in checking the client's accounting. This task may
18. Given the distaste of accountants for audit field work, it usually falls to the youngest
and newest employees to perform this task. As a result, the supervising and reviewing func-
tions are extremely important, since it is fair to say that bewilderment far outweighs under-
standing in most initiates. Sometimes the more experienced find the complexities beyond
their ken. See, e.g., the comments on the work of the senior accountant in Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The SEC in Interstate Hosiery
Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C. 706, 715-16 (1939) placed great emphasis on the review function.
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rest primarily on the senior, who will report to and consult with the
manager or partner on some questions.
"Auditing procedures" are designed to establish the reliability
and integrity of the client's system of "internal controls" over its
activities. "Internal control" means the client's record-keeping sys-
tem and its system of checking the operations of the business, for
example, the subsystem of matching reports of the receiving depart-
ment for goods received with vendors' invoices.'" Audit procedures
further include independent checking, such as confirmation of ac-
counts receivable with customers or of bank balances with banks.
The auditor probably will develop a skeleton audit program
based on an opening trial balance of all the ledger accounts, the
preliminary survey data including a reading of the documents ob-
tained, and audit procedures common to most audits, such as the
confirmation of bank balances, just mentioned. Although he is not
an insurer against fraud on the client, he must always give consider-
ation to "the possibility [that] fraud may exist. ' 2 Moreover, an
even higher awareness must be had of the possibility of deliberate
misrepresentation by management to investors. The discovery of
such misrepresentations "is usually more closely associated with the
objective of the ordinary examination, '21 than is the discovery of
fraud on the company.
The skeleton audit program will be re-examined after the audi-
tor reviews and tests the client's internal control system. The better
the internal control system the more reliable will be the testing and
sampling by the auditor and hence less detailed checking will be
required. The internal control system includes not only matters of
relevance to the audit, but also administration of all aspects of the
business; the auditor need consider only those controls that relate
to the safeguarding of assets from loss and the reliability of the
financial records. He will make a detailed examination of them in
order to determine when he may rely on the client's system and
when he must reinforce that system with his own procedures. He
will also test the client's system by tracing sample transactions from
start to finish to assure that it in fact operates as represented.
Based on the results of his review and testing of the client's
19. For cases illustrating the inadequacy of an internal control system, see Bates v.
Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook, 35 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Mich. 1940);
National Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App. Div. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939); Dantzler Lumber
& Export Co. v. Columbia Cas.Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116 (1934); Fox & Son v. Moorrish,
Grant & Co., 35 T.L.R. 126 (K.B. 1918).
20. AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, in 1 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS.




internal control system as well as the results of the study of the
preliminary survey, he will prepare a revised audit program, which
will consist of specific procedures to test the reliability of the finan-
cial statements including, for example, such matters as testing and
sampling the books of account for accuracy, reading corporate min-
utes, contracts and leases (internal evidence), and confirming bank
accounts with the bank and receivables with the client's debtors
(external evidence).
This generally is the bulk of the work. The audit program is
always regarded as merely tentative and to be modified as facts
unfold in the process of carrying out the procedures. For example,
the necessity of probing suspicious circumstances may require addi-
tional procedures.
(iii) Implementation and adjustment of the audit program.
The planning stage is completed at this point and the audit
program is ready for implementation. In this stage of the process,
the auditor must continue his healthy skepticism, for example, scru-
tinizing documents closely for suspicious deletions or interlinea-
tions, backdating, lack of dating, forgeries and the like. In every
case, materiality and the probabilities of the situation will call for
more or less attention. "It is fundamental that there should be
stronger grounds to sustain the auditor's opinion of relatively impor-
tant items in the financial statements and those with possibilities
of relatively material error than are required to sustain his opinion
of items without these characteristics."2 Financial insecurity of the
business also has a significant influence on how far the auditor's
procedures must go.
When the auditor begins the audit program, he will record in
"working papers" his work and findings. Each page will be dated
and initialed by all persons who dealt with it. The papers should be
indexed and bound and retained for some years. They should also
be comprehensible as they are intended for use by others as well as
for later use.
A trial balance is usually the first working paper. Other stan-
dard working papers are data from the corporate charter, by-laws,
and minutes and analyses of accounts, prescribed by the audit pro-
gram. One of the last working papers will be the management's
"letter of representation" executed by the top officers, stating that
no relevant post-balance-sheet-date events or other matters make
the financial statements misleading, that disclosure of all known
22. MONTGoMmEY'S AuDrnNo, supra note 13, at 49.
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shortages has been made, that complete and correct corporate min-
utes have been supplied, and other matters of like import.
The working papers not only form the basis for integration of
the audit findings with the financial statements but also are the
facts that a partner or other reviewer of the field work will check.
The SEC has stated that the working papers must support in detail
any unusual items as well as all others. 23 They also should establish
the adequacy of the audit procedures.
(iv) The auditor's report.
After completion of the field work and discussions with man-
agement of questions raised as to the form of the financial state-
ments, the auditor will "report" on whether he conducted his exam-
ination in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
(GAAS) and whether the statements are presented in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) consistently
observed in relation to the prior period. The distinction between
accounting principles on the one hand and auditing standards and
procedures on the other must be kept in mind for much misunder-
standing has occurred in judicial opinions and other lawyers' work
because of a lack of discrimination between them, even among so-
phisticated corporate lawyers. This may be because in some cases
the two overlap. Nevertheless, by and large they are separate do-
mains.
"Auditing standards" address the objectives to be attained by
the audit and fix the standard of quality of performance of the audit
procedures. GAAS, as established by the AICPA, require the audi-
tor to exercise skill, independence and care, compel adequate plan-
ning and supervision of the audit including evaluation of the client's
internal controls and independent confirmations, and require the
report of compliance with GAAP.
24
23. Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C. 706, 715-16 (1939).
24. The "generally accepted auditing standards" as established by the AICPA have
been briefly stated:
General Standards
1. The examination is to be performed by a person or persons having adequate techni-
cal training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to
be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the examination and
the preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
1. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be properly
supervised.
2. There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal control as a basis
[Vol. 28
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"Accounting principles," distinguishable from both auditing
standards and auditing procedures, generally deal with such facts
or conclusions as the existence of a deposit in the sum of $1,000 to
the First National Bank which is still outstanding, and provide for
certain accounting treatmient of that fact; e.g., that the bank de-
posit will be designated "Cash" in the accounts, instead of, for
example, "Accounts Receivable-First National Bank."
In order for acounting principles to be considered GAAP they
should have substantial authoritative support. The sources for de-
termining whether a particular principle has substantial authorita-
tive support are the following: practices commonly used in business
that have proven dependable; the views of stock exchanges, com-
mercial and investment bankers, and regulatory agencies, especially
the SEC; affirmative opinions of practicing and academic accoun-
tants in oral or written opinions, expert testimony, textbooks and
articles; and published opinions of the AICPA and the academic
accountants' organization, the American Accounting Association. 5
Thus, accountants define GAAP as going beyond custom; the words,
"generally accepted," are given a meaning contrary to their normal
meaning since customary practices are only one type of GAAP.
The auditor's report may be:
(a) "Unqualified"-indicating that the statements are pre-
sented fairly, that his opinion was formed on the basis of an exami-
nation made in accordance with GAAS, and that the statements
conform with GAAP consistently applied, and include all disclo-
sures necessary to make the statements not misleading. This is the
for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant extent of the tests to which
auditing procedures are to be restricted.
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, obser-
vation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding
the financial statements under examination.
Standards of Reporting
1. The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles.
2. The report shall state whether such principles have been consistently observed in
the current period in relation to the preceding period.
3. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be regarded as reasonably
adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
4. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding the financial
statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot be
expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be expressed, the reasons therefor should be
stated. In all cases where an auditor's name is associated with financial statements, the
report should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's examina-
tion, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking.
SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 150.02.
25. P. GRADY, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACcOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR BusINFSs
ENTEIURiSS, AICPA AcCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 7, 52-53 (1965).
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standard accountant's report found affixed to most audited finan-
cial statements.8
(b) "Qualified"-same as above with certain qualifications
and clearly explained reasons and descriptions of the effect on the
statements. 27
(c) "Adverse"-stating that the statements are not fairly pre-
sented in conformity with GAAP, or
(d) A "Disclaimer of Opinion"-stating that the auditor is
unable to express an opinion because of a serious limitation on the
scope of the examination.
28
This completes the audit.
Keeping this broad outline of the audit process in mind will
facilitate an understanding of the following discussion of some of the
problems of accountants' responsibilities.
II. THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF ACCOUNTING
Accountants, starting with the highest aspirations to provide
fair and unbiased reports, have learned that it is one thing to have
noble ambitions and another to achieve them. Doubtless they seek
to do a good job, but some unsolved problems of accounting remain,
which frustrate full realization of this goal. These are the problems
of the modular, artificial nature of financial reporting, the inde-
pendence of individual auditors, and the impartiality of the profes-
sion.
A. Accounting As A Model of the Real World, and the Pygmalion
Syndrome.
Pygmalion's statue may have been given life by Venus, but
26. Typically, it reads:
Auditors' Report
To the Shareholders of X Corporation: We have examined the consolidated balance
sheet of X Corporation (a Delaware corporation) and subsidiaries as of December 31,
19_ and the related statements of consolidated earnings retained for requirements of
the business and consolidated application of funds for the year then ended. Our exami-
nation was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and accord-
ingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures
as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the financial statements described above present fairly the financial
position of X Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 19., and the results of
their operations and application of funds for the year then ended, in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the
preceding year. Chicago, Illinois, March 19, 19.
/s/Readem & Weep
27. SAS No. 2, 32-34, in 138 J. OF AccouNTANcY, Dec. 1974, at 87, 91-92, now requires
the report to contain a separate explanatory paragraph.
28. See SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU §§ 510-14, repealed and replaced for state-
ments dated after December 31, 1974 by SAS No. 2, note 27 supra.
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such miracles do not often occur; models stay models and although
they bear some similarities to the real world, in many ways they are
quite misleading. While a realistic marble statue may accurately
portray a human being as having four limbs, a head and torso,
standing erect and having certain other features, a visitor from
another planet, not knowing the qualifications on the statute, could
be deceived into believing that earthlings are rigid, hard to the
touch, unthinking and monochromatic.
Thus, one viewing any model constantly must bear in mind
that, unlike Pygmalion's virgin, it is not the real world. Despite the
simplicity of this caveat, many otherwise sophisticated business-
men and even accountants display the Pygmalion Syndrome,"9 and
many, perhaps most, laymen fall into the same error, believing that
the facts, rather than a modular abstraction of the facts, are
contained in financial statements. They are not.
Homer Kripke has dealt with the concept in different terms,
pointing out the qualifications on what he said some people call
accounting "facts," noting:
(a) They represent probabilities, not absolutes (e.g., accounts receivable
are reduced by a statistically derived estimate of probable bad debts);
(b) Conservatism in communicating these probabilities from a securities
seller's viewpoint (e.g., non-inclusion of a probable ore discovery) in a registra-
tion statement is non-conservatism when a buyer does the same thing (e.g.,
on an insider purchase), and the SEC's conservatism for sellers' statements
has worked perversely for buyers' statements;
(c) Alternative accounting choices yield different "facts" for the same
event (e.g., inventory valued on a FIFO basis may be carried at a much higher
figure with resulting higher profit than when the same inventory is valued on
a LFO basis);
(d) Accounting principles change with time and hence accounting
"facts" change; and
(e) Accounting "facts" are sometimes arbitrary determinations because
some GAAP are merely rules of the road selected from among equally suitable
alternatives.-
Kripke finally concludes that the qualifications on the model
are so many and so technical that financial disclosure rules should
be based on communicating only with sophisticated users of finan-
cial statements, because the real world differences from the model
can never be understood fully by the layman, and, in any event, the
intelligent investor acts by getting at least part of his information
from professionals.3'
29. The term is not mine. See J.L. SYNGE, TALKNG ABoUT RrATvY 18 (1970).
30. Kripke, Rule 10b-5 Liability and "Material" "Facts", 46 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1061, 1070-
75 (1971).
31. Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1151, 1165-68 (1970). The question was raised in A. BRILOFF, THE EFFEnTIVmSS OF
AcCOUNTING COMMUNICATON 225-26 (1967) without resolution.
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Other manifestations exist of accounting's modular nature.
Accountants, in discussing the problem of cost or value,3 2 in reality
are raising the question of whether to develop a different model from
the historical cost model because it may work better to solve some
real world problems. Historical cost, like a flat map, has sophisti-
cated uses, but fair value accounting, like a globe, may be better for
other, perhaps less sophisticated, purposes. For example, the histor-
ical cost of an asset owned by a firm has been forcefully stated to
be a "fact" useful to expert users, while the estimated current fair
market value has been said not to be a fact.3 Yet it is clear that an
ordinary investor asked to sell his shares might be misled if the
"fact" of historical cost was stated but the non-fact of a current
value three times as much was not.34 The use of the historical cost
accounting model in this case is deceptive to one unfamiliar with
its limitations.
Thus, the current accounting model is likely to mislead the
layman, unaware of its qualifications, into believing it depicts the
facts of the real world, and therefore is inappropriate for lay users.35
The next logical question is whether we can develop a model that
can be used by laymen.36 In the meantime, the question of immedi-
ate interest for this paper is whether accountants should be held
liable for the limitations of the current accounting model which
mislead lay investors.
Before considering this particular question, two other unre-
solved difficulties of the accounting profession will be described.
32. See, e.g., G. MAY, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 86-88 (1943); H. Ross, FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS, A CRUSADE FOR CURRENT VALUES (1969).
33. Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus.
LAWYER 300, 308-09 (1961).
34. Fogler v. Norcan Oils Ltd., 43 D.L.R.2d 508 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd on other
grounds, 46 D.L.R.2d 630 (Canada, 1964). But see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d
1281, 1291-94 (2d Cir. 1973); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1972); Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1968);
Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 94,869, at 96,960 (D. Del.
1974).
35. Two very unconventional models eliminate financial statements as such in favor of
a textual format. See Wheelabrator-Frye Inc. 1973 Ann. Rep. for Young People at 14 (de-
signed for children and using a pie chart distribution reading in this vein: "We mentioned
earlier that Wheelabrator-Frye received $256,000,000 from its sales to customers in 1973 . ..
Now let's see who was paid how much-and for what: . . ."); Arthur Andersen & Co. 1973
Ann. Rep. (designed for Andersen's partners and audit clients and using a similar although
less "pabulumatic" vocabulary). Is there a message in these reports serving the least and the
most sophisticated in nearly identical fashion?
36. The central problem of accounting has been just this for over 30 years. See G. MAY,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNING 86-117 (1943). See T. FiFus & H. KRusKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS
LAWYERS, ch. 7 (1971) describing the three prototype models now available: historical cost,
price-level, and fair market value.
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B. Independence of the Individual Auditor
In addition to the duties of skill and care common to most
callings, a unique attribute required of accountants, independence,
poses a second unresolved problem: GAAS establish a standard of
"independence in mental attitude" for auditors.37 Because public
confidence in auditors' independence is essential, not only actual
but also apparent independence is necessary. It is a question of fact
in each case38 and hence difficult to ascertain. Moreover, true inde-
37. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at §§ 150.02, 220; 2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. ET § 52
(1974).
38. The standard of the profession for independence is "whether reasonable men, hav-
ing knowledge of all the facts and taking into consideration normal strength of character and
normal behavior under the circumstances, would conclude that a specified relationship be-
tween a CPA and a client poses an unacceptable threat to the CPA's integrity or objectivity."
Code of Professional Ethics, 2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. ET § 52.09 (1974). The Rules of
Conduct for Independence are Rules 101 and 102:
Rule 101-Independence. A member or a firm of which he is a partner or shareholder
shall not express an opinion on financial statements of an enterprise unless he and his
firm are independent with respect to such enterprise. Independence will be considered
to be impaired if, for example:
A. During the period of his professional engagement, or at the time of express.
ing his opinion, he or his firm
1. Had or was committed to acquire any direct or material indirect
financial interest in the enterprise; or
2. Had any joint closely held business investment with the enterprise
or any officer, director or principal stockholder thereof which was ma-
terial in relation to his or his firm's net worth; or
3. Had any loan to or from the enterprise or any officer, director or
principal stockholder thereof. This latter proscription does not apply to
the following loans from a financial institution when made under normal
lending procedures, terms and requirements:
(a) Loans obtained by a member of his firm which are not mate-
rial in relation to the net worth of such borrower.
(b) Home mortgages.
(c) Other secured loans, except loans guaranteed by a member's
firm which are otherwise unsecured.
B. During the period covered by the financial statements, during the period
of the professional engagement or at the time of expressing an opinion, he or his
firm
1. Was connected with the enterprise as a promoter, underwriter or
voting trustee, a director or officer or in any capacity equivalent to that
of a member of management or of an employee; or
2. Was a trustee of any trust or executor or administrator of any estate
if such trust or estate had a direct or material indirect financial interest
in the enterprise; or was a trustee for any pension or profit-sharing trust
of the enterprise.
The above examples are not intended to be all-inclusive.
2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. ET § 101.01 (1974).
Rule 102-Integrity and Objectivity. A member shall not knowingly misrepresent
facts, and when engaged in the practice of public accounting, including the rendering
of tax and management advisory services, shall not subordinate his judgment to others.
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pendence, or at least an appearance of true independence, arguably
has never been achieved.
The profession recently has taken an important step in the
quest by making it an ethical violation for an AICPA member to
certify that financial statements are in conformity with GAAP if
they depart from official pronouncements of the "body designated
by Council" of the Institute9.3  This means that in those situations
In tax practice, a member may resolve doubt in favor of his client as long as there is
reasonable support for his position.
Id. ET § 102.01.
These rules have been supplemented by Ethics Opinions and Interpretations of Rules of
Conduct of the Institute's Ethics Division. See also SEC Accounting Series Release No. 47
(Jan. 25, 1944) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,065 (hereinafter the Commission's Accounting
Series Releases will not be cited to CCH because they appear in consecutive order there).
39. Rule 203 of the Rules of Conduct of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics (1973).
The full text of the rule reads:
Rule 203-Accounting principles. A member shall not express an opinion that financial
statements are presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles if
such statements contain any departure from an accounting principle promulgated by the
body designated by Council to establish such principles which has a material effect on
the statements taken as a whole, unless the member can demonstrate that due to unu-
sual circumstances the financial statements would otherwise have been misleading. In
such cases his report must describe the departure, the approximate effects thereof, if
practicable, and the reasons why compliance with the principle would result in a mis-
leading statement.
2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. ET § 203.01 (1974).
"In the spring of 1973, the Council of the Institute designated FASB as the body to establish
accounting principles pursuant to Rule 203. It also specified that Accounting Research Bulle-
tins and Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board adopted by the APB by June 30, 1973,
shall constitute accounting principles promulgated by a body designated by Council pursuant
to Rule 203 until they are superseded by action of the FASB." Carmichael & Rosenfield, The
Transition to the FASB and Rule 203, 136 J. OF AccouNTANcY, Sept. 1973, at 94. See Appendix
B and Interpretations of Rules of Conduct 203-1 and 203-2, 2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. ET
§§ 203.01-.02 (1974). Rule 203 represents an extremely important milestone in establishing
accounting principles although it falls short in two respects: (1) In the vast area of problems
not covered by FASB or APB Opinions or ARB's it has no effect; (2) it works indirectly by
imposing ethical obligations on members of the AICPA-thus not reaching issuers of state-
ments or even auditors who are non-members of the AICPA. The history of the AICPA's
efforts to provide sanctions for its pronouncements may be traced by reading: (a) Sprouse &
Vagts, The Accounting Principles Board and Differences and Inconsistencies in Accounting
Practice: An Interim Appraisal, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 706 (1965) (for history until mid-
1965); (b) APB Op. No. 6, App. A, 2 CCH AICPA APB ACCOUNTING PICciILEs 6531 (1965);
and (c) Carmichael & Rosenfield, supra. For a good history to November 1971, see Brief of
Arthur Andersen & Co., Before the Study Group on Establishment of Accounting Principles
of the AICPA, App. C (1971).
Kripke, prior to Rule 203, asserted that, "The ultimate sanction for the opinions of the
[APB] presently comes not from the Ethics Committee of the AICPA-but from the fact
that the SEC refuses to accept accounting statements that are not certified as being in accord
with [GAAP], and thus the SEC has made the [APB] its unofficial legislative arm."
Address by Homer Kripke, Conference on Institutional Issues Related to Formulating Report-
ing Standards, Northwestern Univ., Oct. 18-19, 1971, citing Kripke, Is Fair Value Accounting
the Solution?, 26 Bus. LAWYER 289 (1970). See also SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150
(Dec. 20, 1973).
Whether AICPA pronouncements establish standards for nonmembers of the AICPA is
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covered by formal pronouncements, unlike those not so covered,
management may nDt select the accounting principles to be followed
and get unqualified auditor's opinions unless they comport with the
formal statements. Prior to this rule, management could select from
among alternative principles even when formal pronouncements
were different, and the auditor had to approve if the principle had
any support."
Another procedural technique aimed at reinforcing indepen-
dence by way of providing additional incentive to auditors is the
stepped-up effort in the area of peer reviews."
In addition, recognizing the need for the force of law behind
some aspects of the independence issue, Congress in the securities
acts conferred power on the SEC to maximize independence and
rules have been adopted by the Commission to further this end.
42
Recently the Commission has begun a new attack on the inde-
pendence problem. The first salvo was an effort to diminish client
pressures on accountants by requiring disclosure in SEC filings of a
change in auditors and disagreements that could have or did require
mention in the auditor's report.43 In addition, as a matter of policy,
not clearly settled. But a few courts have in certain circumstances applied the AICPA stan-
dards as industry standards. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff,
Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Stanley L. Bloch, Inc. v. Klein, 45 Misc. 2d
1054, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
40. P. GRADY, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR BusINEss
ENTERPRISES, AICPA ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 7 at 47-54 (1965); cf. APB Op. No. 6,
App. A, 2 CCH AICPA APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 6531 (1965). See also Miller, Audited
Statements-Are They Really Managements'?, 118 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 1964, at 43.
41. Under 2 AICPA plans, one for local and the other for multiple office firms, a review
by a panel of auditors from other firms may be arranged, at the expense of the subject firm.
For descriptions see AICPA, SPECIAL CoMIrrE TO STUDY QUALITY REVIEW FOR MULI-OFFICE
FIRMs, PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF AICPA VOLUNTARY PROGRAM FOR REVIEWS OF QUALITY
CONTROL PROCEDURES OF MULTI-OFFICE Fnums (April 1974); Bruschi, The Institute's Local
Firm Quality Review Program, 137 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Mar. 1974, at 109.
The SEC by several consent orders has established peer review procedures. In re Loux,
Gose & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release No. 160 (Aug. 27, 1974); see Touche Ross & Co.,
SEC Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974).
42. The Commission has adopted disciplinary Rule 2e, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e), 4 CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 66,102 (1971), imposing sanctions for unethical conduct, and Rule 2-01 of Reg.
S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01, 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 69,122 (1972), to implement this power.
Rule 2-01 gives these examples of facts that spoil independence: direct financial interests or
material indirect financial interests in the client or connection with the client as a promoter,
underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer or employee. These examples have been fortified
by releases specifying actual situations where independence was lacking. Several ASR's and
administrative proceedings consider the issue of independence. For a partial list, see SEC
Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1972).
43. SEC Securities Act Release No. 9344 (Sept. 27, 1971); SEC Form 8-K, Item 12, 3
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 31,003 (1971). For a similar requirement for broker-dealers, see SEC
Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1972). A sampling of some 300 8-K forms in late 1971
turned up 13 changes of auditors and no indications of any disagreements. Wall Street J.,
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the Commission in conferences with clients generally has shored up
auditors' positions with their clients. Moreover, it has several times
recommended the use of audit committees of outside directors to
facilitate communication with the disinterested segments of the
board.44 Most recently additional disclosures were required in form
8K's, proxy statements and financials, regarding termination of old
auditors as well as engagement of new ones.45
Despite these efforts to enhance independence, major struc-
tural characteristics of the practice of accounting remain a road-
block to full independence. The substantial write-up work of many
small firms and the management and tax advisory services of larger
ones have been attacked as threats to independence." Both write-
up work and management advising, it is said, place the auditor in
a position of being part of management as well as having to assess
the results of his own work, which imposes pressure for a biased
report.
The economic self-interest of the accountant in preserving this
business so far has prevented the profession from prohibiting it.
Indeed, the AICPA Code of Ethics was painstakingly drafted to
legitimize expressly these activities. Yet, the divorce of auditing
from management advisory services A la the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933"1 remains a live suggestion for the enhancement of independ-
ence.
Other steps also remain available but have not yet been taken.
Apparently no one has suggested a return to anything like the origi-
nal practice in England under which shareholders were designated
as "auditors" and empowered to hire accountants at company ex-
pense to help in the audit. 9 Suggestions have been made for selec-
Feb. 7, 1972, at 9, col. 2. In one study, 250 auditor changes resulted in 14 reported disagree-
ments. Bedingfield & Loeb, Auditor Changes-An Examination, 137 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY,
Mar. 1974, at 66.
44. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1972); id. No. 123 (Mar. 23, 1972).
45. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 165 (Dec. 20, 1974); see Hawes, Stockholder
Appointment of Independent Auditors: A Proposal, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1974).
46. See 2 J. CAREY, THERISE op THE AccOUNTN PROFESSION 191-203 (1970) for a descrip-
tion. A student has suggested that the practice of many firms in placing ex-employees with
clients also hinders independence.
47. Rule 102, Code of Professional Ethics, 2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. ET § 102.01
(1974); Interpretations of Rules of Conduct, 2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. ET § 101.04 (1974).
In ASR No. 126, the Commission stated: (a) "Write-up work" for the client prevents inde-
pendence as does certain recordkeeping not involving preparation of the basic records but
including any on which the auditor's report will be based. (b) Systems design including
computer programming would not affect independence.
48. 12 U.S.C. § 24. That act required separation of investment banking from commer-
cial banking. Only the statute as originally enacted contains the effective date of the divorce-
ment. Ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 184-85.
49. A. LrrTLETON, AcCOUNTING EvoLUTION TO 1900, at 289 (1933, reissued 1966).
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tion of accountants by the SEC,Ms and selection of accounting princi-
ples by the auditor rather than management." The judge in one case
suggested that some procedure should be developed for permitting
a court, presumably on petition of the auditor or. some interested
person, to order the retention of an auditor under certain circum-
stances even after dismissal by management.
52
Despite all these other efforts and suggestions, perhaps the
greatest force for independence today is liability of accountants to
SEC administrative and injunctive actions and criminal sanctions
together with civil liability to private parties. This liability plus the
Simon rule, discussed below,5 3 requiring statements that comply
with GAAP also to pass a lay jury's test of whether they are mislead-
ing, appear to have had a great effect on the independence of audi-
tors.
C. Impartiality of the Profession
In addition to the problem of the personal independence of
accountants from corporate managements, a problem of institu-
tional dependence also exists. The erstwhile principle-making arm
of the AICPA, the Accounting Principles Board, and before it, the
Committee on Accounting Procedures, were staffed by practition-
ers-usually partners in the Big Eight firms. Frequently they were
the object of heavy pressures exerted by some of the large corporate
clients of their accounting firms as well as their own partners-with
the result that many accounting principles were more the result of
political pressure than of public discussion, research and reasoned
deliberation.54
50. Johnson, Management and Accounting Principles, 30 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 690,
701 (1965).
51. E.g., A. BRILOFF, THE EFFEcriv ss OF ACCOUNTIG COMMUNICATION, 55-85, 114-47
(1967); Kripke, Conglomerates and the Moment of Truth in Accounting, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
791, 792-94 (Spec. ed. 1970); Sterling, Accounting Power, 135 J. OF AccoUNTANcy, Jan. 1973,
at 61, 65-67.
52. Pacific Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v. Forsyth, [1970] 92 W.N. (N.S.W.) 29, 126 (Mof-
fitt, J.).
53. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), discussed at text accompanying
notes 138-44 infra.
54. See Brief of Arthur Andersen & Co., Before the Study Group on Establishment of
Accounting Principles of the AICPA (1971). The Committee on Accounting Procedure issued
51 Accounting Research Bulletins and 4 Accounting Terminology Bulletins from 1939 until
its termination in 1959. These were non-binding and merely advisory in nature. They were
poorly drafted, unsupported by significant research or public discussion, not guided by
agreed-upon fundamental criteria, and generally avoided controversial problems. The Com-
mittee was replaced by the Accounting Principles Board which issued 31 Opinions and 4
Statements through 1973. The Board did establish a research program to form a basis for its
opinions, and to date 15 Accounting Research Studies have been published. However, little
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Recognizing this institutional dependency, the defects in exist-
ing procedures, inadequate research and non-existent public input,
and aware of the most logical cure-establishment of accounting
principles by some governmental agency-accountants recently
have made what most of them concede to be their last ditch effort
to keep this principle-making power from the governmental sector.
The founding of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
was a desperate attempt to keep government out as well as to form
a centralized authority free of untoward influences.
The FASB was established in 1972 pursuant to the recommen-
dation of the AICPA Study Group on Establishment of Accounting
Principles chaired by Francis M. Wheat. 5 It is composed of seven
members appointed for staggered, five year terms. To assure inde-
pendence, members must cease all other existing employment and
are paid a handsome salary, currently about 100,000 dollars per
annum.
The members of the Board are appointed by the Trustees of the
Financial Accounting Foundation, an independent corporation.
Eight of the nine trustees of the Foundation are elected by the Board
of Directors of the AICPA and the ninth is the senior elected officer
of the Institute. In addition to the Board, the Trustees nominate
members to an advisory body, named the Financial Accounting
Standards Advisory Council, who function strictly as advisers to the
FASB.
Under its published Rules of Procedure, sound research and
wide public participation in establishing standards is assured by the
FASB's process of research, public hearings, and exposure for com-
ment of draft statements. The FASB probably has power under the
broad wording of its mandate to fix auditing standards" but the
general understanding is that it is to deal exclusively with account-
ing principles.
After a slow start resulting in its first pronouncement in Decem-
ber 1973, 51 the Board tackled several major issues including report-
effort was made to obtain public input. At the October 1964 meeting of the Council of the
Institute,.a statement was adopted which provided that material departures from Opinions
of the APB must be disclosed in footnotes or in the auditor's report. See APB Op. No. 6, App.
A, 2 CCH AICPA APB AcCOUNTNo PmNCIPLES 6531 (1965).
It was not until the last year of the APB that the Code of Professional Ethics Rule 203
was adopted compelling observance of formal statements of a body "designated by Council."
2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. ET § 203.01 (1974).
55. See FASB, RULES OF PROCEDURE (1973); FINANCrL ACCOUNTING FOUNDATMN, CERTIFI-
CATE OF INCORPORATIoN/BY-LAws (1973) which form the major bases for the immediate discus-
sion.
56. See FINANCIL ACCOUNTIo FOUNDTMION, supra note 55 at 1, 3.
57. FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 1, Disclosure of Foreign
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ing effects of general price level changes and accounting for intangi-
bles. With only three published statements in nearly two years and
the largest crisis in accounting history overhanging the profession,
the deliberate speed of the FASB has been criticised.8 The AICPA,
through its Ethics Rule 203 and its Council's designation of the
FASB as the principle-making body,59 the SEC and the New York
Stock Exchange,6 ' however, have given their full endorsement to the
FASB. Success seems likely, especially since no other program, in-
cluding one that would involve a governmental agency as the pri-
mary principle-making body, seems attractive or feasible.
One aspect of the constitution of the Board bears comment.
Perhaps more nonaccountants should be on the Board. Recognizing
that accountants will consider others to be amateurs in the field to
which accountants have devoted their careers, nevertheless it is not
remiss to suggest that many of the problems of the Board are not
professional accounting problems. Many are legal and drafting
problems. Anyone studying the old pronouncements of the Commit-
tee on Accounting Procedure (ARB's) and Accounting Principles
Board (APB) Opinions will find many of them to be quite wanting
in analysis and draftsmanship.62 More importantly many of the
problems of accounting are problems in developing processes for the
resolution of problems rather than rules to solve particular prob-
lems. For example, the problem of independence is similar to
lawyer-type problems involving fiduciaries. Further, such matters
as the purchase or pooling battle involve problems of establishing
Currency Translation Information, 3 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. AC § 7001 (1973); No. 2,
Accounting for Research and Development Costs (1974); No. 3, Reporting Accounting
Changes in Interim Financial Statements (1974).
For a brief history of the AICPA's struggle to achieve independence of its principles-
setting body, see Brief of Arthur Andersen & Co., Before the Study Group on Establishment
of Accounting Principles of the AICPA, App. C (1971); D. CAUSEY, Durms AND LIA~xr OF
THE CPA 19-22 (1973). For the fuller story, see S. ZEFF, FORGING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES IN
FIVE CouNTRIEs: A HISTORY AND AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS 110-268 (1971).
58. See Anreder, By the Numbers? The Financial Accounting Standards Board Goes
to Work, Barron's, Nov. 18, 1974, at 3.
59. Since the AICPA no longer looks to its own committees to make principles, it has
appointed a committee to study principles and make its position known to the FASB. See
136 J. OF AccOUNTANcY, Dec. 1973, at 12.
60. The Commission in SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973) stated
that for purposes of its longstanding policy of considering accounting practices, without
substantial authoritative support to be misleading, promulgations of the FASB in both its
Statements and Interpretations would be considered as having substantial authoritative sup-
port and those contrary would be considered not to have such support.
61. NYSE, WHIr PAPER, RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS ON FINANCIAL REPORTING TO
SHAREHOLDERS AND RELATED MATrERS 4-5 (1973).
62. For an illustration, analyzing ARB 45, pointing out the defects of ARB 45, see
Herwitz, Accounting for Long-Term Construction Contracts: A Lawyer's Approach, 70 HARv.
L. REV. 449 (1957).
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standards for the exercise of judgment by the auditor-this is a
lawyer's work ground. Moreover, lawyers are trained to cope with
new and unusual situations and frequently can bring unique talent
to the Board. Accountants' prejudices concerning lawyers, and vice
versa, should not be allowed to prevent maximum utility of the
FASB by limiting its membership.
III. THE Locus OF INITIAL JURISDICTION TO ESTABLISH AUDITING
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES: MANAGE-
MENT, THE PROFESSION, OR THE SEC?
The FASB is now, and the APB was formerly, the primary
principle-making body of the profession. But does the profession
have the exclusive or the final power over accounting principles?
And, who has power over auditing standards?
A. Auditing Standards and Procedures.
After the 1929 crash, the securities industry and the govern-
ment quickly surmised that investor confidence in business must be
restored, and that the best means for doing this was to require fuller
financial disclosure. The preliminary drafts of the federal Securities
Act of 1933 established the requirement that registration statements
be filed (originally with the Federal Trade Commission, and, since
1934, with the then newly established Securities and Exchange
Commission) and that a prospectus be delivered to securities pur-
chasers. 3 At first it was not contemplated that financial statements
be independently audited unless a special investigation was re-
quested by the FTC. Some consideration was given to audits by
government officials but this was rejected after the profession im-
pressed upon the drafting committee the desirability and the
greater benefits of private sector audits. The result was Section
19(a) of the 1933 Act and paragraphs (25), (26) and (27) of Schedule
A thereto."
63. See generally 1 J. CAREY, supra note 11 at 181-92 (1969).
64. "(a) The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and
rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
subchapter, including rules and regulations governing registration statements and prospec-
tuses for various classes of securities and issuers, and defining accounting, technical, and
trade terms used in this subchapter. Among other things, the Commission shall have author-
ity, for the purposes of this subchapter, to prescribe the form or forms in which required
information shall be set forth, the items or details to be shown in the balance sheet and
earning statement, and the methods to be followed in the preparation of accounts, in the
appraisal or valuation of assets and liabilities, in the determination of depreciation and
depletion, in the differentiation of recurring and nonrecurring income, in the differentiation
of investment and operating income, and in the preparation, where the Commission deems
it necessary or desirable, of consolidated balance sheets or income accounts of any person
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In the course of the hearings Senator Gore astutely noted that
the 1929 debacle occurred despite the fact that 85% of stock ex-
directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or
indirect common control with the issuer; but insofar as they relate to any common carrier
subject to the provisions of section 20 of Title 49, the rules and regulations of the Commission
with respect to accounts shall not be inconsistent with the requirements imposed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission under authority of such section. The rules and Regulations
of the Commission shall be effective upon publication in the manner which the Commission
shall prescribe. No provision of this subehapter imposing any liability shall apply to any act
done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation of the Commission,
notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may, after such act or omission, be amended or
rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason."
Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970).
Schedule of information required in registration statement.
"(25) a balance sheet as of a date not more than ninety days prior to the date of the
filing of the registration statement showing all of the assets of the issuer, the nature and cost
thereof, whenever determinable, in such detail and in such form as the Commission shall
prescribe (with intangible items segregated), including any loan in excess of $20,000 to any
officer, director, stockholder or person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the
issuer, or person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer. All the liabilities
of the issuer in such detail and such form as the Commission shall prescribe, including surplus
of the issuer showing how and from what sources such surplus was created, all as of a date
not more than ninety days prior to the filing of the registration statement. If such statement
be not certified by an independent public or certified accountant, in addition to the balance
sheet required to be submitted under this schedule, a similar detailed balance sheet of the
assets and liabilities of the issuer, certified by an independent public or certified accountant,
of a date not more than one year prior to the filing of the registration statement, shall be
submitted;
"(26) a profit and loss statement of the issuer showing earnings and income, the nature
and source thereof, and the expenses and fixed charges in such detail and such form as the
Commission shall prescribe for the latest fiscal year for which such statement is available and
for the two preceding fiscal years, year by year, or, if such issuer has been in actual business
for less than three years, then for such times as the issuer has been in actual business, year
by year. If the date of the filing of the registration statement is more than six months after
the close of the last fiscal year, a statement from such closing date to the latest practicable
date. Such statement shall show what the practice of the issuer has been during the three
years or lesser period as to the character of the charges, dividends or other distributions made
against its various surplus accounts, and as to depreciation, depletion, and maintenance
charges, in such detail and form as the Commission shall prescribe, and if stock dividends or
avails from the sale or rights have been credited to income, they shall be shown separately
with a statement of the basis upon which the credit is computed. Such statement shall also
differentiate between any recurring and nonrecurring income and between any investment
and operating income. Such statement shall be certified by an independent public or certified
accountant;
"(27) If the proceeds, or any part of the proceeds, of the security to be issued is to be
applied directly or indirectly to the purchase of any business, a profit and loss statement of
such business certified by an independent public or certified accountant, meeting the require-
ments of paragraph (26) of this schedule, for the three preceding fiscal years, together with a
balance sheet, similarly certified, of such business, meeting the requirements of paragraph
(25) of this schedule of a date not more than ninety days prior to the filing of the registration
statement or at the date such business was acquired by the issuer if the business was acquired
by the issuer more than ninety days prior to the filing of the registration statement. .. .
Securities Act of 1933, Schedule A, T 25-27, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (25)-(27) (1970). Subsequent
statutes contain varying formulations generally not increasing greatly the 1933 Act authority.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 3(b), 12(b)(1)(J)-(L), 13(b), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§
78c(b), 781(b)(1)(J)-(L), 78m(b), 78q(a) (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
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change listed companies had been audited. 5 Apparently not willing
to rely on the probabilities of a mending of the ways of companies
and their advisers, Congress enacted the express civil, administra-
tive and criminal liability provisions of sections 11, 12, 15, 17, 20 and
24 of the 1933 Act,6 imposing substantial liability for misleading
statements.
The following year saw the adoption of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193467 with its requirements of company registration, periodic
reporting and proxy regulation giving additional impetus to the es-
tablishment of the central importance of financial disclosure. Soon
after these enactments, a remarkable incident in American business
history occurred and caused a great change in the techniques of
establishing audit standards and procedures. The AICPA had par-
ticipated with the Federal Reserve Board as early as 1917 in devel-
oping rudimentary audit standards"8 and by 1936 had issued a third
version, this time under its own auspices."9 The Institute by then
had come to be spokesman of the profession. As was customary with
its pronouncements whenever disagreement occurred, the Institute
in the 1936 statement took an ambivalent position on two important
auditing problems that divided the profession-the need for inde-
pendent verification of inventories and external confirmation of re-
ceivables with the firm's debtors.
The equivocal statement enabled one Philip Musica, a twice-
convicted confidence man, who rose to the presidency of McKesson
& Robbins, Inc., to falsify the statements of that company to the
tune of about 20 million dollars, about half being overstated ac-
counts receivable and the rest, fictitious inventories. Musica and his
henchmen pretended to order goods from vendors who supposedly
retained the goods in storage in their own warehouses for shipment
to customers of McKesson & Robbins. Musica then caused checks
to be issued in the names of the vendors, intercepted them and used
the proceeds to make partial payments to McKesson & Robbins on
resales pretended to have been made for the company. About 2.8
million dollars remained glued to the Musica gang's fingers. The
result was that inventories as well as receivables were fictitious. The
accountants failed to confirm the receivables or take any physical
§§ 5(b)(2)(H)-(I), 14, 15, 20(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79e(b)(2)(H)-(I), 79n, 79o, 79t(a) (1970); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 § 319(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77sss(a) (1970); Investment Company Act of 1940
§§ 30(e), 31(c), 38(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-29(e), 80a-30(c), 80a-37(a) (1970).
65. See extract from Senate Committee Hearings at 1 J. CAREY, supra note 11, at 188.
66. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 15, 17, 20, 24, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o, 77q, 77t,
77x (1970).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970).
68. SAS No. 1, App.'A., supra note 20, at 2061; 1 J. CAREY, supra note 11, at 132.
69. SAS No. 1, App. A., supra note 20, at 2061; 2 J. CAREY, supra note 11, at 20-21.
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views of the inventories and hence failed to detect the wrongs. 70
The enormity of the fraud spurred the accounting profession,
through the American In~titute Committee on Auditing Procedures,
to begin in early 1939 to put its auditing in order by publishing the
first of over fifty Statements on Auditing Procedures. 71 The first one
required that thereafter inventories be actually observed and that
the amoint of receivables be confirmed with the debtors.
The SEC, in the meantime, not happy with its impression of
the low standards followed in the McKesson & Robbins audit, con-
ducted an extensive investigation culminating in Accounting Series
Release (ASR) 19, issued in 1940.
ASR 19 concluded:
We have carefully considered the desirability of specific rules and regula-
tions governing the auditing steps to be performed by accountants in certifying
financial statements to be filed with us. Action has already been taken by the
accounting profession adopting certain of the auditing procedures considered
in this case. We have no reason to believe at this time that these extensions
will not be maintained or that further extensions of auditing procedures along
the lines suggested in this report will not be made. Further, the adoption of
the specific recommendations made in this report as to the type of disclosure
to be made in the accountant's certificate and as to the election of accountants
by stockholders should insure that acceptable standards of auditing procedure
will be observed, that specific deviations therefrom may be considered in the
particular instances in which they arise, and that accountants will be more
independent of management. Until experience should prove the contrary, we
feel that this program is preferable to its alternative-the detailed prescription
of the scope of and procedures to be followed in the audit for the various types
of issuers of securities who file statements with us-and will allow for further
consideration of varying audit procedures and for the development of different
treatment for specific types of issuers.
Thus in the first important battle involving auditing standards
and procedures, the Institute acted prior to the conclusion of the
SEC's investigation to obviate the specific problems of auditing for
receivables and inventories. Prodded by the Commission, the
AICPA began issuing general standards and continued to consider
and publish procedures for auditing. Similar post-calamity reform
occurred in connection with the development of auditing standards
for goods held in public warehouses after the Salad Oil scandal.72
Similarly, the Institute now is in the process of developing auditing
standards to remedy the Equity Funding-type failures. 73
Regardless of whether the seat of power to fix "auditing stan-
dards" is in the profession or the SEC, a question deferred for con-
70. See D. CAuszy, DuEs AND LL aIIrms oF TH CPA 14-17 (1973).
71. 1 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. App. A., at 2063 (1974).
72. SAS No. 1, supra note 20 at AU § 901. See N. MtLmi, THE GREAT SALAD OIL
SWINDLE (1965).
73. See note 193 infra.
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sideration shortly, the bulk of the determinations of auditing stan-
dards and procedures, as in the McKesson & Robbins case, has been
by the AICPA. At any rate, unlike accounting principles, no one




In one major area of auditing standards, however, as we have
seen, that of "independence," the Commission has not been hesi-
tant to establish its own views. 75 Occasionally it has fixed other
auditing standards. For example, it has developed detailed audit
rules for national securities exchanges, brokers and dealers,"0 and
investment companies.7 7 It also has provided standards concerning
opening inventories on new audit engagements78 and review of the
work of subordinates of the auditing firm.79 As in McKesson & Rob-
bins, inventory verification was required in another case on facts
arising before the profession adopted its standards but decided
thereafter."0 In addition, certain requirements for the auditor's re-
port are spelled out in SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 202.81
Although some doubt has been expressed," the express terms
of the securities statutes probably confer adequate authority to per-
mit the Commission to establish auditing standards. Certainly the
audit standard of "independence" is within the Commission's 1933
Act authority because paragraphs (25), (26) and (27) of Schedule A
of the Act prescribe certification by "independent" public accoun-
tants and section 19(a) s expressly authorizes definition of account-
ing terms used in the Act. As to other audit standards and proce-
dures, the express authority to define accounting terms and pre-
scribe methods to be followed in preparation of accounts is clearly
a nonexclusive description of the Commission's powers: section
74. Of course governmentally regulated companies are subject to specific auditing regu-
lations established by specific legislation. Also, it is understood that our discussion of SEC
power over auditing relates only to financial statements subject to SEC regulation.
75. See text accompany notes 38-54 supra.
76. See SEC Form X-17A-5, 17 C.F.R. § 249.617 (1974), 3 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
33,921-38 (1974).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-1 (1974) (concerning securities held by investment companies);
SEC Accounting Series Release Nos. 113 & 118 (Oct. 21, 1969).
78. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 90 (Mar 1, 1962).
79. Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc. 4 S.E.C. 706 (1939).
80. Illinois Zinc Co., 6 S.E.C. 850 (1940).
81. SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02 (1974).
82. E.g., Burton, The SEC and the Accounting Profession: Responsibility, Authority
and Progress, in INSTrrtUnONAL ISSUES IN PuBLic AcCOUNTING, 265-71 (R. Sterling ed. 1974);
Liggio, Expanding Concepts of Accountant's Liability, CALM. CPA Q. 18, 20 (Sept. 1974);
Isbell, An Overview of Accountants' Duties and Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Laws
and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing, 35 Omo ST. L.J. 261, 268-69 (1974).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970).
[Vol. 28
A CCOUNTANTS RESPONSIBILITIES
19(a) expressly authorizes "such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter," and then
uses the draftsman's special words for denoting nonexclusiveness
"including . . . defining accounting . . . terms" and "[almong
other things" prescription of "methods to be followed in the prepa-
ration of accounts."
84
A court should have no difficulty in construing the "necessary"
clause to include the authority to regulate audits given the Supreme
Court's repeated admonitions that the securities acts are to be con-
strued liberally. 5 Furthermore financial statements are "accounts"
in common parlance and "preparation" arguably may include au-
dits without doing violence to the ordinary meaning of the word.
Thus, the power to prescribe auditing "methods" would include
procedures and probably standards for those procedures.
The other cited provisions of the securities statutes would seem
to be equally susceptible to this construction. For example, § 17(a)
of the 1934 Act, compelling broker-dealers, securities exchanges and
associations to keep such accounts and make such reports as the
Commission may prescribe "as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors"" was not even ques-
tioned as a sufficient basis for establishing specific audit procedures
concerning internal controls in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst."7
Despite this overwhelming basis for jurisdiction to regulate
auditing, counsel for the AICPA insists that the Commission has no
general authority over auditing standards and procedures. 8 This
position is somewhat distressing inasmuch as it was most recently
published during an interesting set of occurrences in connection
with the drafting of the ALI Federal Securities Code § 1503(a),89
which purports to deal with this subject matter. Because all activi-
ties in drafting the Code prior to publication of Tentative Drafts are
expressly made -confidential, it would be inappropriate to detail the
full history even if it were known. 0 Suffice it to say that § 1503(a)
states:
84. Id. (Emphasis added). Section 13(b) of the 1934 Act uses the word "reports" instead
of "accounts," 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1970).
85. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent of Insur-
ance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 386 (1970); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970).
87. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
88. See Isbell, An Overview of Accountants' Duties and Liabilities Under the Federal
Securities Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHO ST. L.J. 261, 269 at n.46
(1974).
89. ALI FED. SEcuRrTmS CODE § 1503(a) (Tent. Draft No. 3 1974).
90. See my remarks and those of Professor Loss in discussion of § 1503 in Proceedings,
ALI 51st Ann. Meeting (May 24, 1974) (yet to be published).
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Sec. 1503. [Accounting and records.] (a) [Rule-making authority.] For
purposes of this Code and in addition to its authority under section 1502, the
Commission, by rule, may (1) define accounting terms, (2) prescribe the form
and content of financial statements and the accounting principles and
standards used in their preparation, (3) require the examination of and report-
ing on financial statements by independent public accountants, (4) establish
standards of independence for public accountants insofar as they practice
before it, and (5) prescribe the form and content of the independent public
accountant's report.
Section 1502, referred to in section 1503, permits the Commis-
sion to "adopt . rules and orders to implement specific provi-
sions of' the Code and perhaps therefore carries full power to regu-
late audits under any of the provisions calling for audited financial
statements. Section 1503 expressly authorizes establishing
standards of independence and the form and content of the accoun-
tant's report and only arguably would authorize audit supervision
by the Commission. Moreover, the reporter's note mysteriously
states:
This draft of § 1503 is advanced on the assumption (1) that nothing in it
is designed to subtract from the authority (express or implied) that the Com-
mission already has under all the source provisions, or to change the basic
relationship between the Commission.and the accounting profession, and (2)
that § 1503(a) necessarily subsumes a degree of authority with respect to the
scope (or standards) of, and the procedures to be followed in, audit examina-
tions.
One can only speculate about why all this ink need be spilled
and the risk of uncertainty be endured when the addition of one
more line to § 1503(a) could obviate the problem. Why not add: "(6)
prescribe auditing standards and procedures"?
When the SEC's authority is not applicable it, of course, does
not have authority to regulate audits although its determinations
may provide authoritative support by analogy or otherwise. Thus in
most audits for other than SEC purposes, the profession retains the
primary power to fix standards, although presumably other admin-
istrative agencies will have the power in certain cases.
B. Accounting Principles
The power of the Commission to prescribe accounting princi-
ples, as opposed to auditing standards and procedures, is based on
the same statutory sections, but seems unquestioned." And section
1503 of the proposed ALI Code also is clear in authorizing the Com-
mission to prescribe "accounting principles."
Although the Commission has been less reticent in establishing




accounting principles than it has been for auditing matters, it has
never exerted its full power but instead has deferred to the profes-
sion in most cases.92 For the first dozen years of its existence the
Commission played a relatively active role in developing accounting
principles, both through publication of its Accounting Series Re-
leases and formal administrative proceedings. 3 Then quiescence set
in for over two decades until the outbreak of scandals in the late
'60's. Since 1969 the Commission has issued a torrent of ASR's,
many of which deal with accounting principles.94 Most of these re-
cent developments have dealt with the quality of earnings re-
ported. 5
A further example of the Commission's interest in quality of
earnings is contained in its proposals providing for disclosure of
accounting policies." The release proposes, among other things, to
require disclosure of the impact on earnings caused by choosing one
of two alternative accounting principles. Thus, if under an
installment method income is 2,000 dollars, whereas under ordinary
accrual accounting it would be 10,000 dollars, whichever method is
chosen, disclosure in a footnote or otherwise of the other figure will
be necessary. Another illustration of the SEC's active interest in the
quality of earnings was provided in a recent suit against Avis, Inc.
In that case the Commission complained that "Avis omitted to
disclose . . . the material fact that a substantial part of. . . earn-
ings . . . , approximately seventy percent . . . before taxes ... ,
were realized from sales of vehicles in the first quarter of 1973, and
that only. . . approximately thirty percent. . . were realized from
car rental, leasing and other operations."9
92. For discussions of the relationship of the SEC and the AICPA, see Burton, The SEC
and the Accounting Profession: Responsibility, Authority and Progress, in INSTrrUTmONAL Is-
SUES IN PuBLic ACCOUNTNG 265 (R. Sterling ed. 1974); Lamden, Response at id. 276; id. 281;
Armstrong, Will Washington Listen to the Private Sector? FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE Mar. 1974,
at 52; Pines, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Accounting Principles, 30 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 727 (1965); Kripke, The S.E.C., TheAccountants, Some Myths and Some
Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1151, 1176-86 (1970); Horngren, Accounting Principles: Private
or Public Sector, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, May 1972, at 37.
93. For a good description of the SEC's principle-making activity, see Pines, The Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission and Accounting Principles, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 727
(1965).
94. SEC Accounting Series Release Nos. 1-116 were issued through 1970. In 1971, Nos.
117-122 were issued; in 1972, Nos. 123-133; in 1973, Nos. 134-150; in 1974, Nos. 151-166.
95. E.g., Nos. 150, 151, 153, 162, 166.
96. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5427 (Oct. 4, 1973).
97. SEC v. Avis, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10672 (Mar. 7, 1974)
(No. 74-1065, S.D.N.Y. 1974); BNA Sac. REo. & L. REP. No. 243 at A-14 (1974). See also SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5520 (Aug. 12, 1974) (requiring interpretation and evaluation of
earnings summaries by management).
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The Commission's previous long period of hibernation during
which the AICPA pressed forward vigorously, first with pronounce-
ments of the Committee on Accounting Procedure (ARB's) and then
Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board (APB's), and finally
by establishing the independent Financial Accounting Standards
Board, gave a mindset to the profession from which it came to be
quite jealous of its function of establishing accounting principles.
An illustration of this attitude recently was evidenced in the ever-
bubbling "purchase or pooling" area. 8
It previously had been suggested that unlike the lawmaking
powers of stock exchanges and securities dealers associations, which
the SEC was, by statute, expressly authorized to establish," nothing
in the federal securities acts expressly contemplated that the Com-
mission should delegate such power to any professional association
of accountants.' 0 Hence, it was contended, if accounting principles
of the AICPA were to be adopted by the Commission, that must be
done by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of
the Administrative Procedure Act"0' requiring the observance of for-
mal rule-making procedures. 2 The Commission had never done
that; instead, it simply followed the AICPA pronouncements.
After the lid was precariously placed on the purchase or pooling
imbroglio in 1970 by the AICPA's Accounting Principles Board
Opinions No. 16 and 17,103 the SEC became uneasy about the loose
construction put on one part of Opinion 16 in filings with the Com-
mission. In that Opinion the APB, in establishing guidelines for
choosing between accounting on a purchase or a pooling basis for a
business combination through stock issuances, stated that if the
transaction was a true pooling of the interests of two entities, neither
company should change its book values. But, if the combination was
in reality an acquisition of one company by the other, it should be
treated as a purchase, with the acquired company's assets coming
on the books of the acquiring company at the purchase price. A
pooling involved a continuity of interest of the equity owners of both
firms while a purchase basically was a discontinuance of the interest
of the owners of the acquired firm.
In a publicly traded company, if shares are acquired by the
98. The FASB has announced it will reconsider the subject matter of business combina-
tions and related intangibles so called "purchase or pooling" accounting, the subject matter
of APB Op's. 16 and 17. FASB, status Report No. 10, p.2 (2-28-74).
99. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 6, 15A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 0-3 (1970).
100. Cf. T. Fnus & H. KRPKE, AccoUMNT FOR BusmEss LAwymS 596 (1971).
101. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
102. Cf. T. Fnus & H. KRipKE, supra note 100, at 597.
103. AICPA, APB Op. Nos. 16 & 17 (1970).
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corporation, eliminating certain shareholders, and then those treas-
ury shares are reissued to shareholders of another firm in a business
combination, the overall effect is a discontinuance of interest of the
former owners of the treasury shares. An AICPA interpretation of
Opinion 16 says that in these circumstances a presumption arises
that the transaction was a purchase not a pooling."4 As always,
pressures for pooling frequently caused the presumption to be
ignored. The Commission, in an effort to make the presumption
effective, issued ASR 146,15 which supplemented the two AICPA
pronouncements by covering additional details.
Arthur Andersen & Co., viewing the Commission's release as an
incursion on the profession's law-making power, filed a suit to enjoin
enforcement of the SEC's claimed interpretive release on the basis
that it in fact was a rule made without complying with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act notice and hearing provisions and that it was
an unconstitutional ex post facto rule."0 8 The Commission sus-
pended its release, 117 heard public comments and then reissued the
release with minor supplements to apply prospectively, in effect
overcoming both objections. 0 Andersen then apparently dropped
its suit.
Perhaps it became apparent to Andersen's attorneys in the
course of these proceedings that if the SEC must follow the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act in making its own statements on purchase
or pooling accounting, simple logic would require the same proce-
dure when the Commission adopted the AICPA's pronouncements
through a process of incorporation by reference. If this were re-
quired, the profession would end up with less influence than it now
has, since despite the SEC's de jure power to make accounting
principles, the de facto exercise is usually by the AICPA. 1°0
Although the profession considers that it has the power to es-
tablish GAAP at least when the SEC has not spoken, and has exer-
cised that power in quite limited areas through its Accounting Prin-
ciples Board Opinions and its Accounting Research Bulletins and
Financial Accounting Standards Board statements, most of the
thousands of accounting principles applied in practice have not
104. AICPA, Accounting Interpretation No. 20, 3 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. AC § U
1091.067 (1974).
105. SEC Accounting Series Release 146 (Aug. 24, 1973).
106. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. SEC, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 94, 147 (D.D.C. 1973).
107. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5429 (Oct. 5, 1973).
108. SEC Accounting Series Release 146A (April 11, 1974).
109. An earlier court battle evidencing the views of several erstwhile high SEC officials
as to who has actually made most accounting principles-the AICPA-is described in T.
FiFus & H. KEiPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BusINEsS LAwYERs 489-91 (1971).
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been the subject of these formal statements. Who has the power to
make GAAP in these cases in which neither the SEC nor the profes-
sion has acted?
In addressing these situations, accountants are fond of litaniz-
ing that the financial statements are those of management and that
the auditor's duty is to report on the. statements, among other
things, indicating whether they comport with GAAP."0 The result
of this position is that when the SEC or the profession have not
issued a statement of principle, it is not the individual auditor who
determines what principles are applied; it is the management of the
audited firm that selects them.
The power that the individual auditor does have with respect
to the use of management's principles is to state his opinion whether
the financial statements are presented fairly in conformity with
GAAP. Despite the fact that even prior to enactment of the federal
securities laws, accountants and securities lawyers were well aware
of the abuses of trust by auditors in accepting statements that ap-
plied principles most favorable to management by minimizing the
natural meaning of the words "present fairly," ' the effect of the
fairness requirement has never been settled by the profession. In
fact lawyers for the profession finally came to articulate the view
that those words are nearly meaningless and that the only require-
ments were that the accounting principles used be generally ac-
cepted and that accountants consider them fair."'
Fortunately, the courts were able to see clearly through that
absurdity in the Continental Vending case, United States v. Simon,
described below.13 We will see that there has been a 180 degree turn
to a state in which fairness is all-important and general acceptance
is taken for granted as a minimal requirement.
IV. AcCOUNTING AND AUDITING STANDARDS IN THE COURTS
A. Potential Sanctions
Private damage actions, remarkable for the large size of judg-
ments or settlements, are not the only basis for the profession's
current trepidation. Criminal convictions have been obtained in the
Continental Vending 14 and National Student Marketing"5 situa-
110. See SAS No. 1, § 110.02 (1973).
111. See 10 SEC ANN. REP. 13-14 (1944).
112. See brief amicus curiae of AICPA in United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1969).
113. See text accompanying notes 137-74 infra.
114. See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
115. SEC Litigation Release 6599, 5 SEC DocKET 586 (Nov. 22, 1974).
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tions, both of which involved activity in which the auditors did not
appear to go far beyond mere negligence."'
Suits for injunctions also have been brought by the Commis-
sion." 7 Although Judge Moore, dissenting in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 8
pointed out the severe effects of injunctions, the mentality of SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. "I has prevailed, to the effect
that an injunction is nothing more than a slap on the wrist. Judging
by the large number of consent decrees being entered, 20 counsel for
some defendants may be taking inadequate notice of these effects.
A battle is being waged now to point up the dangers. 2' These in-
clude: use in subsequent private damage actions; 22 civil and crimi-
nal contempt exposure; 1933 Act disqualifications to participate in
Regulation A offerings and Rule 2(e) exposure to disbarment from
SEC practice.
23
In addition to criminal and injunctive proceedings, "Rule 2(e)
proceedings" to enforce standards of practice before the Commis-
sion have been used effectively to supervise accounting and audit-
ing. 2 4 Other administrative proceedings against clients may affect
the auditors.
One aspect of recent administrative orders and consent decrees
116. See also United States v. Goldblum, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,700 (The Equity Funding case); Wall Street J. 32, cols. 1-6 (Jan. 8, 1975)
(describing opening of trial); United States v. Clark, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93,745 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (The Four Seasons Case; acquittal of one partner and
employee of auditing firm and hung jury on another partner); Note, Federal Criminal and
Administrative Controls for Auditors: The Need for a Consistent Standard, 1969 WASH.
U.L.Q. 187.
For a survey see SEC Enforcement rechniques, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 237 at B-
1 Jan. 30, 1974.
117. E.g., SEC v. Liberty Equities Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 92,745 (D.D.C. 1970); SEC v. Nat'l. Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C.
1972); SEC v. Geo. Tek. Resources Fund, Inc., BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 204 at A-3 (N.D.
Cal. 1973); SEC v. Talley Indus. Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,198
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No.243 at
A-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
118. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 870 (2d Cir. 1968) (dissenting
opinion).
119. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
120. See Address by Matthews, Liability of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws,
at ABA National Institute on Advisors to Management, Responsibilities and Liabilities of
Lawyers and Accountants, in New York, Oct. 3-5, 1974.
121. Id.; BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 266 at A-8 (Aug. 21, 1974).
122. 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
123. Matthews, supra note 120.
124. See Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, SEC Accounting Series Release
No. 144 (May 23, 1973); Touche Ross & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb.
25, 1974) [formal institution of Rule 2(e) proceedings waived]; In re Loux, Gose & Co., SEC
Accounting Series Release No. 160 (Aug. 27, 1974). See also SEC Accounting Series Release
No. 59 (Jan. 23, 1947); 68 (July 5, 1949); 73 (Oct. 30, 1952); 78 (Mar. 25, 1957).
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that seems worthy of comment is the inordinate intrusion of govern-
ment into professional activity which they portend. For example, in
one case involving attorneys, not only was illegal activity enjoined,
but also a process for assuring compliance was developed which
included an agreement to:
(1) meet as a firm every two weeks to discuss the firm's active
cases and obtain approval of all partners before any opinions are
issued;
(2) investigate bond offerings to assure independent auditors
are used and to check background of participants;
(3) use an appropriate "engagement letter" emphasizing the
law firm's duty to the bondholders;
(4) have partners and associates, at least annually, attend con-
tinuing education workshops and seminars.
1 5
As to issuers of securities, a similar intrustion is illustrated by
SEC v. Mattel, Inc."' in which an amended decree required ap-
pointment of a majority of disinterested directors and establishment
of an audit committee of the board and a litigation committee, all
composed of members satisfactory to the SEC. In SEC v. Canadian
Javelin Ltd.'27 forty percent of the board was required to be
outsiders satisfactory to the Commission and special counsel was
required, among other things, to pursue rights under Canadian law.
Similarly, accountants have recently been subjected to peer review
procedures by virtue of the settlement of Rule 2(e) proceedings."8
This agency governance of issuers, their accountants and their
lawyers, whatever its constitutional infirmities, seems like too much
candy for a nickel and may give indigestion to the Commission if
too large an accumulation occurs. It also would seem likely to bog
down the various firms in bureaucratic controls. One would hope
125. In re Ferguson, Securities Act Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974); 5 SEC DOCKET
No. 2, at 37-38 (Sept. 3, 1974), BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 268 at A-25 (Sept. 11, 1974).
This case illustrates the Commission's new approach of using leverage against professionals
to cure ills not solely in the securities markets. The findings included the determination that
a project developer for a municipality was to split profits with a consultant who had passed
on the need for the project and that these facts should have been disclosed in the bond
prospectus.
126. SEC Litigation Release No. 6467, 4 SEC DocKET No. 20 at 724 (1974), amended,
SEC Litigation Release No. 6531 (Oct. 2, 1974), 5 SEC DOCKET No. 8 at 241 (1974); Litigation
Release No. 6532 (Oct. 3, 1974), 5 SEC DOCKET No. 8, at 242 (1974).
127. SEC Litigation Release No. 6441 (Aug. 24, 1974), 4 SEC DOCKET No. 18 at 620
(1974), BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 262 at A-18 (July 24, 1974).
128. In re Loux, Gose & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release No. 160 (Aug. 27, 1974).
See also SEC v. Raffer, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 92,632
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1970).
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that the Commission will not become overly zealous in the use of
such imaginative arrangements.
129
B. Standards of Conduct
When considering legal standards of conduct for accountants in
the absence of an SEC or other statutory or regulatory agency rule,
the courts must keep in mind several different matters:
(a) The actual conduct of the accountant in the particular
case, including his own firm's standards,30 and the conduct of the
engagement;
(b) Customs and practices of the profession, if any, dealing
with the particular problem;
(c) Formal professional standards, if any, covering the situa-
tion, established by some organization such as the AICPA, the stock
exchanges or the FASB;
(d) Expert testimony of appropriate conduct in the circum-
stances;
(e) Writings of accountants and others in treatises and jour-
nals; and
(f) The legal standard of conduct to be established for the
case. Items (b), (c), (d) and (e) often are referred to, individually
or collectively, as sources of GAAS or GAAP without discrimina-
tion.
As previously stated, usually no formally established standard
or no custom for the particular question will be available. For this
reason in litigation the most important source of comparison with
the accountant's actual conduct will be expert testimony concerning
what the expert would have done under similar circumstances.3 '
Sometimes two or more of the above six items will coincide, but
often they will not. Thus, formal generally accepted auditing
standards' ((c) above) may require use of particular auditing pro-
cedures to review events subsequent to the balance sheet date, but
the custom ((b)) may be limited to searching for unrecorded liabili-
ties,13 and the accounting firm's audit program ((a)) may omit all
procedures for subsequent events. Furthermore, an expert may tes-
129. For concern about other aspects of the use of consent decrees, see Freedman, A
Civil Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulations, 35 01o ST. L.J. 280 (1974); Sargent, The
SEC and the Individual Investor: Restoring His Confidence in the Market, 60 VA. L. REv.
553 (1974).
130. E.g., Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
131. For convenience the term "expert judgment" will be used to describe this type of
testimony.
132. SAS No. 1, supra note 20 at, AU § 560.
133. See Practitioners' Forum, J. oF AccouNTANcy, Sept. 1974, at 104-05.
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tify that he would not consider any increase in a particular account
receivable to be a matter of concern ((d)), and a court may deter-
mine that in addition to events required to be noticed some addi-
tional matters such as the increase in the account receivable should
be checked and disclosed ((f)). 34
The same may be true for accounting principles especially when
not formally established by the AICPA or FASB.
The question in this part of the paper is, what is the appropriate
legal standard of conduct for audits and the use of accounting prin-
ciples in relation to the above listed pertinent formal professional
standards, customs, writings and expert judgments? In this consi-
deration it may be helpful to keep in mind the modular nature of
accounting; it will not do to excuse an accountant from liability if
he merely complies with the model unless society determines that
the accounting model should be the legal standard.
1. The Inapt Analogy of Medical Malpractice
In the area of medical malpractice the more general view is
that: (a) the standard of conduct to which the courts will hold a
defendant is the custom of the profession or, even in the absence of
a custom, the view of experts; the jury usually is not authorized to
question the wisdom of the custom or expert judgment as being
itself unreasonable; and (b) the plaintiff cannot prevail unless he
produces expert testimony of nonconformity by the defendant with
custom or expert judgment. 
35
The effect of the dual requirements that the plaintiff show non-
conformity with custom or expert judgment and that he do so with
medical experts provides a very real insulation for medical practi-
tioners from the vicissitudes of litigation. The costs in terms of
injustice in the cases of nonrecovery is considered to be appropriate
when weighed against such benefits as the availability of medical
practitioners and the willingness to serve-benefits that some fear
might be lost if a different standard of conduct were imposed.
But in one area of medical malpractice, termed "informed con-
sent," which deals with the question of whether a patient who con-
sents to a particular treatment has been adequately informed of
134. Cf. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
135. See, e.g., McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv.
549 (1959); Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147 (1942). There are excep-
tions. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been invoked in some types of cases, 1 D. LouisELL
& H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 14,06 (1973), and in others, typified by the surgical




risks, a few courts hold that the adequacy of the practitioner's com-
munication of the risks is not to be tested by practitioners' custom-
ary disclosures but is a question for the lay jury. Hence, expert
testimony of judgment or custom is not indispensable to the plain-
tiff's case. Nor is the defendant's expert evidence of custom invul-
nerable to a jury determination of unreasonableness." 6
Similarly to the informed consent cases, but in contrast with
the other rules in the Inedical malpractice area, most courts hold
that for most other occupations, questions about the reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct under the circumstances are for the jury,
although evidence of custom may be relevant. Expert judgments,
however, concerning the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct
are generally inadmissible except to prove custom. Further, the cus-
tom may be ignored by the jury as constituting an unreasonably low
standard of conduct.
1 37
Many writers and judges, generalizing from the fact that both
medicine and accounting often are referred to as "professions,"
without additional warrant, conclude that in litigation against ac-
countants as with medical practitioners (a) professional standards
are conclusive, and (b) expert witnesses to prove nonconformity for
the plaintiff are indispensable.
Aside from the demonstrable flimsiness of the analogy between
doctors and accountants, the generalization does not hold up. Let
us consider the question as it relates to accounting principles and
auditing standards and procedures separately.
2. Accounting Principles in the Courts
In United States v. Simon,35 accountants, supported by the
AICPA as amicus, sought to obtain the same insulation as medical
practitioners for their misleading financial statements. They urged
136. See generally, Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L.
REv. 1396 (1967). In one case the court held no expert testimony was necessary to prove the
custom of disclosure because the custom was so nebulous as to vest discretion in the individ-
ual physician. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). See also
Wilkinson v. Vesez, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 268 A.2d
647 (1971).
137. W. PROssFR, LAw oF TORTS 168 (4th ed. 1971) states that custom must meet the
challenge of "learned reason," but "[o]ne apparent exception arises in the case of profes-
sional customs, such as those of physicians and surgeons." Id. at n.90. The phrase "learned
reason" is derived from Allen, Learned and Unlearned Reason, 36 JURID. REV. 254 (1924).
Allen said, "Every custom adduced in support of an alleged right must pass the test of
reasonableness: and the true rule seems to be not that a custom will be admitted if reasona-
ble, but that, it will be admitted unless it is unreasonable." Id. at 263. For a fine analysis of
the substantive effect of custom in the law of negligence and problems of proof, see Morris,
note 135 supra.
138. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
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that for purposes of determining whether published financial state-
ments were materially misleading, a jury should be conclusively
bound by expert testimony that the statements were prepared in
accordance with GAAP.
3 8.1
The case involved a criminal conviction of three accountants for
certifying false or misleading financial statements in violation of
several federal statutes. 3 ' Upon conviction, the defendants ap-
pealed on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence, incorrect
instructions as to the applicable rules of law, and the improper
refusal by the trial judge to charge the jury as defendants had pro-
posed.
The facts supporting the jury verdict were that Harold Roth,
president and controlling shareholder of Continental Vending, had
been borrowing indirectly from Continental through loans to its
sister corporation, Valley Financial, also controlled by him, and
138.1. Accountants' reports generally state that the statements present fairly the finan-
cial data in conformity with GAAP. But there has never been general agreement in the
profession on what this means. For the latest confirmation of this, see Carmichael, What Does
the Independent Auditor's Opinion Really Mean?, 138 J. OF AccoUNTANcY, Nov. 1974, at 83.
The APB's Statement No. 4 (1970) at 189 purports to define the term as follows:
189. The qualitative standard of fair presentation in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles of financial position and results of operations is particu-
larly important in evaluating financial presentations. This standard guides preparers of
financial statements and is the subjective benchmark against which independent public
accountants judge the propriety of the financial accounting information communicated.
Financial statements "present fairly in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles" if a number of conditions are met: (1) generally accepted accounting princi-
ples applicable in the circumstances have been applied in accumulating and processing
the financial accounting information, (2) changes from period to period in generally
accepted accounting principles have been appropriately disclosed, (3) the information
in the underlying records is properly reflected and described in the financial statements
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, and (4) a proper balance
has been achieved between the conflicting needs to disclose important aspects of finan-
cial position and results of operations in accordance with conventional concepts and to
summarize the voluminous underlying data into a limited number of financial statement
captions and supporting notes.
There are large areas in most balance sheets for which GAAP are not settled. In a letter of
the AICPA, accounting standards division, to the SEC's Chief Accountant, dated February
20, 1974 and described in Carmichael, supra, it is said that the following areas are the only
ones in which use of the available alternative accounting principles is arbitrary:
(1) The investment credit;
(2) Preoperating costs, start-up costs and similar deferrals;
(3) Inventories;
(4) Depreciation; and
(5) Goodwill and other purchased or acquired intangibles.
Even if the letter is correct, there is not much left on the asset side of the typical firm's
balance sheet that is governed and not arbitrary.
139. Securities Exchange Ait of 1934 § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970), the Mail Fraud Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970), and a provision concerning false statements in matters before U.S.
agencies generally, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
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loans from Valley to himself, to finance various stock market ven-
tures of his own. At the end of the year in question, 1962, Continen-
tal's books showed a receivable of 3.5 million dollars, owing from
Valley, which was owed the same amount by Roth. Continental, on
the other hand, had borrowed 1 million dollars from Valley evi-
denced by notes which Valley had then negotiated to two banks;
therefore the notes could not be offset against the debt of Valley to
Continental. Roth's financial condition was such that he was unable
to repay his debts. Under pressure from the auditors, he and other
members of his family transferred 3 million dollars in securities to
a trustee as security for his debt to Valley and Valley's debt to
Continental. About eighty percent of the value of these securities
consisted of Continental stock and debentures. At that time a prior
lien of 1 million dollars existed against these securities in favor of
third parties. These facts were known to the defendant accountants
but the financials prepared by them merely described the receiv-
ables as being adequately secured.
The prosecution contended that Continental's financial state-
ments wrongfully failed to disclose that: (1) the 3.5 million dollar
receivable from Valley was uncollectible because Valley had re-
loaned it to Roth who was unable to make repayment, (2) eighty
percent of the collateral purportedly securing the Valley receivable
was Continental's own securities, (3) the receivable could not be
offset by the 1 million dollar debt owing by Continental to Valley
and the 3 million dollar collateral was therefore insufficient, and (4)
the amount receivable from Valley had increased by 400,000 dollars
since the year end. 4 ' As a consequence of the decline in market price
140. The court contrasted the actual disclosure of Continental with that proposed by
the government, by comparing the prosecution's proposed footnote with the actual footnote
which read:
2. The amount receivable from Valley Commercial Corp. (an affiliated company of
which Mr. Harold Roth is an officer, director and stockholder) bears interest at 12% a
year. Such amount, less the balance of the notes payable to that company, is secured
by the assignment to the Company of Valley's equity in certain marketable securities.
As of February 15, 1963, the amount of such equity at current market quotations ex-
ceeded the net amount receivable.
The government's proposed footnote read:
2. The amount receivable from Valley Commercial Corp. (an affiliated company of
which Mr. Harold Roth is an officer, director and stockholder), which bears interest at
12% a year, was uncollectible at September 30, 1962, since Valley had loaned approxi-
mately the same amount to Mr. Roth who was unable to pay. Since that date Mr. Roth
and others have pledged as security for the repayment of his obligation to Valley and
its obligation to Continental (now $3,900,000, against which Continental's liability to
Valley cannot be offset) securities which, as of February 15, 1963, had a market value




of Continental stock immediately after publication of the financial
statements, which were discouraging even without the omitted
facts, the collateral became nearly valueless and bankruptcy en-
sued.
Eight expert accounting witnesses called by the defense testi-
fied that the financial statements treated the Valley receivable in
accordance with GAAP and GAAS and fairly presented the year end
financial position except for the erroneous intimation that the mil-
lion dollars owing to Valley by Continental could be offset against
the 3.5 million-dollar receivable from Valley, an error that the de-
fendants attributed to negligence, not intent. The experts speci-
fically testified that nothing need be said about the eighty percent
of the collateral which was Continental's own securities (although
three said that, on hindsight, disclosure would be preferable) or
about the 400,000 dollar post-balance-sheet-date increase in the re-
ceivable or about the fact that Roth was the ultimate recipient of
the loans to Valley and could not repay them. The government's two
experts took a contrary view.
The defendants argued in their briefs that if the financial state-
ments complied with GAAP, they must be acquitted on the ground
that the fairness of disclosure was to be judged by what GAAP
established as fair. "Fairness" as used here in establishing the duty
of disclosure was equated by the parties with absence of material
misrepresentations. Thus the accountants' position was that if
GAAP, as related by the experts, did not require disclosure, no
liability would ensue. In other words, if the current accounting
model was properly followed, no liability could be imposed.
The Second Circuit, in a thorough opinion by Judge Friendly,
neatly laid the accountants' arguments to rest. He upheld the trial
judge's instructions that the "critical test" was whether the finan-
cial statements as a whole fairly presented the financial data, that
proof of conformity with GAAP was persuasive but not conclusive,
and that the jury could determine whether the testimony was sup-
ported by reason."' Thus, the court aligned the case with those
involving nonprofessional occupations and the minority view in the
medical cases involving informed consent. The profession appears
to have accepted Simon.
42
141. 425 F.2d at 805-06.
142. E.g., Kapnick, Let's Abandon "Generally Accepted," in INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN
PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 375-76 (R. Sterling ed. 1974); cf. Isbell, An Overview of Accountants'
Duties and Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle.
Blowing, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 261, 270 (1974); and Sterling, Accounting Power, 137 J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY, Jan. 1973, at 61, 65.
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One must be careful, however, to note that the court did no
more than hold that the expert judgment of the expert witnesses was
not conclusive. This was not a case of GAAP composed of proven
custom or formal professional standards enacted by the AICPA or
FASB. This was the typical case of facts not expressly covered by
custom or formal pronouncements, calling for the exercise of profes-
sional judgment, and the court merely held that, as with lay occupa-
tions other than medicine, when the issue of the reasonableness of
the defendant's conduct under the circumstances is for the jury,
then the issue of whether the financial statements contained mate-
rial misrepresentations also was for the jury.
Judge Friendly indicated his view of the similarity of the negli-
gence issue (reasonableness of the defendant's conduct under the
circumstances) with the materiality issue in Simon when he said:
We do not think the jury was also required to accept the accountants' [expert
witnesses'] evaluation whether a given fact was material to overall fair presen-
tation, at least not when the accountants' testimony was not based on specific
rules or prohibitions to which they could point, but only on the need for the
auditor to make an honest judgment and their conclusion that nothing in the
financial statements themselves negated the conclusion that an honest judg-
ment had been made. Such evidence may be highly persuasive, but it is not
conclusive, and so the trial judge correctly charged."
3
This quoted paragraph contains another important point. The
statement concerning "specific rules or prohibitions" is a caveat; it
is not a dictum that if "specific rules or prohibitions" had been
present the result would be different.' It would not be unreasonable
to assume that Judge Friendly had in mind such specifics as APB
Opinions or ARB's-formal professional pronouncements. He may
even have been thinking of customs or writings of accountants, al-
In accord is United States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1971); cf. Republic
Technology Fund, Inc. v. The Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1973). But see Franklin
Supply Co. v. Tolman, 454 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972). In Shahmoon v. General Development
Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 94,308 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) in
which a company sold homesites on installment contracts and receivables were carried at face
value, without allowance for bad debts even though there was no personal liability of the
obligors, the court held no fraud occurred since the statements complied with GAAP. The
court also found that the plaintiff, a sophisticated investor, was not misled. This is in no way
inconsistent with Simon since that case does not hold that all GAAP are misleading.
The SEC in its complaints in the Penn Central and National Student Marketing cases
drew a clear distinction between observance of GAAP and fairness, obviously embracing the
Simon principles. See Paragraph 31 of Complaint in SEC v. Penn Central Co., CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. T 94,527 (1974); Complaint in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-
1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. SEc. L. REP. 1 93,360 at paragraphs 28(e)(2),(3).
143. 425 F.2d at 806.
144. For the view that the inference is that if such specifics had been present the
decision would be different, see Isbell, The Continental Vending Case: Lessons for the Profes-
sion, J. oF AccouNTArcy, Aug. 1970, at 36.
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though inclusion of the latter seems unlikely. At any rate, he simply
wrote narrowly, deciding the case before the court-one involving
expert judgment-and did nothing more than indicate that a differ-
ent case would require individual consideration.
What would a court do if a charge of misrepresentation were
defended on the basis that an accounting custom was followed by
the defendant? Some cases decided prior to Simon held that observ-
ance of a customary accounting principle was no defense to a charge
of misrepresentation. In Baumel v.Rosen'l' former shareholders of a
retail land sales firm charged successfully that use of a conventional
installment method of reporting income from sales understated in-
come, and thereby misled the plaintiffs into selling their shares
at a depressed price. And, in Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co. the
Second Circuit held that a footnote, which failed to note that a
dramatic rise in fourth quarter income for a new company was the
result of an inventory adjustment allocable to other quarters, was
misleading, "regardless of whether [the] accounting system was a
sound one."' 48
If, after Simon, any doubt remained that compliance with
GAAP is not conclusive when customary treatment is given, that
doubt must have been dispelled by Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krek-
stein, Horwath & Horwath.47 In that case, land was sold with a
small down payment to a weakly capitalized corporation under cir-
cumstances making collection problematical and the nature of the
contract doubtful. The auditors, Laventhol, Krekstein, after exten-
sive study by various members of the firm, refused to recognize the
full $2,030,500 gross profit and instead limited recognition to
$235,000 consisting of $50,000 cash received and $185,000 promised
as liquidated damages in the event of the buyer's default. The ac-
countants also described the contract in detail and gave only a
qualified opinion "subject to the collectibility of the balance receiv-
able on the contract of sale." This treatment is the customary cau-
tious treatment when collectibility is doubtful.
The court said that the duty of full disclosure "cannot be ful-
filled merely by following generally accepted accounting principles
... . [Aiccountants, as well as insiders, must take pains to lay
bare all the facts needed by investors to interpret the financial
statements accurately."'' The court held that this would require
145. 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969).
146. 195 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1952). The opinion is ambiguous and may not have been
intended to mean what is suggested. Cf. In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 11 S.E.C. 975, 1058-
59 (1942).
147. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEc. L. REP. 94,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
148. Id. at 95,999.
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disclosure of the primary facts on which the defendants based their
reservations. The client, FGL, had purchased the real estate from a
company called Monterey and then resold it to Continental, con-
trolled by one Ruderian. The court held disclosure inadequate and
listed the additional disclosures required:
Thus, we believe that the full disclosure mandated by the Act required
Laventhol to include in its report at least the following facts: (1) Continental's
net worth; (2) the ambiguity of the language in the contracts which might have
suggested to some that they were options; (3) Ruderian, on whose reputation
and representations Laventhol was depending, was not personally liable on the
contracts; (4) Ruderian's practice of reselling property before he paid for it;
(5) neither of the transactions was recorded in FGL's books of original entry
or corporate minute books; (6) this transaction was the largest in which FGL
had ever participated; (7) FGL would show a loss if the income from the
Monterey transactions were not realized; (8) FGL had not acquired title to the
nursing home properties from Monterey; (9) no deed, title search or title insur-
ance on the properties had ever been obtained by FGL; and (10) the legal
opinion sought by Laventhol, on which it relied in treating the transaction as
an enforceable purchase and sale, had been obtained over the telephone from
an attorney who not only never saw the contract but never even had it read to
him on the telephone."'
If the courts follow the Simon principles not only when the
GAAP in question consist of experts' judgments on what would be
appropriate accounting under the circumstances, but also, as in
Herzfeld, when the GAAP are customs, will they hold similarly if
the GAAP are formal pronouncements such as APB or FASB Opin-
ions or ARB's?
Although the vast majority of accounting decisions require ad
hoc determinations based on reasoning from principles that do not
precisely cover the problem, several very significant accounting
questions are covered expressly by formal statements. Furthermore,
these statements often involve close choices among alternatives on
which reasonable men could differ. Often the very reason for the
formal pronouncement is to resolve these differences one way or the
other. For example the purchase or pooling debate continues simply
because good cases can be made for numerous differing treatments.
This being so, if formal professional standards are not conclusive, a
lay jury will be allowed to second guess the profession. And, since
the formal pronouncements are customarily reviewed by the SEC
when promulgated, with power to override them, the jury would in
fact be third guessing. It is at least the formal pronouncement which
149. Id. at 96,001-02. The Herzfeld holding is consistent with the better view in the
informed consent cases in medicine. D. LouiszLL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 594,
600 (1969) disposes of the "doctor knows best" slogan there by commenting that although
the doctor can best assess needs, "it hardly follows that his is the right to make the decision
as to whether the risks shall be run."
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Judge Friendly doubtless had in mind when he uttered the caveat
in Simon.
If a jury believes that the accounting in a particular case results
in a material misrepresentation even though based on a formal
pronouncement, may the accountants be held responsible if the
other elements of an action are established?
The question is not likely to arise in this simple form. Often,
all that will be required to avoid being misleading will be some
additional disclosure, which will permit the use of the formal princi-
ple without harm. Many times, the poor exercise of judgment by the
accountant will be the actual reason for the deception. The particu-
lar accounting principle may not be appropriate for the circumstan-
ces. Or, the misrepresentation will result from the cumulative im-
pact of individually acceptable applications of accounting princi-
ples all skewed to a biased presentation.'50
The case that comes closest to illustrating the truly difficult
problem of a formal pronouncement-there the historical cost con-
vention-is another Second Circuit decision by Judge Friendly,
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.'' Although the historical cost con-
vention is not embodied in a formal pronouncement as such, it is
evidenced in different ways in many of them'52 and is a fundamental
conception on which the present accounting model is built.'53 If it is
not in a formal pronouncement, that is only because none is neces-
sary. 1
54
150. See Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 11 S.E.C. 975, 1058 (1942). One able commentator
has suggested that practitioners must determine:
(a) Not only whether the accounting principles used are generally acceptable in the
abstract, but also:
(b) whether they are appropriate for the particular situation;
(c) and their cumulative effect is not misleading; and
(d) whether an accounting principle selected is applied to the transaction in a manner
that properly recognizes the economic impact of the transaction in terms of the firm's
present and future cash flows.
He also goes on to say, "I believe that auditors have a general conception of how the success
or failure of a business should be measured. That general conception was through accounting
theory and gives some idea of the purpose of accounting. It is a simple guide by reference to
which it can be seen whether the chosen accounting principles are operating satisfactorily.
To succeed, a business must ultimately take in more cash than it spends. If the business is
failing by that simple guideline, the financial statements should not portray a picture of
success." Carmichael, What Does the Independent Auditor's Opinion Really Mean? J. oF
AccouNTANcy, Nov. 1974, at 86.
151. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
152. E.g., ARB 43 c.4 (Inventory Pricing); c.5, 4 (Intangible Assets); c.9, §§ A, B
(Depreciation); APB Op's No. 6, 17; No. 16.
153. For an explanation of how the cost convention varies from price level and from fair
value accounting, see T. FiFus & H. KRi'KE, AcCOUNTING FOR BUSNESS LAwYERs c. 6 (1971).
154. "Actually, accounting theory maintains that original costs (or values) are not
always and without exception to be adhered to, but that new values may be properly entered
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In Gerstle, two companies solicited proxies for approval of a
merger using a proxy statement containing financials based on his-
torical cost in accordance with the universal convention. One com-
pany, General Outdoor Advertising ("GOA"), was controlled by the
other, Gamble-Skogmo ("Skogmo"), and held outdoor advertising
plants of a value far in excess of book (historical cost).
Prior to the merger, GOA had been in the process of liquidating
these plants at prices far greater than book value but it discontinued
plant sales at the beginning of the merger deliberations until after
consummation. It had been negotiating some sales within days be-
fore the shareholders' meeting, however, and either had firm offers
or appraisals of all remaining plants. Further, it was found that
Skogmo intended to pursue aggressively the policy of selling the
plants.'55 The SEC was told no firm sale negotiations were in process
and refused to require disclosure of these possible sale values in a
hearing requested by an unrelated stockbroker. The Commission
branch chief disallowed the disclosure of values on the strength of
the note to Rule 14a-9 of the Proxy Regulations giving examples of
what may be misleading statements, including "[P]redictions as
to specific future market values . .. ."I"
The merger terms called for the GOA shareholders to receive
forty-dollar par value convertible preferred for each share of GOA
held. The book value of the GOA shares was approximately thirty-
seven dollars and underlying asset values were estimated at fifty
dollars. The proxy statement disclosed that the market value of
the plants was "considerably in excess of book value" and described
the prior sales at 250 percent of book. The allegedly misleading
statements were in a paragraph stating:
If the merger becomes effective, it is the intention of Gamble-Skogmo, as
the surviving corporation, to continue the business of General Outdoor, includ-
ing the policy of considering offers for the sale to acceptable prospective pur-
chasers of outdoor advertising branches or subsidiaries of General Outdoor
with the proceeds of any such sales, to the extent immediately available, being
used to further expand and diversify operations now being conducted or which
might be acquired and conducted by Gamble-Skogmo or its new, wholly-
owned subsidiary, GOA, Inc. There have been expressions of interest in acquir-
when historic costs are no longer a significant measurement of the accountability of the
corporation for those assets." [Citing May, Postulates of Income Accounting, 86 J. OF
AccouNTANcy, Aug. 1948, at 107, 109 and mentioning that "a number of accounting authori-
ties ... are said to have made 'cautiously vague remarks' that indicate possible approval of
revaluing fixed assets to a present-value basis. [H. HATFIELD, T. SANDERS & N. BURTON,
AccouNTING PRINCIlPZS AND PRAcTcES 347 (1940)]. In practice, however, historical acquisition
costs remain the only valuation basis used." Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporation
Law, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 791, 810 (1965).
155. 478 F.2d 1281.
156. Note to Rule 14a-9 of Proxy Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1974).
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ing many of the remaining branches of General Outdoor and discussions have
taken place in connection therewith, but at the present time there are no
agreements, arrangements or understandings with respect to the sale of any
branch and no negotiations are presently being conducted with respect to the
sale of any branch."7
Within a year after the merger, commencing with a major sale
within a week, all the remaining plants were sold at an 11 million-
dollar profit representing twenty-five percent of GOA's net worth.
The district judge found the proxy statement misleading for
failing to disclose the appraisals and firm offers for the plants, but
on appeal the Court of Appeals held that requiring disclosure of
appraisals, as opposed to firm offers, would run counter to the Com-
mission's long standing practice and the imposition of liability on
this ground would be unfair. It also decided not to rest liability on
the existence of the firm offers, holding instead that the proxy state-
ment was misleading for failing adequately to disclose Skogmo's
intent to pursue aggressively the policy of selling GOA's plants
while giving an impression of an intent to continue GOA's busi-
ness.1
5 8
Thus the court did not hold historical cost accounting to be
misleading when asset values are far in excess of book. But that may
have occurred because it had another means of finding the proxy
statement misleading. The court expressly stated that it was loath
to impose liability on Skogmo on the basis of what it regarded as a
subsequent reversal of the SEC's position on appraisals from prohi-
bition of disclosure to compulsion.
Manifestly one could find numerous grounds for distinguishing
Gerstle from the problem at hand. Among other things, the argu-
ment was not that the financial statements should have shown the
appraised values or firm offer values of the plants. No accounting
witnesses appeared and the defendants were not accountants. No
reference was even made to Simon, although Judge Friendly wrote
both opinions and would not have overlooked Simon if he had
thought it relevant. Moreover, the court refused to impose liability
157. 478 F.2d at 1288.
158. Accord, Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.
1973); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd with modification
of damages, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). Absent the factor of failure to disclose an intent to
sell, the courts have not held failure to disclose market values different from book values to
be actionable. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1291-94 (2d Cir. 1973); Kohn
v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972); SunRay DX Oil Co. v. Helmer-
ich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1968); Brown Co. Securities Litigation,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also




on the basis that conventional accounting was misleading and chose
another ground of decision. Thus, no one could argue that GerstIe
modified Simon in the eyes of the court.
Nevertheless the issue was present; the historical cost figures
were ultimately held misleading in the absence of additional disclo-
sure of the intent to liquidate and the higher figures obtainable on
liquidation as indicated by the firm offers.
Gerstle and several other cases cited ' all dealt with historical
cost as a potential misleading misrepresentation. Because the model
is based on historical cost, the result of a decision of liability would
have been to make all present day accounting obsolete. When the
law is reformed, every effort is made to avoid such a revolutionary
sweep. The winds of change are blowing, however, and the accoun-
tants in their renewed interest for fair value accounting doubtless
will have a weather eye out.
Suppose some less fundamental but nevertheless significant
formal accounting principle came under attack. For example, now
that the FASB has issued its Opinion No. 2160 requiring immediate
expensing of all research and development costs, cases of such write-
offs will occur, with resultant decreases in profits and sales of securi-
ties by existing shareholders at market prices affected by the result-
ing lower reported profits. It would seem that Baumel v. Rosen,
noted earlier, might be sound precedent for holding the statements
misleading unless adequate disclosure of the effects of expensing the
research and development costs is made."' Even in a Gerstle-type
situation, it seems reasonable to hold that the financial statements
(as opposed to the text of the proxy statement) were misleading
absent footnote disclosure of the intent to sell.
A more timely illustration is supplied by current efforts to de-
fine away some of the problems caused when an auditor requests
information from the attorney for their mutual client with respect
to contingent liabilities. One of the concerns is that certain types of
potential claims, such as antitrust violations or title disputes to the
client's land holdings, more likely will be recognized and asserted
if they are disclosed in the financial statements. For example, if a
client has held possession under a defective title for six years and
159. See cases cited note 158 supra.
160. FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 2, Accounting for Re-
search and Development Costs (1974).
161. Since the writing of the above statement, id., the SEC has proposed the sug-
gested disclosure, lending some weight to the view expressed. See SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5541 (Nov. 21, 1974). Compare Independent Protective League v. AVCO, [Current
Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 94,943 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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seven months and will acquire title by adverse possession at the end
of seven years, disclosure before that time expires may excite the
adverse claimant to action and cause loss to the client.
Such factual situations probably are no more common now
than ever,'62 but auditors and lawyers, alerted to their own duties
of disclosure under the securities acts, are concerned about the di-
lemma caused when an auditor (through the client) asks an attorney
if he is aware of any contingent liabilities of their mutual client and
the lawyer knows of the land title defect under the above
circumstances. If the lawyer says he is aware of no defect, he is lying
and is knowingly causing the issuance of a false financial statement.
If the falsity is material, it may be actionable against the lawyer,
the client, and perhaps even the auditor. If the lawyer discloses, the
auditor either must publish the information or himself be a princi-
pal defendant with the client, and probably the lawyer (on some
theory that he has a duty to "blow the whistle") .163 If the lawyer
simply says he is aware of a contingency but is under a duty of
confidentiality,'64 the auditor must qualify his report, making it
unacceptable for certain securities law functions.'65
In the past, doubtless these problems were solved by the lawyer
exercising his professional judgment in consultation with the client
and perhaps even the auditor. Presumably nondisclosure usually
resulted, based on the pre-10b-5 precept that one should let sleeping
dogs lie.
Except for the fact that the financial statements will be pub-
lished and any omission will result in at least a half-truth (and the
auditor's report may be an affirmative misrepresentation) it might
be possible to invoke the "business purpose" rule of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur case."' Texas Gulf, however, involved not a question of the
right to tell a lie but only the right not to say anything so long as
no trading occurs. Hence, logically it does not apply. But strict logic
162. However, with "consumerism" and the "environmental movement," it is probable
that potential large claims of a wholly new type are now more likely. Certainly more securities
acts claims are being made now than before.
163. See text accompanying notes 421-43 infra.
164. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 37.
165. See Report of Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, Scope of Lawyers'
Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 29 Bus. LAWYER 1391, 1395 (1974).
166. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968); Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971); and Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
306 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), all recognized that because Texas Gulf's land
acquisition program would fail if its Timmins ore strike were disclosed, the company was
under no duty to disclose the strike to its existing shareholders even though many of them
sold their shares below fair value prior to the disclosure and were thus damaged. See also
Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell, Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973),
which fleshes out the business purpose rule in the duty to disclose area.
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has never been the life of the law.'67 Further, the Texas Gulf
"business purpose" .rule itself is based on the broader determination
that when a conflict of interest arises between the corporation and
those investors who may sell their securities, the better course is to
serve the corporation, whose constituency also includes all the non-
selling shareholders, creditors, consumers, employees and everyone
else who has become dependent on the entity. Therefore the course
favoring the corporation would best comport with the expectations
of all and the mores of the times.
On this ground, would it not be equally defensible for the law-
yer who knows of the land title defect to keep it under his hat after
obtaining the client's approval to do so? Perhaps with this in mind,
the recommendation has been made to the Financial Accounting
Standards Board that, under these circumstances, no disclosure of
the matter should be made.'
If the suggestion is adopted and thus becomes GAAP, will the
courts nevertheless apply Simon to this very specific GAAP if they
do not buy the rationale above and hold it can be misleading?, Or,
will the caveat of Judge Friendly regarding specific GAAP become
an exception to Simon?
Does Simon further mean that if financial statements are fair,
they need not comply with GAAP? For example, if GAAP are not
followed but the auditor states in his report that they were, but
nevertheless the information is fairly presented, will liability ensue
for misrepresenting the nonconformity? Again the issue is not
167. 0. HoLms, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
168. Letter from the Joint Task Force on Contingent Liabilities of the AICPA and the
Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, American Bar Association, to the FASB, Dec. 12, 1974. The letter suggests an amend-
ment to the FASB's proposed redefinition of contingent liabilities to add the following:
In the case of ... a contingency involving an unasserted claim or assessment where
there has been no manifestation by a potential claimant of an awareness of a possible
claim or assessment, no disclosure of such contingency is required by this paragraph
unless the assertion thereof is considered reasonably likely to occur.
Incidentally, it should be noted that in the case where a GAAP is established by an SEC rule,
a defendant sued under the securities acts would have the defense of § 19(a) of the 1933 Act
(15 U.S.C. § 77s (1970)) or § 23(a) of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78w (1970)) both of which
make the liability provisions of the statutes inapplicable to acts done in good faith in con-
formity with Commission rules. The court in Gerstle so stated. 478 F.2d at 1294. This suggests
that the SEC should be asked to adopt a rule like that suggested by the Joint Task Force.
Query whether § 19(a) and 23(a) together with the SEC's endorsement of FASB and
AICPA opinions in ASR 150 would largely obviate the problem discussed in the text. Does
ASR 150 make the AICPA and FASB formal statements of accounting principles into SEC
rules under §§ 19(a) and 23(a)?
169. See remarks of now Commissioner Pollack at PLI, SEcuamrs REGULATmON TRAN-
scRnPr SERIEs No. 4, FouRTH ANNuAL INsTrtrrE ON SEcuarrms REGULATION 235 (Mundheim,
Fleischer, Schupper eds. 1973) who would hold the silence misleading.
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whether a misrepresentation of fact occurred, but whether the mis-
representation is material. " '
It is now apparently well-established that financial statements
must in most cases not give a misleading impression to a layman
as determined by a lay jury even if the statements comply with
GAAP. Neither custom nor expert judgment will be binding on the
jury and perhaps this is true of even formal pronouncements of the
profession. Evidence of GAAP is relevant, however.
The significance of all this is great. If the accounting model estab-
lished by GAAP subjects accountants to great liabilities, they may
abandon it and develop a new model based on fair value, which is
closer to the real world. In addition, since mere conformity to GAAP
is insufficient to insulate accountants from liability, corporate man-
agements, which traditionally choose the GAAP to be applied, no
longer will have the dominant voice in the content of financial state-
ments. Instead the auditor who is responsible for fairness will be the
principal judge-as many reformers have suggested he should be. 7'
3. Auditing Standards and Procedures in the Courts
As with GAAP, the sources of GAAS, auditing standards and
170. See, e.g., Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058, 1061, 1063, 1064 (D.N.D. 1974)
(no misrepresentdtion if fair even if GAAP not followed).
171. A. BuwOFF, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ACCOUNTING COMMUNICATION 55-84, 114-46, 224-
25 (1967). Kripke argues that management's selection of accounting principles is the crux of
the accountant's difficulties. Kripke, Conglomerates and the Moment of Truth in
Accounting, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 791 (Spec. ed. 1970); Kripke, The Objective of Financial
Accounting Should Be to Provide Information for the Serious Investor, in A. RAPPAPORT & L.
REvSINE, CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING: THE IssuEs, THE OBJECTIVES AND SOME NEW
PRoPosALs 107 (1942) (reprinted in 42 C.P.A.J. 389 (1972)); Kripke, Book Review, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 1681, 1686 (1973).
The assertion in the text is disapproved by the 1972 report of Price-Waterhouse & Co.
for The Liberian American-Swedish Minerals Company. In one paragraph of its report Price-
Waterhouse stated its belief that unrealized foreign currency losses should be reflected in the
1972 statements although they occurred in early 1973. But finding authoritative support for
management's treatment, the auditors went on to give an opinion that the statements were
presented fairly.
A serious question arises whether this is adequately based on the "buried facts" concept.
Cf. Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 433-34 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated on other
grounds, 396 U.S. 375 (1970), in which a disclosure, although accurately made, was held
misleading when it appeared on a remote page of the proxy statement. Unsophisticated users
of financial statements may read only the figures in the statements, not the report. Hence
data in the report may be held to be "buried" at least insofar as the client's liability, as
opposed to the auditor's liability, is concerned. See Swanson v. American Consumer Indus.,
Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1330 (7th Cir. 1969); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp.
981, 995 (D. Del. 1971); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1362 (E.D.
Pa. 1970), modified on other grounds, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1971); Beatly v. Bright, 318 F.
Supp. 169, 174 (S.D. Iowa 1970); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096, 1110-11
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part, remanded in part on other grounds, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir.
1969). Contra, Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 601-03 (5th Cir. 1974).
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procedures, may be customs, formal professional standards, expert
judgment, or writings of accountants and others. The same analysis
applied to GAAP would seem applicable here and will not be re-
peated. Instead some problems unique to GAAS will be pursued.
One of the three principal types of GAAS, as articulated by the
AICPA, consists of the previously listed "Standards of Report-
ing,'1 2 which concern presentation of data to readers of the finan-
cial statements. When a question of auditing involves such a com-
munication, Simon will apply. Thus, in the Herzfeld case' the
failure of the auditor's report to spell out the basis for the qualifica-
tion that the net income was subject to collectibility was held ac-
tionable even though it was customary.
Despite intimations to the contrary in numerous informal state-
ments, it would not be inconsistent for the courts to apply lay stan-
dards to accounting principles as in Simon and to auditing stan-
dards of reporting as in Herzfeld while at the same time applying
the standards of the profession to other auditing questions. For ex-
ample, in BarChris, the case most often cited for the proposition
that the standards of the profession must control auditing, the court
determined, consistently with Simon, and without even referring to
the profession's accounting principles for such activities, that the
inclusion in income of proceeds from a sale and leaseback transac-
tion was misleading.' Thus, in the same case a court looked to the
standards of the profession for an auditing question but to its own
judgment for an accounting question.
A court could rationally defend these differing treatments for
auditing and for accounting principles by pointing out that commu-
nication of financial data to lay readers, based on accounting princi-
ples and reporting requirements, should be tested by the standard
of meaningfulness to the layman, while those processes of auditing,
consisting of data collection, testing, and drawing of inferences, are
a matter for the expertise of an auditor, to be regulated by those who
know something about the processes.' That argument merely sup-
ports the relevance of expert judgments and customs, not their con-
clusiveness. In other occupations, such as pipefitting, experts are
allowed to explain their technology but their opinions do not bind
the jury.
172. See note 24 supra.
173. See text at accompanying notes 145-49 supra.
174. Escott v. BarChrist Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 658-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
175. Cf. text accompanying note 136 supra. (Distinction between the medical malprac-




When BarChris stated that accountants should be held to the
standard of the profession, the inquisitive mind must naturally ask,
why? Why not a higher or lower standard? Why precisely the stan-
dard of the profession? Any suggestion of a lower standard cannot
be followed because accountants in their reports purport to have
conducted their audit in conformity with GAAS and they should be
held at least to that representation. Further, there would seem to
be no social utility to fixing a lower standard.
What of the suggestion that accountants, like tugboat opera-
tors, 176 may be held to a higher standard than the customary, when
the custom is not supported by learned reason? 7
BarChris is itself only a dictum that the custom is the standard
since in that case the defendant failed to reach even the level of
custom. The court did not hold that he had reached that level and
hence would be excused. A dictum by the Fourth Circuit, in Rhode
Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz, Bresenof, Yavner
& Jacobs,' said that industry standards may in some cases be too
low. In two recent cases involving auditing standards, also contrary
to BarChris, the courts expressly stated, by dicta, that customs of
auditing are not binding. In Pacific Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v.
Forsyth,'7' a New South Wales trial court said:
When the conduct of an auditor is in question in legal proceedings it is not the
province of the auditing profession itself to determine what is the legal duty
of auditors or to determine what reasonable skill and care requires to be done
in a particular case, although what others do or what is usually done is relevant
to the question of whether there had been a breach of duty.
It follows, if the auditing profession or most of them fail to adopt some
step which despite their practice was reasonably required of them, such failure
does not cease to be a breach of duty because all or most of them did the same.
Despite the fact that this was a trial court opinion in a foreign
jurisdiction, it is sound authority because the trial lasted about a
year, the issue was thoroughly litigated and the opinion is well-
reasoned throughout its 105 printed pages. Further, American ac-
counting, like Australian, is even more closely related to English
practices than is the American common law-not only by reason of
their common origins in English and Scottish accounting 0 but also
because the large accounting firms, more than any of the large law
firms, conduct their business on an international scale in order to
176. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
177. See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
178. 455 F.2d 847, 852 (4th Cir. 1972).
179. [1970] 92 W.N. (N.S.W.) 29, 75.
180. See 1 J. CAREY, supra note 11, at 1-35.
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serve their international business clients. 8 ' Indeed the accountants
in Pacific Acceptance were members of Price, Waterhouse & Co.
Further, the Seventh Circuit, in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,'82
in dictum recently said:
And, although the defendant [accountant] correctly states that generally
accepted auditing standards do not ordinarily require such investigation, we
do not find that entirely compelling. The teaching of The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d
737 (2d Cir. 1932), is not lost to us for we recognize that we are not constrained
to accept faulty standards of practice otherwise generally accepted in an indus-
try or profession.11'13
Moreover, we have already seen in the Herzfeld case that one
type of GAAS-reporting standards-are not binding on the courts.
In Fischer v. Kletz 83 an auditing standard was fashioned by a court
without any fear of limitation by professional standards. Only after
the decision did the AICPA adopt a ten paragraph auditing stan-
dard complying with the rationale of that decision.'84 Also, in
Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc.'85 the SEC made clear its own view
that professional auditing standards were not the test of liability.
4. The Appropriate Legal Standards for Accounting Principles and
Auditing Standards and Procedures
The question whether the legal standards of auditing may in
some cases be higher than professional standards seems particularly
appropriate in the circumstances of BarChris because the liability
in that case was for false statements in a registration statement
under section 11 of the 1933 Act, and section 11(c) has an express
standard for defendants' conduct-"that required of a prudent man
in the management of his own property." Should not the court apply
the statutory standard and, in doing so, ascertain the policies of this
portion of the securities acts and the history that led to enactment?
And might not this result in a statutory standard higher than cus-
tom? If Congress was content with customary performance of com-
panies and their auditors, section 11 would not have been needed.
Doubtless it had in mind upgrading performance. This is clear from
the fact that section 11(c) was even more strict as originally enacted.
It originally read:
181. 2 Id. 369-72 (1970).
182. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
182.1. Id. at 1113.
183. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
184. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 561.
185. 4 SEC 706, 715 (1939). For a further explication of the SEC's views see L. RAPPA-
PORT, SEC ACCOUNTINO PRACr7cE AND PROCEDURE ch. 5 (3d ed. 1972).
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(c) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this
section, what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for
belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a person oc-
cupying a fiduciary relationship.'"
Similarly, for liability under other sections of the securities
acts, the standards of conduct must be determined with due regard
for the policies of the securities acts, which require a higher degree
of fairness to investors than had ever been customary. 8 ' The acts
are intended to give a reasonable opportunity to make informed and
intelligent investment decisions in fair and honest markets."'8
It would seem that the securities acts establish a legislative
mandate not subject to modification by the courts. Hence the com-
mon law grounds for special treatment of doctors in medical mal-
practice cases would not seem to be relevant. As stated by the
Second Circuit panel in a related situation involving an attorney's
conduct in issuing opinions on exemptions from 1933 Act registra-
tion requirements:
The public trust demands more of its legal advisors than 'customary' activities
which prove to be careless.1"
But what of cases not regulated by the securities acts? The argu-
ments for merely following the standards of the profession in audit-
ing matters would seem to be the same as those considered for
accounting principles. The bases for the view that professional stan-
dards should be conclusive in the medical malpractice cases have
been (1) practicality (viz. it is said that judges and juries are usually
186. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 11(c), 48 Stat. 83 (amended to present form by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 206(c) 48 Stat. 907).
187. See Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUm. L. Rzv. 1147, 1154-55 (1942), in
which it is suggested that the question is whether the policy of the law is to simply accept
custom or to encourage a particular standard of conduct.
188. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 140 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
granted, No. 74-124, Nov. 11, 1974. In Investors Management Co., Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,163, at 80,517 (SEC 1971) it was said that "the mainte-
nance of fair and honest markets in securities and the prevention of inequitable and unfair
practices in such markets are primary objectives of the federal securities laws." With regard
to Rule 10b-5, see Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236
(2d Cir. 1974) ("In short, whether invoked in an SEC injunction action or in a private damage
action, 'the Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information. . . .' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., . . . 401 F.2d at 848." The court went
on to quote further from Texas Gulf Sulphur, "It was the intent of Congress that all members
of the investing public should be subject to identical market risks. . . . (And] inequities
based upon unequal access to knowledge should not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way
of life, or, in view of the congressional concern in the area, remain uncorrected.' 401 F.2d at
851-52." 495 F.2d at 236 n.13.
See generally 3 A. BROMBE G, Sacuarrms LAw: FRAuD §§ 12.1-12.7 (1973).
189 SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973).
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not competent to determine whether a doctor acted reasonably, and
hence no other rule is workable)' and (2) a policy to preserve the
profession from second guessing by jurors, which might result in
inhibiting doctors from exercising their best judgment."' A third
justification might be based on an application of economic princi-
ples leading to the conclusion that custom always perfectly balances
the costs and benefits.
92
Whatever the persuasiveness of these reasons for making cus-
tom conclusive in the medical malpractice cases, a question we need
not consider, it does not seem overpowering when the questions
involve the reasonableness of accounting principles or the conduct
of an audit. First, as to practicality, auditing and accounting seem
no more complex than certain other highly technical occupations
when the questions are narrowed down by the judge and the lawyers.
For example, a case likely to arise some day will involve the reasona-
bleness of auditing a computerized set of records when none of the
auditors on the scene knows anything about computers. 13 The ques-
tion can be made to appear complex but it would seem that in some
cases, at least, it would not be different from a question of whether
a reasonable safety precaution for a steel mill is to require high
friction stair treads in work areas.' 4 As to the second basis, encour-
aging the best judgment of auditors, one would intuit that fear of
liability would sharpen judgment. In any case, these two bases for
fixing custom as the standard require behavioral study for verifica-
tion of the asserted practicality and enhanced room for professional
judgement. The third basis, the assertion purportedly based on an
economic analysis, suffers from the fact that some of its supporters
are afflicted with the Pygmalion Syndrome--they must not forget
that their economic model is not the real world and therefore can
be nothing more than a basis for establishing hypotheses for experi-
190. Morris, supra note 187, at 1164.
191. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 608
(1959).
192. Cf. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71-72 (1972).
193. Auditors are now very conscious of their incapacities concerning computer sys-
tems; their problem is in how to remedy the shortcomings. See, e.g., Levine, Auditing Re-
quirement for Advanced Systems, 137 J. OF AccouNTANcy Mar. 1974, at 74.
Proposed audit standards were issued July 26, 1974, in an exposure draft entitled, The
Effects of EDP on the Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control. J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1974, at 24. See also AICPA Audit Guide, Audits of Service-Center-
Produced Records (April 1974).
194. Even in the medical malpractice area, if the issue is not beyond the comprehension
of a jury, as when the claimed negligence is that surgical sponges were not removed, no
requirement of expert testimony is placed on the plaintiff. Morris, supra note 187, at 1165;
James & Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 V~AD. L.
Rv. 697, 701 & n.15 (1952).
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mentation. Thus it too requires empirical verification. But logic can
supply us with help, and we do not need experience in this particu-
lar case. Even if the model were realistic, to say that custom will
rise to a point at which the costs of the customary care will be
balanced by the benefits in a doctor-patient or businessman-
customer situation is one thing; to say this in the auditor-public
investor situation is another. One of the proponents of economic
analysis. points out that in the doctor-patient situation the patient
will pay extra for treatment until the last dollar spent buys just one
dollar of accident cost reduction. "However, no firm [e.g., of audi-
tors] will have an incentive to take precautions against accidents
that are dangerous only to people [e.g., public investors] with
whom the firm does not, and due to high transaction costs cannot,
deal."195
Perhaps the conventional technique of lawmaking should in-
stead be used here-i.e., gradual improvements in the standards
may be made, taking into account current social conditions and
adjusting the standards as experience dictates. Insofar as the federal
securities laws establish a standard, courts deciding cases not regu-
lated by those acts probably would be well-advised to conform to
the standards in both types of cases.
C. Proof of'Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards and
Procedures
If expert testimony of expert judgment as well as customs and
formal pronouncements on matters of accounting principles are rel-
evant and admissible although not binding on the basis that lay
standards control:
(a) a plaintiff need not introduce such evidence to make his
case,
(b) but a defendant will probably introduce it in defense in
most cases. Many times the plaintiff will wish to introduce expert
evidence either to establish nonconformity with GAAP or GAAS or
to counter the defendant's witnesses. More often than not he will
be met with a wall of silence by accountants whom he seeks to enlist
as expert witnesses. " This phenomenon, once common in the medi-
195. R. POSNER, supra note 192, at 71 (words in brackets supplied).
196. This silence may be more similar to affirmative acts of conspiracy than to mere
conscious parallelism. See the editorial statement in the AICPA's Journal of Accountancy of
a president of the AICPA urging accountants to "examine their consciences" before testifying
against their brethren and if they have doubts on the merits to consider the effects on their
own self-respect and the respect of their fellow practitioners. Editorial, The Specter of
Auditor's Liability, 120 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1965, at 33-34. And see the inadequate




cal malpractice area, is partially balanced by the Simon holding.'
But is that enough? As a practical matter, will not an array of
defendant's experts opposed to none for the plaintiff be likely to
result in injustice?' 8 If so, it behooves the courts as well as the
accounting profession to cure the situation.
Perhaps the courts should exclude defense testimony from ex-
perts on the basis of unfairness to plaintiffs until the profession
establishes panels of experts available to testify against accoun-
tants. Such an exclusionary rule, however, may not withstand due
process arguments. More reasonably, courts should be more recep-
tive to fashioning doctrines in the nature of res ipsa loquitur or
presumptions in favor of plaintiffs to redress the imbalance from the
expert testimony for defendants. Further, the courts might admit
articles and books and nonexpert testimony of accounting practices
as well as plaintiff's evidence of unsuccessful efforts to procure ex-
perts."' Courts should also freely comment on the expert evidence
if it seems unreasonable.
In the final analysis, though, it is the responsibility of the
AICPA to take steps to establish panels of experts available to tes-
tify for reasonable compensation. '
V. FOUR CURRENT PROBLEMS OF DAMAGE LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
FOR AUDITED STATEMENTS
An accountant may be charged with liability in damages for
197. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969). In that case itself one suspects that the government's
extremely careful preparation must have included efforts to procure expert witnesses but
those efforts failed as the only two government experts were SEC staffers. 425 F.2d at 805.
Experience with other litigation makes clear that peer pressure as well as a misconceived
notion of impropriety make it nigh impossible to obtain expert witnesses against accountants.
In Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1110 (7th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff hit on a
fruitful source in retaining retired accountants.
198. For illustrations of apparent willingness of medical experts to approach perjury,
see 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLAms, MEDicAL MALPRACTICE 420 n.3 (1973). Accounting experts
seem prone to stretching a point. See the description of the expert testimony in Evans v.
Commissioner, 264 F.2d 502, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd sub noam. Massey Motors, Inc. v.
United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960). In that case the experts testified that useful life and salvage
value of fixed assets for depreciation purposes are the economic lives and salvage value to
the ultimate user-despite all the texts and treatises to the effect that it is the useful life and
salvage value to the business which is relevant. See the authorities cited at 364 U.S. at 106
n.7 and MONTGOMERY'S AUDTNG, supra note 13, at 271.
199. Even in the medical malpractice cases nonexperts like chiropractors sometimes
have been allowed to testify, and books and articles, although usually prohibited as hearsay,
in a few states are admitted under common law or statute. See McCoid, The Care Required
of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. Rlv. 549, 619-21 (1959). For a discussion of arguments
in favor of admissibility of treatises see 6 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCe §§ 1691-92 (3d ed. 1940).
200. For a description of such panels in the medical area see 1 D. LOUISELL & H.
WILLAMS, MEDicAL MALPRAcrIcE 10-12 (1973).
19751
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
materially misleading financial statements whether audited or not,
or for misleading statements or failure to speak up when a duty
arises even absent any misleading financial statements. In this part,
some aspects of liability to third parties on audited statements only
will be considered. And, since this paper is not a treatise, we will
consider only a few of the questions that seem particularly interest-
ing at this time. They will include: first, whether more than the
audited statements should be considered "expertised" by the audi-
tors under section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act; secondly, the duty
to discover fraud; thirdly, who can sue accountants for misleading
financials; and lastly, whether the flexible duty standard should
supplant culpability. Liability on other than audited statements
and the auditor's duty to "blow the whistle" on his client will be
the subjects of the next part. Numerous other questions will be left
unexplored.
A. "Expertised" Portions of the Registration Statement Under
§ 11 of the 1933 Act
Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act20' imposes on various par-
ticipants in a registered offering of securities liability for damages
for misleading registration statements. The right is limited to per-
sons who purchase the registered securities,"'2 and the liability is
imposed unless the defendant establishes his own due diligence (the
issuer has no "due diligence" defense).
Among those liable are:
every accountant . . . who has with his consent been named as having
prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having
prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with
the registration statement, with respect to the statement in such registration
statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certi-
fied by him. . ..
The literature is replete with fine discussions of section 11 lia-
bility, especially concerning the BarChris case,24 and what has al-
ready been said need not be repeated. There is, however, one ques-
tion peculiar to accountants' liability under section 11 that deserves
further consideration: Does the accountant's "expertised" portions
of the registration statement mean only the audited financial state-
201. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
202. Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1970).
204. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See, e.g.,




ments or does it include other financial data such as unaudited
interim statements, summaries, and charts? This issue was raised
and resolved in BarChris but it rests on a factual determination in
each case.
In the typical underwritten registered offering the auditor per-
forms three tasks with respect to the financial statements. He
usually:
(a) audits a set of statements for the preceding year, which are
contained in the prospectus;
(b) performs an "S-1 review" of events up to a date on or
closely before the effective date of the registration statement;
20 5
(c) conducts certain procedures to enable him to write a
"comfort letter" for the underwriters delivered at the closing date
(i.e., the date when the proceeds of the offering are delivered by the
underwriter to the issuer or seller) .214
All three activities involve substantial investigation of events subse-
quent to the balance sheet date"7 and the latter two extend far
beyond the normal audit and typically will involve events subse-
quent to the original auditor's report. The comfort letter investiga-
tion will even include some period after the effective date of the
registration statement.
Thus on the original audit of financials for a period ending
December 31 of Year One, because the auditor's report will be exe-
cuted some time after the year end, it has become standard practice
to consider additional evidence with respect to conditions existing
at the date of the balance sheet and which affect the data therein.
These include matters such as a loss on an uncollectible account
receivable that became certain after the balance sheet date but was
the result of prior conditions, or a repurchase pursuant to a "put"
agreement with a purchaser of the company's product.2 8 That type
of post-balance-sheet-date event affects the figures on the Year One
financials and must be taken into account. A second type of infor-
mation may become available which, although it does not affect the
Year One figures, is so material as to require disclosure. For exam-
ple, disclosure should be made of securities issuances or business
205. This is required by § 11(a) of the 1933 Act, which fixes responsibilities as of the
effective date. For descriptions of an S-1 review, see Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643, 701-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) and SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 710.08.
206. For a description of the recommended procedures on a comfort letter engagement,
see SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 630. These are not prescribed auditing procedures. Id.
at AU § 630.02.
207. For the post balance sheet date auditing duties on a normal audit, see SAS No. 1,
supra note 20, at AU § 560.
208. See In re Touche Ross & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release 153 (Feb. 25, 1974).
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acquisitions occurring after the end of Year One. The auditor's duty
with respect to facts arising between the balance sheet date and the
auditor's report date includes, according to SAS No. 1,209 a duty to
read the latest available interim statements, to interview officers
regarding post balance sheet date events, to review corporate min-
utes and to perform other procedures. A failure to perform these
duties properly may result in the auditor's liability for resultant
misleading statements.
The S-1 review similarly entails post-balance-sheet-date in-
vestgation as above, plus study of the proposed registration state-
ment.
The comfort letter for underwriters is a matter of contract be-
tween the parties, but usually includes specific representations by
the auditor of his independence, and compliance as to form with
SEC requirements for audited and interim unaudited statements,
changes in certain items after year-end and other financial data.
The comfort letter usually is dated after the offering date and at or
shortly before the closing date. It ordinarily is addressed to the lead
underwriter and expressly is made exclusively for his use without
right of publication.
Despite all this activity beyond the audited statements,
BarChris, construing section 11 of the 1933 Act, held auditors liable
only for misrepresentations in the audited statements210 because the
statute imposes liability only for a matter for which the accountant
has consented to be named as having prepared or certified ' any
part of the registration statement or a report which is used in
connection with the registration statement and which is itself mis-
leading. In the eyes of the court, the auditors in BarChris apparently
did not consent to such use beyond the audited statements. Never-
theless, as in that case, the post-balance-sheet-date investigation
may be inadequately performed to establish the accountant's due
diligence defense under section 11 with respect to the audited state-
209. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 560.11-560.12.
210. 283 F. Supp. at 684.
211. Accountants' reports do not "certify" anything although they once did [see Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931)] and accountants claim that they
do not prepare the statements, which they say are management's. See note 110 supra. They
might thus claim that the first two italicized words in the quoted portion of § 11(a)(4) have
no applicability to them in the usual case. But the term "certify" is used in Schedule A, items
(25), (26), and (27) as describing the required auditor's report. Thus it has a technical
meaning under the Act that includes reporting. At any rate, the accountant has "prepared"
his "report" (see the next three italicized words), which is used in connection with the
registration statement and thus even if a court were prone to hold accountants' reports to
not be certifications, and financial statements to be prepared by management, the express
language of § 11(a)(4) is sufficient to cover the matter.
[Vol. 28
A CCOUNTANTS RESPONSIBILITIES
ments. BarChris also held that the contractual terms of the comfort
letter would preclude finding a duty based on the representations
therein running to persons other than the underwriter.22
The scope of section 11 liability for auditors is important be-
cause although auditors mjay be held liable on audited or unaudited
statements under other securities acts sections, the section 11 case
for a plaintiff is relatively simple since he need merely prove the
existence of misrepresentations in the registration statement. Is
BarChris correct in holding the auditors liable only for the audited
statements under section 11?
Since the issue under section 11 is whether the auditors have
with their consent been named as having prepared or certified any
part of the registration statement or any report used in connection
with it, the question in each case is a factual one. Given his exten-
sive post-balance-sheet-date activities, even if an auditor merely is
named as the firm's accountant in the registration statement, it
would seem that he might be held liable under section 11 for mis-
leading unaudited interim statements or summaries of earnings and
similar accounting data. The point is that the statute does not limit
liability to audited statements but limits liability to matters that
the auditor has "with his consent been named as having prepared
or certified." If a reader might reasonably infer that the auditor has
prepared misleading data, he should be held liable under section 11.
Since under section 11(b)(3)(C) nonexperts have no duty to
investigate expertised portions of the registration statement, the
nonexpert underwriter, directors and others will have some interest
in the expansion of the accountant's expertised work.
In addition to liability for statements in a prospectus or a regis-
tration statement under section 11, liability under the ubiquitous
Rule 10b-5 also may ensue. Different legal issues will arise in that
situation, including the issue whether section 11 and Rule 10b-5
may both apply to a prospectus misrepresentation case, 2 3 the proper
212. 283 F. Supp. at 698. If the terms of the comfort letter read differently, contract or
tort law principles might yield a different result. For example it would not take much to
enable fashioning a third party beneficiary case. Nevertheless the typical comfort letter is
drafted as in BarChris to avoid this type of claim. Of course, a claim under Rule 10b-5 (in
addition to a contractual claim) by the underwriter against the authors of the comfort letter
may be present when, as is usual, the underwriters have purchased the securities. Cf. Drake
v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967); H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F.
Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). And, the auditors may be considered "participants" with the
issuer for purposes of § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. See Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59
(N.D. Ohio 1964); 2 A. BROMBERG, SacuRmEs LAw: FRAUD § 8.5 (315) (1973); Folk, Civil
Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 199, 201-
07, 215-16 (1969).
213. For varying views see, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (private
19751
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
test of materiality, causation of the transaction and of the loss,
justifiability of the plaintiff's actions, and the measure of damages.
Moreover, Rule 10b-5 liability is not limited to statements for which
the auditor has consented to the use of his name.
Certain express liabilities also exist under section 12(2) of the
1933 Act but, since privity is required thereunder, an auditor could
be liable only as a "participant" in a section 12(2) wrong.214 Section
17 of that Act also has been the basis for implied private actions in
many courts.
21 5
If the registration statement is also doubling as a proxy state-
ment as is frequently the case in a merger transaction, liability may
also arise for violation of the proxy rules under section 14 of the 1934
Act.26 Finally, section 18 of the 1934 Act, which covers false reports
to the Commission, may be a basis for liability for misleading state-
ments in registration statements .217
These other liability provisions may prove of practical import-
ance if section 11 is unavailable as, for example, when the section
13 period of limitations has run or the plaintiff is unable to establish
the linear privity with the issuer or secondary seller as required by
Barnes v. Osofsky.218 Usually a plaintiff will include claims under
one or more of these sections to avoid the narrow limitation of sec-
tion 11 to statements for which the accountant has consented to
have his name used.
suit available); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 282 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1967)
(no private suit against any seller under 10b-5), rev'd, 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968); Trussell
v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964) (if scienter present, 10b-5 is
available); Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (no
suit against sellers under 10b-5 if an express remedy is available). For a recent analysis, see
Stewart. v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1973).
214. See Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964) and In re Caesar's
Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), upholding an aiding and abetting
claim under § 12(2).
215. See, e.g., Hanraty v. Ostertag, 470 F.2d 1096 (10th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Jackson
Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262
(7th Cir. 1967); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 788-91 (8th Cir. 1967); Harris
v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1964); Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n.2 (2d Cir. 1951); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp.
1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972). But see Horton, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act-The Wrong
Place for a Private Right, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 44 (1973).
216. SEC Rule 145 relating to business combinations treats a merger proxy statement
as a § 11 registration statement. Thus the same document will be subject both to § 11 of the
1933 Act and § 14 of the 1934 Act.
217. See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F.
Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
218. 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 28
1975] A CCOUNTANTS RESPONSIBILITIES
B. The Auditor's Duties Concerning Discovery of Management's
Creative Accounting and Frauds by Others
Accountants frequently state that their duties do not include
discovery of fraud. The scope of duty concerning fraud is a crucial
aspect of the question of liability to third parties, for if auditors have
no duty to use care to discover frauds, including management misre-
presentations in the financial statements, or if having such a duty,
it is owing only to the client, no liability could arise to third parties
on the part of auditors except in the rare case in which the auditor
is an active swindler.
2 19
Thus, two pertinent questions arise:
(a) What duties, if any, does an accountant have concerning
frauds on the client or misrepresentations by the client's manage-
ment in the financials?
(b) If the duty arises, to whom is it owed?
The AICPA has stated abundantly and clearly that the auditor
must be aware of the potentiality for fraud and be on the lookout
for it; 22 GAAS require that an auditor must develop and properly
apply tests of the client's internal control system221 and that if suspi-
219. Only infrequently is the auditor guilty of seeking consciously to defraud third
parties. The following observation, of ancient vintage, remains true:
[D]erelictions by accountants are for the most part not a result of greed to share in the
loot produced by fraud. On the contrary, accountants have been led astray by their
desire to help their clients out of a particular embarrassment by stretching a point of
auditing or accounting principle. Unless the affairs of the client improve, the accoun-
tants subsequently find themselves committed to the same intentional errors but to a
greater degree, until a day of reckoning, when third parties, usually creditors, stockhold-
ers, or the government, delve into the affairs of the client and discover the fraud...
almost invariably the facts show that except for the retention of the particular client of
doubtful value, accountants have not profited by the schemes. . . . Kostelanetz,
Accountants Responsibilities and the Criminal Law, THE NEw YoRK CERTIFIED PUBLIC
AccouNTANT 401 (July 1943), quoted approvingly in Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37
S.E.C. 629, 669 n.59 (1957).
220. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 110.05 states:
In making the ordinary examination, the independent auditor is aware of the possibility
that fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated as the result of defalcations
and similar irregularities, or deliberate misrepresentation by management, or both. The
auditor recognizes that fraud, if sufficiently material, may affect his opinion on the
financial statements, and his examination, made in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards, gives consideration to this possibility. However, the ordinary exami-
nation directed to the expression of an opinion on financial statements is not primarily
or specifically designed, and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other
similar irregularities, although their discovery may result. Similarly, although the dis-
covery of deliberate misrepresentation by management is usually more closely associated
with the objective of the ordinary examination, such examination cannot be relied upon
to assure its discovery. The responsibility of the independent auditor for failure to detect
fraud (which responsibility differs as to clients and others) arises only when such failure
clearly results from failure to comply with generally accepted auditing standards.
221. Id. AU § 110.06.
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cious circumstances arise, he must probe thoroughly if he is to con-
tinue the engagement.2 2 The frauds to which these GAAS apply
include employee defalcations and other violations of the firm's well
being, but even "more closely associated with the objective of the
ordinary examination" is misrepresentation by management in the
financial statements.
Thus, no duty to guarantee discovery of all fraud is imposed,
but a duty to investigate is present, especially for misrepresen-
tations by management in the financials. And, if suspicious circum-
stances arise a further duty to probe arises. Indeed, often this is the
very purpose of the engagement." 3 Because the source of the duty
to investigate and the duty to inquire into suspicious circumstances
is GAAS, when the standards are incorporated in state law rules, the
duty is a state law duty, whereas it is a federal law duty when
incorporated in a federal law rule.1
24
Several recent cases illustrate both the duty to probe suspicious
circumstances and the duty to investigate for fraud or management
misrepresentations even absent suspicions.
1. The Duty To Inquire Into Suspicious Circumstances
The essential basis of Simon22 was that the Second Circuit
panel simply could not bring itself to sanction nondisclosure, no
matter what GAAP provided, when it was known by the auditors
that the controlling person of the client corporation was misusing
corporate funds for his personal stock speculations. In dictum the
court further stated that when the auditor has reason to doubt that
the corporate affairs are being honestly conducted, he must extend
his audit procedures to determine whether his suspicions are justi-
fied. If so, full disclosure is required "unless he has made sure the
wrong has been righted and procedures to avoid a repetition have
been established.
' '2 6
Other cases deal with the duty to probe suspicious circum-
stances. For example, in 1136 Tenants Corp. v. Max Rothenberg &
Co.227 the defendant accountants were charged with failure to un-
cover defalcations of the building manager. The Appellate Division
held that on becoming aware that invoices purportedly paid by the
222. Id. AU § 110.07.
223. National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App. Div. 226, 235-36, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 554,
563 (1939).
224. Cf. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
225. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
226. 425 F.2d at 806-07.
227. 36 App. Div. 2d 804, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 1007 (1971), afj'd, 30 N.Y.2d 585, 281 N.E.2d
846, 330 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1972).
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manager were missing, the accountant had a duty at least to inform
the client. "Defendant was not free to consider these and other
suspicious circumstances as being of no significance and prepare its
financial reports as if same did not exist. '228
United States v. Benjamin 2 1 also involved suspicious circum-
stances that the court held were enough to substantiate a finding
of criminally intentional misrepresentation. In this case the defen-
dant accountant, among other things, was victimized by his client's
lack of credit to cover a 200 dollar hotel bill; yet he reported that
the company had fine prospects. The court used an apt phrase to
describe in a negative form the accountant's duty to probe suspi-
cious circumstances, saying that intent was shown when the "defen-
dant deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had a duty to see." 2 °
One recent case of failure to inquire into suspicious circum-
stances, the U.S. Financial fiasco, 2 is of timely import because it
is typical of the epidemic of creative accounting cases. These cases
were most dramatically portrayed in the Penn Central outrages 232
but were also exemplified in the Westec, IOS, Franklin National,
Republic National Life Insurance, Westgate California Corporation,
and other situations.2ss The basic fraud in these situations was the
use of some related entity (or an unrelated entity with a side agree-
ment protecting it from loss) with which a transaction is made,
usually involving little or no real cash from the other party and
artificially high values, which are usually indefensible, designed to
result in accounting profits. One also is led to suspect, because of
the sophistication displayed, that more often than not some accoun-
tant, if not the auditor, has advised upon and condoned the
228. 36 App. Div. 2d 804, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 1008 (1971); accord, Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F.
Supp. 255, 266 (D. Ore. 1972) (dictum).
229. 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
230. See also United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v.
Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
231. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974).
232. STAFF REP. OF THE SEC To SPEC. SUECOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY (1972); SEC v. Penn Central Co., CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,527 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (complaint); COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, THE PENN
CENTRAL FAILURE AND THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, Staff Rep. H.R. 92d Cong., 1st sess.
(1972); COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, INADEQUACIES OF PROTECTIONS FOR
INVESTORS IN PENN CENTRAL AND OTHER ICC-RIGuLATED COMPANIES, StaffRep. H.R. 92d Cong.
(1971); Hearings Before Spec. Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Penn Central Trans. Co.: Adequacy of Investor Protection, H.R. 91st Cong., 2d
sess. (1970).
233. See A. BRILOFF, UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING (1972) for one generally available
description of some of these matters.They have been documented in dozens of news and other
articles over the past several years. Regarding Republic National, see Accounting Series




scheme.24 The use of related persons to inflate income artificially
is an ancient device and auditors from the beginning have been
taught that whenever a sale is made between such persons the price
is not to be taken at face value unless face value is fair value.
235
Thus, if an asset with a fair value of twenty dollars is sold by a
parent to an unconsolidated subsidiary for one hundred dollars,
even if for cash, the eighty-dollar difference that would have been
sales income in an arm's length transaction is simply a dividend or
contribution to the capital of the parent and perhaps waste by the
subsidiary.
In U.S. Financial, according to a consent order that did not
constitute an admission of facts, the transactions were more compli-
cated. In one deal, USF purportedly sold some land and uncom-
pleted buildings to a company called Burnham at a profit of 550,000
dollars under a letter agreement that was never closed. The agree-
ment committed USF to complete construction, to use its best ef-
forts to secure permanent financing for the buyer, to pay underwrit-
ing costs for Burnham's planned syndication of the property, and
to guarantee Burnham against loss from operations. After the year
end USF was forced to take back the properties under a verbal
"put" agreement and found two so-called buyers who were in fact
nominees of USF, one of whom used USF's own funds. According
to the consent order, the USF auditors, Touche, Ross & Co., report-
edly knew that the closing was never documented, received the
document containing the guarantee against loss but failed to exam-
ine it, and failed to pursue the post-balance-sheet-date resales.
Other transactions involved the use of USF's own funds to fi-
nance pretended purchases or swaps of real estate, or joint ventures
or partnerships, some of which were elaborately constructed on the
misrepresented basis that "tax reasons" required it. In addition a
pattern developed whereby USF made very few but very large trans-
actions, all very complex and usually at year end. Further, an at-
mosphere developed of keen interest by management in reported
profits.
The Commission, with its usual sophistication, held that these
characteristics were badges of nonarms-length transactions that
should have aroused suspicions entailing extended audit proce-
234. "A really successful fraud can scarcely be accomplished in our complex financial
worlds without the help of accountants and lawyers. This may be active and intentional
connivance or it may be more passive and subtle, but it is frequently essential." Speech of
Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. of the SEC before ABA National Institute on Professional Liabil-
ity, May 30-31, 1974, Montreal.




dures. The Commission stated very specifically that it was not going
beyond GAAS. It quoted from the McKesson and Robbins release
stating:
[W]e believe that . . .[with respect to] examinations for corporations whose
securities are held by the public, accountants can be expected to detect gross
overstatements of assets and profits, whether resulting from fraud or other-
wise. We believe that alertness on the part of the entire [audit] staff, coupled
with intelligent analysis by experienced accountants of the manner of doing
business, should detect overstatements in the accounts, regardless of their
cause, long before they assume the magnitude reached in this case. Further-
more, an examination of this kind should not, in our opinion, exclude the
highest officers of the corporation from its appraisal of the manner in which
the business under'review is conducted. . . .[W]e feel that the discovery of
gross overstatements in the accounts is a major purpose of . . . an
audit. .... "I
Significantly, the Commission refused validity to a defense
being raised frequently of late to the effect that the auditors were
themselves victims of the fraud, having been misled by USF. The
Commission quite properly made it clear that it is part of the audi-
tor's job to detect management deceptions and that it is not suffi-
cient to obtain assurances from management itself that transactions
are legitimate. Thus, when one of the aforesaid badges of a
nonarms-length transaction appears, "it is critical that the accoun-
tant not only receive assurances that [it] . . .does not involve
members of management, but also that he obtain information con-
cerning the nature and extent of the [transaction] as well as the
identity of the [participants] ."237
2. The Duty To Investigate Even Absent
Suspicious Circumstances
The auditor's duty does not permit him to wait for an alarm bell
to arouse him to investigation. He has a duty in the first instance
to focus a skeptical eye on the accounts. That is the purpose of an
audit-it is not merely an arithmetical check and a determination
of compliance with form. One of the things GAAS specifically in-
clude is a duty to look for the suspicious circumstances that in turn
will raise the auditor's duty to probe to the bottom.
One recent case illustrating the existence and scope of the duty
to investigate is Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst.21 In this case, one
Leston Nay, president and ninety-two percent stockholder of a bro-
236. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19 (Dec. 5, 1940).
237. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974). The Commission similarly
dismissed Arthur Andersen's defense that it had been defrauded by its client in In re Arthur
Andersen & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release No. 157 (July 8, 1974).
238. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
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kerage firm audited by the defendants, induced the plaintiffs to put
their funds in a special account established for the purpose of yield-
ing a high return. In fact, Nay used the funds for his own purposes
as disclosed in his suicide note. The defendants were charged with
aiding and abetting Nay's fraud, even though they had no knowl-
edge of it, on the basis that they had been guilty of negligently
failing to discover and follow up by further procedures the existence
of Nay's "mail rule," whereby he directed that all mail addressed
to him or to his attention was to be opened by no one but himself,
even if he was away from the office.
The Seventh Circuit panel held that there were both common
law and federal securities acts duties to investigate by virtue of the
undertaking to make the audits and that the appropriate standard
of conduct was the AICPA statement of GAAS. The court quoted
from the prodecessor of SAS No. 1, § 110.05239 and then determined
the scope of the duty in the circumstances. It held that the auditor's
duty to study and evaluate the client's internal control system 4'
raised two issues for the trier of facts:
(1) whether Nay's "mail rule" constituted a material inade-
quacy in [the brokerage firm's] system of internal accounting
countrol; and
(2) whether [the defendants] failed to exercise the due care
required of a professional auditor in that it did not discover a mate-
rial inadequacy in internal accounting control.24 '
In an extremely thorough opinion, the court in Pacific Accept-
ance Corp. Ltd. v. Forsyth,242 spelled out the auditor's duty to inves-
tigate as well as his additional duty to probe irregularities. In that
case one Thomson, a director and principal shareholder, had pro-
cured loans from Pacific Acceptance Corporation, Ltd., on the secu-
rity of fictitious real estate mortgages. The auditors had verified the
mortgages through Thomson's attorney but had not physically ex-
amined the documents themselves. When Thomson failed, Pacific
lost over a million dollars.
The court found that the auditors had failed in their duty to
study and evaluate the internal control system by ascertaining the
nature of the system, appraising its reliability and sampling its
operation. Numerous other acts of negligence also were found, in-
239. See note 220 supra.
240. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 150.02.
241. 503 F.2d at 1111.
In re Touche Ross & Co., ASR No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974) also contains further illustrations
of the duty to investigate. See the descriptions of the deals involving Palm Springs Mobile
Country Club and Coastal Land Corporation.
242. Pacific Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v. Forsyth [1970] 92 N.S.W. 29.
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cluding a failure to follow up numerous irregularities beyond an
inquiry of employees. The court said that detecting speculations by
employees was incidental to the main task, "but the auditor should
satisfy himself that the internal control, together with his audit
procedure, guard against major frauds.
' 243
From this discussion one can see readily that it is deceptive to
urge that GAAS do not impose a duty to discover fraud. As the trial
judge in Pacific Acceptance accurately stated, the audit must be
designed so "that if fraud exists there are reasonable prospects of it
being revealed. ' 2  And, Hochfelder demonstrates that a question of
fact is posed by a failure to discover the fraud.
One further aspect of the duty to investigate, which is illus-
trated by Pacific Acceptance, should be mentioned; that is the ques-
243. Id. at 65. One particularly meaningful passage is quoted here rather extensively
since the report is not generally available. At page 65-66 the court stated:
The magnitude of thepossibility of fraud and its possible nature to be considered in
any particular audit will depend on the nature of the organization involved and the
manner in which its business is conducted and the auditor pays due regard to the
possibility by considering it in its particular context. It is possible it may occur within
or outside the company . . . or at a low or high level of authority for these human
frailties may extend to any such person. The possibility of fraud may be greater in
certain organizations, particularly where the temptations or opportunities for fraud are
greater or control is weaker. Fraud usually does not appear on the face of a company's
records, but often indications of it will appear in the form of irregularities, and often it
is only by examining the irregularities that fraud is revealed.
An auditor pays due regard to the possibility of fraud or error by framing and
carrying out his procedures, having in mind the general and particular possibilities that
exist, to the intent that if a substantial or material error or fraud has crept into the
affairs of the company he has a reasonable expectation that it will be revealed. The
problem is an intensely practical one. On the other hand, it may be unjust to criticize a
procedure, particularly with hindsight, merely because it was not apt to reveal some
fraud devised with particular ingenuity or some isolated or minor fraud or error ....
In such instances in particular it is important with resolution to exclude the operation
of hindsight, because after the event it is often so easy to think of procedures that could
have been adopted that would have revealed even the ingenious fraud, whereas in fact
the auditor looking at the matter as it then presented itself was acting reasonably. A
judge can only guard against this danger by constantly reminding himself of it, as I have
endeavoured to do. On the other hand, it should be recognized that an auditor has an
opportunity to plan much of work in advance and to work out a programme, which is
often built up over a period of time, having some general application, based on some
understanding of the possible points of danger in the financial affairs of an organization.
He therefore has an opportunity, with some deliberation and forethought, to design
procedures which take some account at least of the fact that experience has shown that
frauds or their concealment commonly involve manipulation at particular points in the
financial operations of a business-for example, cash inanipulations near a balance date,
which manipulations often fall into various well-known patterns; or, for example, manip-
ulation by means of various descriptions of fictitious sales, purchases, loans or borrow-
ings; or, for example, misappropriation of moneys received or intended to be paid out,
usually covered up by well-known devices; or, for example, manipulations of various
types in respect of stock or securities or supposed stock or securities of the business.
244. 92 N.S.W. at 64.
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tion of delegability of responsibility. Frequently an auditor must
rely on the attorney of the client, or on other auditors of subsidiary
companies or recent merger partners. As to the right to rely on
attorneys, for example, concerning the existence of contingent lia-
bilities, it seems that the right to rely extends only to matters within
the attorney's legal expertise. Thus, Pacific Acceptance held the
auditor must examine the original mortgage documents to ascertain
whether they existed and he may not rely on an attorney's state-
ment of their existence since that is not a technical legal question.
24
If personal inspection was not feasible, a system of testing the relia-
bility of the attorney's responses, such as spot checking, would have
to be devised. The court did indicate that if a legal question arose
the attorney's advice might be observed unless circumstances indi-
cated it was unreliable.
Further authorities indicating that auditors may not avoid re-
sponsibility by delegating their own duties exist in analogous cases.
Thus, in BarChris the court would not contemplate excusing the
underwriters' counsel on the basis of their reliance on issuer's
counsel.246 Also, Gould v. American Hawaiian SS. Co. 247 held proxy
solicitors had no right to depend on the corporate counsel to correct
proxy statements that became false. On the other hand, a case
indirectly upholding the auditor's right to rely on an attorney for
legal questions is the dictum in SEC v. Frank48 that would permit
an attorney's reliance on a chemist's technical description.
If it is the rule that an auditor may delegate responsibility to
an attorney only for legal matters, certain questions arising in the
current debate concerning an attorney's responses to auditor's re-
quests for information 249 should be dealt with in a different manner
than currently proposed in some quarters. For example, one pro-
posal is that an auditor should rely on an attorney's determination
that certain liabilities are not material. 20 Doubtless, materiality
often will be a legal question, as when a claim is considered to be
without any legal basis. On the other hand, when the determination
of materiality is made on a quantitative basis, it is more an account-
ing question than a legal one.
245. 92 N.S.W. at 30, 83-4, 86.
246. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
247. 351 F. Supp. 853, 867 (D. Del. 1972).
248. 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
249. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, Scope of Lawyers' Re-
sponses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 29 Bus. LAWYER 1391 (1974); Deer, Lawyers'
Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 28 Bus. LAWYER 947 (1973).
250. ABA COMMITTEE ON CORP. LAW AND ACCT'G., SEC. OF CORPORATION, BANKINO AND




Another area in which the delegability problem presents acute
practical difficulties is the right to rely on other auditors. Only a
brief mention of some questions will be made here.
When one auditor prepares consolidated statements and a sub-
sidiary's statements have been audited by another auditor, a fre-
quent situation in these days of conglomerates and multi-nationals,
is it enough for the auditor's report merely to state that the audit
of the subsidiary was conducted by another firm, as was done in one
case? 5' As a minimum it would seem that the consolidating auditor
should make some inquiry into the reputation of the other, his inde-
pendence, and perhaps take other steps to assure accuracy. 2 2 Indeed
GAAS may require it.253
There is, however, a further consideration. As recognized in
Pacific Acceptance25 the relationship of the consolidating auditor to
the shareholders is different from that of the subsidiary's auditors
to the shareholders. They may be (a) answerable only to manage-
ment or (b) operating under a lesser practical and legal duty in
relation to management's own activities.
The AICPA has addressed the problem of multiple auditors by
providing generalized guidelines for the reporting auditor.2 55 The
guidelines do not resolve the above questions but seem to assume
they do not exist by often referring to a "division of responsibility."
The problems have prompted at least one firm not to accept
engagements unless it audits all affiliates. The court in Pacific
Acceptance recommended a single auditor for all companies when
practicable, and when it was not, identification of the other auditors
and confirmation of their selection by the parent's shareholders.256
251. Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 244-45, 191 N.E. 808, 810 (1934). Reg. S-X,
§ 2-05 provides minimal requirements in this situation, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-05 (1974).
252. See SEC Rel. No. 33-5275 (7-26-72), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., Special Rep. No. 434,
pp. 11-12 (1972) in which a participating underwriter in an offering was said to be entitled to
delegate the § 11 duty to investigate to lead underwriters, although "he must take some steps
to assure the accuracy of the statements in the registration statement. To do this, he at least
should assure himself that the manager made a reasonable investigation."
253. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 543.10.
254. See 92 N.S.W. at 32, 48-49, 112-16.
255. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 543. See also SAS No. 2 14 (1974).
256. 92 N.S.W. at 126. According to The Wall Street Journal, one alleged fraud in
Equity Funding was facilitated by the fact that two different auditors were retained. At one
point the parent company pretended to have paid out cash of $16 million for certificates of
deposit when in fact the cash was paid to a subsidiary purportedly as insurance premium
receipts.
The subsidiazy's auditors did not bother to check the source of the $16 million as it was
cash and hence not suspect. After the subsidiary's audit, the cash was repaid to the parent
whose auditors again did not consider it necessary to check the source. If the same auditor
had performed both audits the money shuffle might have been discovered. Wall Street J.,
Jan. 6, 1975, at p. 32, cols. 1-6.
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3. Auditors' Duties To Third Parties
Concerning Discovery of Fraud
The issue whether auditors' duties run to third parties (i.e., to
other than clients) will be discussed immediately below.
C. Common Law Liability To Third Parties for
Negligence-The Replacement of Privity
The common law liabilities for misrepresentation have not been
uniformly settled. The difficulties arise from (a) the fact that misre-
presentation is the common nexus of various liabilities, criminal
and civil, legal and equitable, in tort257 and in contract,258 as well as
(b) an unwillingness to establish tight definitions of the elements of
liability.
Thus, even if a particular jurisdiction establishes a set of ele-
ments for the single common law action in deceit, the statement of
elements does not describe fully the law of misrepresentation in that
jurisdiction because additional remedies, for example, negligence or
equitable rescission, may be available. Also, as between different
jurisdictions and even from case to case in a single jurisdiction, the
content of the elements of the deceit action may vary, as when the
jurisdiction requires "scienter," but it is defined in one case to in-
clude only a "conscious awareness" of falsity and in another to
include a "reckless disregard" for the truth or falsity of the state-
ment. Even if one verbal formula is used, the evidence to meet it
varies from case to case.
Further, because of the subjective nature of such elements as
materiality, scienter and reliance, much circumstantial evidence
and imprecise methods of dealing with the evidence compound the
chaotic picture of this field of law.21 The tort writers have not been
able to systematize satisfactorily the law in any intellectually com-
fortable form.
26
Nevertheless, perhaps we can isolate one major problem for
257. Misrepresentation is often found at the root of tort actions no one conceives of as
being misrepresentation actions. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 683-84 (4th ed. 1971) for a
catalogue.
258. The debate over whether actions for innocent misrepresentation lie in tort or con-
tract continues. See Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLuM. L. REv. 679
(1973).
259. See Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 583
(1958); Comment, Warranty and Deceit-Remedy for Misrepresentation in Contract
Negotiations, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 244, 247-49 (1959) (describing the confusion in the Wisconsin
decisions).
260. For one treatment, see W. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS 683-736 (4th ed. 1971) and
Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 231 (1966).
[Vol. 28
A CCOUNTANTS RESPONSIBILITIES
scrutiny-the need for privity between plaintiff and defendant in a
damage suit for negligent misrepresentation-since this issue is
often raised and has been the subject of some interesting recent
developments.
To place the question in context, the following simplistic, yet
convenient, sketch of the various liabilities for misrepresentation
should be kept in mind. When a misrepresentation of a material fact
is made by one party to another in a business transaction, causing
some injury, an action may lie in contract for breach of warranty.
For example, when an accounting firm misrepresents that it has
conducted an audit in accordance with GAAS, resulting in some loss
to the client, the client may sue for breach of the engagement con-
tract to perform the audit in accordance with GAAS. Or, the action
may be for the torts of deceit or negligence. In addition to those
three legal remedies, numerous equitable remedies may be sought,
for example, raising the misrepresentation as a basis for rescission
or reformation of the contract. Or, the misrepresentation may be a
defense in a legal or equitable action by the auditor.
When the injured person, instead of being the client, is a third
party, such as an investor in the audited firm, the range of choice
of actions is narrowed (assuming a stockholder's derivative action
is not appropriate). The third-party common-law action is most
likely to be one for deceit or negligence when the injury is pecuniary,
as opposed to physical harm to person or property.
If in deceit, the plaintiff will have to prove (1) a false represen-
tation, (2) some form of knowledge of the falsity, (3) an intention
to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action, (4) justifiable
reliance, and (5) resultant damage.
26'
If the action is for negligence, the first question is whether
negligence under the circumstances is at all actionable.262 Assuming
it is, the second element of deceit, knowledge, would of course be
replaced by: "a failure to exercise reasonable care or competence in
obtaining or communicating the information. 2  The first, fourth
and fifth elements of negligence probably could be subsumed in the
same above-numbered elements of deceit, although the factual con-
tents of the elements may differ.
As noted, one difficult question is whether an action should lie
for mere negligence, but the cited materials indicate that the ques-
tion has been much discussed, and little can be added on the sub-
261. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
262. See, e.g., Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 583 (1958); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 545-51 (1956).
263. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
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ject.211 Much recent activity concerning the third element has oc-
curred, involving the question of the relatioiship between plaintiff
and defendant required to sustain the action. 265 This is our concern
here.
The requirement of privity for negligent torts resulting in pecu-
niary loss, once based in historical sources, 266 acquired a policy
ground in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche.2 17 In that case, Judge
Cardozo, forced to distinguish the newly decided cases eliminating
privity for physical torts, and fearing the possible ruin of the ac-
counting profession from exposure to third-party claims, suggested
that the legislature, not the courts, should be the agency to change
the law if alteration was desirable. The unlimited publicity that
misleading financial statements might obtain was viewed as a po-
tential cause of widespread reliance and loss, and a change in the
law to liability for such loss was considered too radical for judicial
reform like that which altered the law of physical torts in
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.26 It is important, however, to note
two features of Ultramares.
First, the court did not hold that only those in privity of con-
tract with the accountant could recover for negligence; the circle of
liability encompassed persons who were recipients of the defen-
dant's representation as the end and aim of the transaction, some-
264. The tandem nature of the two questions of whether an action will lie for negligent
misrepresentation and if so, what relationship will be required between the parties, may be
noted. If it is said that the negligence action may be maintained but only by one in privity
with the defendant, what is also being said is that the action cannot be maintained by a third
party. Because the existence of the two variables complicates discussion, and to anchor the
problem for analysis, Prosser suggests discussing the cases by dividing them into 3 categories
of constants: (a) intentional misrepresentation; (b) negligent misrepresentation; (c)'innocent
misrepresentation. Another approach, perhaps more efficient from the parties' viewpoint is
to organize them according to whether they are either of two constants: (a) suits between
parties in privity, or (b) third party actions.
265. The cases are collected and well analyzed in Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1972).
266. Privity was originally required because actions for misrepresentation were thought
to arise ex contractu, and only a party to the contract could enforce it. But even contract
rights were extended somewhat by the third party beneficiary concept of Lawrence v. Fox,
20 N.Y. 268 (1859). Before long, however, misrepresentation became a basis for tort action;
but then, even physical torts required some direct relationship between the parties. It was
not until MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) that the citadel
of privity finally fell in the United States. For an early case involving negligent accounting
and requiring privity of contract, apparently on the historical ground that there is not duty
of care owed to third parties to avoid pecuniary torts, only a contractual duty to parties in
privity, see Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919).
For the genesis of the historical rule that the duty of care in performance of a contract
ran only to parties to the contract, see Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
267. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
268. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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times known as the "primary beneficiary,""2 9 a bond "so close as to
approach that of privity" but nevertheless not identical with it.
Secondly, the reason for not extending liability further was based
on the fact that extension would be a change of the law and Judge
Cardozo felt it not feasible for a court to determine whether the
economic impact of further liability would destroy the profession; 271
rather, "[a] change so revolutionary, if expedient, must be wrought
by legislation."' Thus, Judge Cardozo did not find the wide expo-
sure; he merely hypothesized its possibility and, as a matter of his
perception of the legal process, thought it would be better for the
legislature rather than a court to decide it.
Despite the first feature, it was not long before the case came
to be cited for requiring privity. 72 Only recently have a few courts
been persuaded to read the opinion more carefully. 23 More impor-
tantly, the second aspect of Ultramares, opting for the status quo
in the face of unknown exposure, must be recognized as a product
of the times-a period when the role of the auditor and the matu-
rity, power and prestige of the profession were vastly different from
their present status. Can anyone suggest that a modem court would
say, as did Judge Cardozo, that "public accountants are public only
in the same sense that their services are offered to anyone who
chooses to employ them"? Is the "public" in "public accountant"
still akin to the "public" in "public stenographer"?
If in the 1920's accountants were solely responsible to those who
paid them, they have since then sold their wares with respect to
publicly-held companies on the basis of their being not only avail-
able to the public for hire but also responsible to the public investors
in audited companies. The federal courts, construing the federal
securities laws, have long since recognized the fact that the profes-
sion is responsible not just to its immediate employers, but also to
the investing public.24 How can courts continue the ludicrous fic-
269. 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
270. "If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect
a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." 255 N.Y.
at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
271. 255 N.Y. at 187, 174 N.E. at 447.
272. See Leviton, Accountants' Scope of Liability for Defective Financial Reports, 15
HASTINGS L. J. 436, 447 (1964).
273. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v.
Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969). The great misunderstanding of Ultramares is noted in
Levitin, supra note 272, at 447-50 and Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public
Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REV. 797, 815-21 (1959).
274. In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957); In re American
Finance Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962); Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th
Cir, 1974). Of course, in some circuits this responsibility will not be actionable for negligence
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tion that accountants serve their payors only for state law purposes,
but the public investors for federal purposes?
Virtually every pronouncement on the subject from the profes-
sion either expressly states the public responsibility of accountants
or takes it for granted. The very first sentence of the AICPA's Code
of Ethics asserts: "A distinguishing mark of a professional is his
acceptance of responsibility to the public." 7 5 The same page refers
to the shift to the current relationship to the public:
The ethical Code of the American Institute emphasizes the profession's respon-
sibility to the public, a responsibility that has grown as the number of investors
has grown, as the relationship between corporate managers and stockholders
has become more impersonal and as government increasingly relies on ac-
counting information.
The remainder of the Code reads in a similar vein. The Preface to
the 1953 Restatement of Accounting Research Bulletinsns also ad-
verts to the "increasing interest by the public in financial report-
ing."
The trend of the profession toward assuming a duty to public
investors mentioned in these pronouncements did not begin until
after Ultramares was decided, although previous enlightened talk
had concerned public responsibility.277 Nevertheless, corporate fi-
nancial statements in the 1920's were still an exercise in creative
accounting.278 In 1933, two years after Ultramares, the climax came
as the true state of affairs of public financing became clear to all.
An AICPA committee, operating under the chairmanship of one of
the most outstanding leaders of the profession, George 0. May,
reported that "[tihe passage of the Securities Act seems to your
committee to make a clearer definition of the responsibilities of
auditors more imperatively necessary. ' '2 7 Adolph Berle, the keenest
early student of law and accounting, in a paper presented to the
1933 annual meeting of the AICPA stated the culmination of the
prior decades of history: "It becomes plain that accounting is rap-
idly ceasing to be in any sense of the word a private matter."' 0
John Carey, in his recent historical study,2 8' provides more de-
under Rule 10b-5 since "scienter" is required. Negligence alone may be "scienter" in the case
of an auditor who fails to observe his duty of inquiry of suspicious circumstances on an audit,
or his duty to investigate. Cf. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341, 363 (2d Cir. 1973).
275. Code of Professional Ethics, 2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. ET § 52.09 (1974).
276. AICPA, ARB 43 Preface (1953).
277. See 1 J. CAREY, supra note 11, at 77-80.
278. See supra note 3.
279. 1 J. CAREY supra note 11, at 172.
280. Id. at 173.
281. Id. at 172 et seq.
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tails to this same effect that accountants believe and advertise that
they have a duty to the public. The point need not be labored
further here.
Clearly the role of accounting in 1931, the time of Ultramares,
was only beginning to become a public one and had not attained its
current public service status. Hence, the Ultramares decision, after
a long and active life, may now be obsolete.
Further reason to eliminate privity as a common-law require-
ment is the changing perception of the basis of tort liability in
general. Even the middle-aged view that tort liability should be
imposed on the person best able to distribute the loss would be
sufficient for judicial experimentation with the imposition of the
loss on accountants."2 Thus, if no liability existed whatsoever for
misrepresentations in financial statements, losses would be visited
fortuitously in large amounts on investors or companies. One way
to spread the loss adequately among all those who participate in
investment activity would be to legislate establishment of a single
governmental insurance fund, such as the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, with premiums paid on share transactions.
Another loss-spreading technique, feasible for court law mak-
ing, is to impose liability on management, directors, lawyers and
auditors, who, knowing of the risk, can pass along the costs by
increasing their fees in order to either pay their own increased insur-
ance premiums or establish a self-insurance fund. This is much less
harsh than holding the client whose financial statements are mis-
leading solely responsible because frequently the client will be insol-
vent (the loss to investors that forms the basis for suit being the
cause of that insolvency). In that case, innocent parties, the share-
holders and other constituents of the client, would bear the loss.
If privity is no longer a viable limiting doctrine, but recovery
should not extend to the universe, what should replace the crum-
bling citadel?2 3 Although some courts continue to honor the privity
requirement,2s4 many have moved toward effectuating the language
282. Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968) stated that the
auditor is an efficient loss distributor.
283. The English case which finally eliminated privity as a requirement for negligent
torts resulting in pecuniary damages, Hedley, Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.,
[1964] A.C. 465, [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (House of Lords 1963) posed this question by first
eliminating privity and then, in 5 extremely lengthy speeches, posing various relationships
that might have been sufficient had the defendants not been excused from liability on the
defense that they had disclaimed responsibility for the representation.
284. Koch Industries, Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974); Stephens Industries
v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., CCH BLUE
SKY L. REP. 71,178 (Utah 1974); Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So.2d 505 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968); Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291 -(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
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of Ultramares which distinguished Glanzer v. Shepard.5 They hold
accountants liable to third parties whose reliance actually could be
foreseen. 8 Some, including the draftsmen of the Restatement and
Restatement (Second) of Torts"7 would go further and impose liabil-
ity on members of a class whose reliance in the same or a similar
transaction is foreseen although the individual plaintiff was un-
known. Others would impose liability coextensively with liability for
physical torts-to all those whose reliance is foreseeable,"' following
the principal for physical torts that "the risk reasonably to be per-
ceived defines the duty to be obeyed." 5 No court construing state
law has suggested that no limitation by virtue of the relationship of
the parties should exist-that suggestion presumably would call for
liability whenever "but for" causation existed or even without caus-
ation, on some basis of deterrence.
2 0
One must be careful to note that implicit in most of these
MacNerland v. Barnes (Ga. App. 1973) (Unreported; see J. AccouNTANcy, Sept. 1973, at 71).
Cf. Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058, 1062 (D.N.D. 1974). Except for the unreported
Georgia case, all the cited decisions were decided by courts constrained to follow law estab-
lished by other courts. The Utah case and the 2 Florida decisions were by intermediate courts
bound by higher court decisions and Buchman contained intimations that if the court had
had its "druthers" it might have ruled otherwise. Stephens Industries was a federal diversity
case applying Erie to determine what the Colorado court would have done if it had had the
question. Koch Indus., Inc. v. Vosko purporting to find Kansas or Bahamian law, miscon-
ceived Hedley, Byrne, which would have been controlling in the Bahamas.
285. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
286. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455
F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 93 (D.R.I. 1968);
Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973) (noted 39 Mo.
L. REV. 466 (1974)); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971);
Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa, 1969). The newest cases in New York contain only
intimations of a possible departure from the older ones. Compare Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F.
Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Mutual Ventures, Inc. v. Barondess, 17 Misc. 2d 483, 186
N.Y.S.2d 308 (1959) (dictum); and C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955)
(dictum) with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); O'Connor v.
Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937); and State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d
416 (1938). See Gormley, Accountants' Professional Liability-A Ten-Year Review, 29 Bus.
LAWYER 1205, 1208-12 (1974). The author, a very competent writer, draws a distinction be-
tween the "end and aim," "primary beneficiary" rule of Glanzer v. Shepard and the actually
foreseen test, citing Rhode Island Hospital Trust in accord. In any event, the varying relation-
ships are on a single continuum and, the slices of the continuum may vary in thickness
depending on the commentator.
287. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 552 (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 552 (Tent.
Draft No. 12, 1966).
288. Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (dictum).
289. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
290. Cf. Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974) (holding "causation in fact" to be the appropriate basis in a Rule 10b-5 case against
tipping insiders and tippees who sold without disclosure of material inside information to
plaintiffs who purchased during the period of non-disclosure but would have acted differently
had they known).
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statements is the concept that not only the parties should have the
indicated relationship, but also the type of transaction in which the
plaintiff incurred his injury should be foreseen, foreseeable or be the
end and aim of the defendant's actions.
As a matter of abstract justice it seems impossible to develop
a simple generally acceptable rule for all cases. From the viewpoint
of the injured party, and perhaps those who would seek to sterilize
the market in corporate securities, "but-for" causation is not too
severe a test. That view, however, is tempered by the policy consid-
eration that the slightest error very often would result in total ruin
of the auditor or at least a very severe cost, disproportionate to the
wrong. What then is the solution?
One possibility is a flexible balancing process which has been
applied in California to resolve this question in a group of three
cases involving defectively drafted wills. The intended beneficiaries
were allowed actions for negligence although the contracts to draft
the wills were made only with the respective testators. In the first,
Biakanja v. Irving,2 ' the court held that a notary public liable in
negligence to a named beneficiary under a will drafted by the notary
when the will was held invalid for improper attestation. The court
stated:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the
balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transac-
tion was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future
harm. . . . Here, the "end and aim" of the transaction was to provide for the
passing of Moroevich's estate to plaintiff. See Glanzer v. Shepard, 244 N.Y.
236, 135 N.E. 375, 23 A.L.R. 1425.2
In each of the other two cases, the claim was against an attor-
ney for failure to execute properly the testator's intention to cause
the plaintiff to take under the will. 93
These cases illustrate the wisdom of the balancing approach. If
291. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
292. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
293. Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161 (1969) (recovery against attorney who
failed to provide against spouse's statutory share); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d
685 (1961) (recovery denied for lack of negligence); accord, Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp.
378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966).
The reasoning of these cases was merely a specific application of the modem flexible
approach to torts, eschewing the old view based on often artificial categories that might have
been justified by conditions in earlier times. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
443 P.2d 561 (1968) (eliminating the classification of trespassers, licensees, and invitees for
purpose of fixing duties of care of owners of land).
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one were to speak in the wooden, conventional terms of privity or
foreseeability, he might reach the same result as was achieved in
these cases, stating a rule that one not in privity may recover if he
actually is foreseen as a potential victim of negligence. This view
would leave no room for the very real consideration in a case involv-
ing auditors because of the difference between the limited amount
of exposure to injury caused by the failure of the will and the much
wider exposure of the auditor.29 Even in cases involving auditors the
facts will vary. In one case the audit may be of a closely held com-
pany for use in making a new public offering, or in another case, for
reporting to the existing management. One would not be offended
in the former case with a finding of liability to the investors despite
the absence of privity, whereas in the second case imposition of
liability for loss in an unintended transaction would be unthinkable.
Of course the "actually foreseen" test could resolve these last
two cases. But the merit of the balancing process is that it permits
the court to weigh any pertinent considerations as they appear more
or less relevant in each case, including changing public policy.
The federal courts, construing Rule 10b-5 in cases of misrepre-
sentations in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, have
had to fashion a federal common law concerning these same issues.
As with state law, the two tandem major questions have been, first,
the necessity for intent and, if it is necessary, its definition, and
secondly, the required relationship of defendant and plaintiff.
On the second question it was thought early in the process that
privity might be required, 25 but this position soon was dispelled.29'
Now it goes unmentioned because the courts have concerned them-




Clearly, privity is not required for accountants' liability under Rule
10b-5. 211
Privity, however, has always been relevant in the sense that its
294. For an interesting realization of the need to view each case on its own facts, see
Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969), where the Illinois court in a case
involving a surveyor's alleged negligent preparation of a plat of survey, purported to eliminate
privity for all pecuniary torts but reversed the question of accountants' liability as a special
case.
295. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). But
see 3 L. Loss, SEcuRmEs REGULATMON 1767-71 (1961).
296. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
297. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974).
298. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974); Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 189-94 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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presence or absence affected other elements of liability. Thus in a
non-10b-5 case, discussing the Rule, the court said:
Privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants is not a fixed
condition precedent to the implication of a private remedy for a statutory
violation that injured the plaintiffs, members of the protected class. In that
situation, privity is not an ultimate or operative fact. It is an evidentiary fact
to be considered in conjunction with other material facts in determining
whether the relationship (such as it is) between the plaintiffs and the defen-
dants and the nature of the particular acts and transactions involve the duty
created by the statute.
The relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the natureof
the defendants' participation in the challenged transactions, and the plain-
tiffs' reliance upon the defendants' acts may vary. The relationship may be as
direct as that of vendor and purchaser or that of a corporation and its active
directors who personally profited. Other relationships that shade off into re-
mote and indirect connections may be hypothesized.
In the case of a corporation, for example, the defendant-directors may not
have personally participated or profited from the allegedly wrongful acts.2"
This system under Rule 10b-5, considering the whole mosaic of
the relationship of the parties, the degree of culpability of the defen-
dant, whether the defendant profited, and the plaintiff's reliance on
the defendant, is nothing less than the same sort of consideration
used in the California balancing process.
Absent legislation, other courts interpreting state law would be
best able to administer a rough form of justice through application
of this technique. At the cost of predictability, a court could at least
consider and weigh the factors calling for liability. Presumably pre-
dictability will develop as the courts through accretion of cases fill
in the doubtful spaces in the normal common-law way.
In any event, the trial court should do the weighing as a ques-
tion of law."' Even if a jury does the weighing, it should be reviewa-
ble on a basis that it is a question of law, not of fact. Perhaps if the
question is given to the jury, trial courts should be required to exact
299. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The quoted portion
was cited and followed in Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
and Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37-38 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See L. Loss,
SEcuRITIEs RzGULATION 1064 (1951); L. Loss, SacURTs REGULATION 371-72 (Supp. 1955). See
the discussion following the "flexible duty standard" at text accompanying notes 364-76 infra.
300. It may be suggested that White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974),
may make the question solely one of fact. I do not concur with this argument. Primary facts,
of course, such as whether the plaintiffs relied on the defendant's acts are for the fact-finder.
But White, at the cited pages, although not free of ambiguity, does not say that the fact-
finder should be instructed that if it finds reliance, etc., it may find either a duty or no duty.
Rather, the language of the opinion is not inconsistent with the position taken in the text to
the effect, for example, that the instruction to the jury should be that if the jury finds reliance,
etc., it shall find a duty. In short, the issue is not answered in White.
The relationship of White to the instant decision should become apparent after reading
the text accompanying notes 305-64 infra. See also note 348 infra and accompanying text.
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special verdicts to enable a reviewing court to know the primary
facts as determined by the jury. Then the jury's or judge's determi-
nation could be tested on something other than the standards ap-
plied to factual determinations. It may be best to permit full power
to the reviewing court to perform its own balancing. The merit
would be in avoiding disparities and arbitrariness.
In most cases, one could expect that an actually foreseen reliant
plaintiffis injury would be compensated under the balancing test.
The results in cases of actually foreseen classes or reasonably fore-
seeable plaintiffs would be more variant.
Would a legislative resolution be more desirable? It seems likely
that most conceivable legislation would work a rougher justice on
plaintiffs than would be worked by the California balancing process
on defendants. One model that has been suggested is the ALI Pro-
posed Federal Securities Code."' That Code establishes differing
requirements as to materiality, culpability, causation, etc., depend-
ing, among other things, on the issue of whether the plaintiff and
defendant are in privity or whether the injury was foreseeable. Thus,
it is designed in a way analogous to the balancing technique except
that the elements of the various torts are balanced by the draftsman
in the abstract.
Because of the intricacies of the Code's draftsmanship, it is
quite difficult to discern that the Code virtually would eliminate
accountants' liabilities except for misleading 1933 and 1934 Act type
registration statements and form 1OK's unless the accountant had
knowledge of falsity or was a party to a securities transaction.32
Neither of these fact events occurs frequently or needs a securities
law sanction when it does. The design of the Code will be the subject
of further comment, but for present purposes another aspect of the
Code is pertinent.
After the Code fashions its quite limited substantive rights of
action, a further limitation is placed on liability of parties under
which, if a party is liable for negligence, liability is limited to
100,000 dollars per defendant, regardless of the plaintiff's loss.
Thus, an auditor who would be held for the issue price under section
11 of the 1933 Act, will, under the Code," 3 be held to a limit of
100,000 dollars. The Code surmounts the problem of exposure, not
by limiting the class of plaintiffs to those who are in privity, but by
limiting the amount for which the defendant may be held liable.
301. See note 8 supra.
302. ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 1402-06 (Tent. Draft. No. 2, 1973).
303. Id. § 1403.
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A state legislature might choose this approach because it will
obviate the difficulties of defendants, but this would be unjust to
injured parties while working unevenly as to defendants. For many
defendants, a 100,000 dollar liability would be ruinous. For the large
firms it could be of no concern."4 On balance, it seems that the
California and federal common-law balancing technique commends
itself above this legislative method and any of the judicially devised
limiting doctrines such as foreseeability, actual foreseeability or
privity.
D. Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Negligence, Flexible Duty,
Privity, Foreseeability, Causation in Fact
1. Flexible Duty.
This section is concerned with the other side of the privity coin,
the tandem question whether scienter should be required for 10b-5
liability of auditors."0 Enough has been written on the topic3 so
that concentration might be placed on the latest development-the
flexible duty standard-to ascertain whether it is an aberration or
the wave of the future.
The genius of the law of Rule 10b-5 is the genius of the common
law. The federal courts in interpreting the Rule are, for the most
part, developing judge-made law, not construing legislation. Be-
cause cases must be adjudicated whether or not a pertinent rule
exists to apply, the judges allow the facts to guide the direction of
their thought with the result that the best justice of which they are
capable is decreed.
In the early stages of such a process, great discomfort is experi-
enced by legal planners, since predictability is difficult. Neverthe-
less, through accretion, common patterns of policies, principles and
results emerge, making future cases more easily predictable. Thus,
304. Arthur Andersen & Co., not the largest firm, had gross revenues of $271 million in
fiscal 1973 and active and inactive partners' distributions amounted to $66.5 million. Arthur
Andersen & Co. 1973 Ann. Rep. 32. Better tailoring of the lines of liability could be achieved,
for example, by limiting liability to a multiple of the fee received by the auditor for the
engagement in which the breach of duty occurred; or a multiple of fees received from the
client during a particular period; or a multiple of gross revenues from all clients for a particu-
lar period.
For a study of the amount of audit fees, see MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE,
SURVEY ON COMPANY APPROACHES TO REDUCE OUTSIDE AUDIT FEES (1974), summarized in
FINANCIAL EXEc. 42 (Sept., 1974).
305. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970); 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5 (1974).
306. See, e.g., 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 9.21(4)
(1974), 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.5 (1973); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1766 (1961); 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3883-88 (Supp. 1969).
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ten years ago, no lawyer could have predicted confidently the
liabilities that would arise if a director of a natural resource com-
pany purchased shares of his company on a stock exchange after
learning nonpublic information that the company had made a drill
hole showing substantial mineralization likely to result in a material
discovery of valuable ore. Today, although the factual determina-
tion of materiality, the measure of damages,- and perhaps other
questions of relief remain as difficulties, the risk is clear that the
purchase may be illegal, and may expose the purchaser to damage
liability to concurrent sellers,"'*"restitutionary or injunctive relief in
a suit by the SEC3°1 or a private person,30 and criminal sanctions. 1
The tough questions of the last decade are being settled. The
fact that it was a stock exchange transaction is no longer of concern.
Lack of common-law reliance by the seller because nothing was said
on which to rely is not troublesome; similarly, lack of privity is no
bother. Other difficult questions presently in litigation, such as the
extent of the buyer-seller requirement and the inclusion of nonde-
ceptive breaches of duty, also presumably will be settled soon.
One important question, decided variously in hundreds of 10b-
5 cases, has defied rationalization until recently. That is, what
should be the standard of knowledge, purpose, or care required of
the defendant for 10b-5 liability? The first difficulty with the ques-
tion is that ihe words of the Rule and enabling statute311 provide
little guidance in determining the standard: The statute has been
said to require some degree of scienter312 and no degree of scienter;
311
the Rule, in clause (2), clearly could be read to prohibit innocent
misrepresentations; 34 clause (3) may be read to prohibit activities
which, although not constituting "fraud or deceit," have the same
effect on the victim.
31 5
307. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974).
308. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
309. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974).
310. 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 306, at § 10.3.
311. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b (1974).
312. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
313. Comment, Civil Liability Under Section lob and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 683 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
314. See id.
315. E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); Sonde &
Freedman, "Seagulls on the Water-Some Ships in a Storm": A Comment on Lanza v.
Drexel, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 270, 290 (1974); Comment, supra note 313, at 683 (10b-5(3) "covers
action which 'operates' as a fraud, and seems concerned with the effect of conduct, not the




The second great difficulty with the question of the proper stan-
dard is that courts and commentators for the most part assume that
a single answer exists to this single question. But 10b-5 is a many
splendored thing-it is a congeries of torts and other wrongs involv-
ing securities transactions. It is like common-law misrepresentation,
which involves much more than deceit, negligent misrepresentation,
and rescission, and extends to battery for feeding someone poisoned
chocolates, false imprisonment resulting from a pretense of power
to make an arrest, obtaining goods by false pretenses, a malicious
lie resulting in mental suffering, a misleading signal by a driver
about to make a turn in the opposite direction, defamation through
falsehood, interference with contracts by false statements, etc.311 In
the poisoning case, reliance or privity are not considered worth dis-
cussing although scienter is essential. On the other hand, scienter
in the wrong-turn-signal situation is incongruous.
One describing all these common-law misrepresentation cases
would speak in terms of several distinct torts and each tort could
be described in terms of the duty and right of action. Similarly,
courts and commentators now realize that Rule 10b-5 involves many
different varieties of wrong. Although at first the Rule was thought
to include only misrepresentation and insider trading without dis-
closure, now equally large numbers of cases involve insider tipping,
breaches of fiduciary duty,317 and broker-dealer sharp-dealing, as
well as other cases not fitting these categories.3 18 Given this rich
variety, it seems incredible that anyone could ever have asked,
which of scienter or negligence (choose one) is required by Rule 10b-
5? Yet the question continues to be posed in that form.3 1'
The third great difficulty with the question of the proper stan-
dard of knowledge, purpose, or care, is that the contents of words
like scienter, intent, knowledge, negligence, recklessness, fraud and
316. W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRTS, 683-84 (4th ed. 1971).
317. See Comment, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mis-
management Cases, 86 HRV. L. REv. 1007 (1973), refining and updating the original analysis
of Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-
Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969).
318. E.g., A.T. Brad & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Hooper v. Mountain
State Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp.
21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
319. E.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Tenth Circuit has its own mode of coping with the problem. It simply uses inscruta-
ble language which can be of little utility as precedent and fails to follow even that small
clue to the state of the law. For the latest illustration, quoting from and purporting to
rationalize a long line of mysterious statements on the subject, see Clegg v. Conk, CCH FED.
SEC. L. Rm. 94,897 (10th Cir. 1974).
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deceit, have never been delimited-they are open-ended and have
no blueprint brightly marking their bounds.
Given this state of affairs, a lawyer seeking to systematize the
cases may adopt any number of techniques. He may take all the
decided cases, grouping those with several common characteristics
and describe each set, supplementing his description as new irregu-
lar cases are decided. Or he may establish a few broad categories
using fewer characteristics and describe them as cases of insider
trading or tipping, affirmative misrepresentation, breach of fidu-
ciary duty and broker-dealer wrongs, with a catch-all class at the
end. A different system might use one set of characteristics, such
as the nature of the transaction, to separate the cases and then
within each set, subdivide further using another set of characteris-
tics like standard of conduct, reliance, etc. Or, recognizing that the
combinations and permutations of wrongs in securities transactions
will cover a nearly unlimited number of situations, he may deter-
mine that classification would strain the understanding and provide
little utility until more decisions are on the books. Instead he might
simplify the consideration by asking for each case: did defendant
owe a duty to plaintiff that was violated, and if so, should the breach
be compensated? This approach has newly come to be consciously
applied to 10b-5 cases by the Ninth Circuit under the designation
of, the "flexible duty standard."32 0
In White v. Abrams, in which the phrase, "flexible duty," was
coined, an elaborate "Ponzi scheme" was inflicted on the plaintiff
by a long-term trusted investment advisor acting as loan broker for
the main operator. After first determining that the original treat-
ment of 10b-5 cases had been "a compartmentalized approach...
requiring some semblance of the traditional elements of common
law fraud: materiality, scienter, reliance, causation and damages,"
the court found a trend "to modify or completely eliminate some of
these elements."
Relying heavily on a student comment,3"' it cogently described
the Supreme Court's process of resolving Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States.322 It found that the Supreme Court, although it did
not discuss the scope of the defendant's duty, had considered factors
such as the relationship of the parties, the benefit to defendants
320. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503
F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,904
(9th Cir. 1974); see note 293 supra.
321. Comment, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States-The Supreme Court Speaks
on Rule 10b-5, 1973 UTAH L. Rxv. 119, 121-31.
322. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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from the transaction, access of the parties to the relevant informa-
tion, and the degree. of activity of the defendants. The Ninth Circuit
stated:
We believe that the cases and commentators demonstrate that any attempt
to limit the scope of duty in all 10b-5 cases by the use of one standard for state
of mind or scienter is confusing and unworkable. Consequently, we reject
scienter or any other discussion of state of mind as a necessary and separate
element of a 10b-5 action. The proper standard to be applied is the extent of
the duty that Rule 10b-5 imposes on this particular defendant. In making this
determination the court should focus on the goals of the securities fraud legis-
lation by considering a number of factors that have been found to be signifi-
cant in securities transactions.an
The concept of flexible duty was not invented by the Ninth
Circuit; it was discovered. Previously decided Rule 10b-5 cases
pointed very clearly toward the conclusion that the concept was in
fact adopted by the courts long before it was christened.
One might suggest that the evolution of the flexible duty stan-
dard proceeded through the several following stages:
(a) First Stage.-The common law of misrepresentation,
which developed liability under certain combinations of circum-
stances, with the only common elements being materiality and
misrepresentation.
Ultramares itself illustrates the concept: the court upheld one
claim against the defendant accountants in which scienter was pres-
ent but not privity. But in a second count, it required privity to be
joined with negligence to constitute a claim. Thus, to oversimplify,
the accountants in Ultramares owed the duties:
(1) not to misrepresent material facts intentionally to persons
who are the intended recipients of the information and who act
on it to their prejudices;
(2) not to misrepresent material facts negligently to parties in
privity.
Prosser has in effect determined that a flexible duty standard
was established by the pattern of the common law cases of
misrepresentation, although in his zeal to systematize the law he
failed to recognize what he had found. Thus, in an analysis of cases
for the entire field of misrepresentation, he found certain patterns
in the cases and described five groups of factors that the courts
weighed in determining rights and liabilities. The factors he found
to be of consequence are:
323. 495 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974).
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(1) nature of the injury-physical injury to person or prop-
erty v. pecuniary harm;
(2) basis of liability-intent, negligence or strict liability
without fault;
(3) purpose, expectation, or foresight that the plaintiff
may act;
(4) size of the group of which plaintiff is a member;
(5) character of the transaction by plaintiff and whether




What emerges from Prosser's analysis is not a picture of the
courts looking to a rigid formula contained in Prosser's restatement
of the cases, but a pattern of courts weighing flexibly all the factors
in the case to determine whether a compensable breach of duty has
occurred.
(b) Second Stage.-The balancing process for determining when
privity is necessary, set forth in the California and Rule 10b-5 cases
earlier described.
The articulation of the balancing process in the California and
federal 10b-5 cases dealing with privity was the second step in the
development' of the flexible duty standard. The balancing process
is simply the crude reciprocal of the flexible duty standard for de-
fendant's knowledge, purpose, or care: if, in applying the balancing
process a court considers the defendant's knowledge, purpose, or
care as an element, then of necessity, in determining the standard
of knowledge, purpose, or care required, the court is considering the
presence of privity or the particular relationship of the parties. 31 In
short, the flexible duty standard is the balancing process previously
described, not from the perspective of one asking whether privity is
necessary, but rather from the perspective of one asking whether
scienter is required.
(c) Third Stage.-The early groping about for need of scienter and
its definition under Rule 10b-5.
Under Rule 10b-5, one variable, the remedy sought, has been a
basis for courts establishing negligence as the standard for a pro-
spective injunction even though some form of scienter was required
324. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 231 (1966).
325. E.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 270 (3d Cir. 1972)
(Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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in damage cases in the same courts." ' In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.,327 Judge Friendly suggested that negligence should not be
enough to grant money relief against the corporation although it
would be enough for a prophylactic remedy. In numerous other
cases, 38 strong intimations of the flexible duty standard presaged
the statement of it in White v. Abrams.
Another case, involving accountants' liability, which could be
said to be grounded at least in part in the rudimentary flexible duty
concept, is Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 32' in which the court
expressly adverted to the special relationship of accountants to the
public in upholding a claim for negligent reporting.335 The court
distinguished accountants from corporate officers 31 and found a
higher duty for the accountants.
In Fischer v. Kletz,n3l auditors discovered that prior audited
statements on which they had reported were materially misleading,
and did nothing. The court held that a common-law duty existed
to correct the misimpression caused. The court rebelled at the con-
straint of having to decide whether the failure to correct was due to
scienter or something less. It recognized that the straightforward
approach was best when it held that the question was one of duty,
not mental state:
Liability in a case of nondisclosure is based upon the breach of a duty
imposed by the demands of 'good faith and common honesty.'. .. The impo-
sition of the duty creates an objective standard against which to measure a
defendant's actions and leaves no room for an analysis of the subjective consid-
erations inherent in the area of intent. Thus, to base liability in part upon
subjective standards of intent of the nondisclosing defendant would blur and
326. E.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
327. 401 F.2d 833, 863, 866-68 (2d Cir. 1968).
328. E.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971) (distinguish-
ing Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965) as involving "significantly different
circumstances."). See also Financial Indus. Fund. Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d
514 (10th Cir. 1973); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 395, (2d
Cir. 1973) (opinion of Mansfield, J.); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,
276-88 (3d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion of Adams, J.); Lanza v. Drexel & Co. 479 F.2d 1277
(2d Cir. 1973); (dissent of Hays, J.). Cf. Gould v. American Hawaiian SS Co., 351 F. Supp.
853 (D. Del. 1972), in which the court construing § 14a to impose liability for negligence on
outside directors discretely noted that this visits liability based on the particular defendant's
due diligence, and, "[t]herefore, the negligence standard embodies a criterion which would
permit consideration of the individual's particular position with the corporation and his
relationship to the pertinent information held to be erroneously or incompletely stated in the
proxy materials." 351 F. Supp. at 865.
329. 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
330. See Mann, Rule lOb-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch
Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 1206,1213 (1970) suggesting that Drake
substantiates this thesis.
331. 282 F. Supp. at 105.
332. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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weaken the objective basis of impact of nondisclosure upon the plaintiff. In the
alternative, if this rationale be deemed unacceptable, it can be persuasively
urged that in a nondisclosure case, intent can be sensibly imputed to a defen-
dant who, knowing that plaintiff will rely upon his original representations,
sits by silently when they turn out to be falseA
m
(d) Fourth Stage.-The articulation of a rudimentary flexible
duty concept by perceptive commentators.
At this point, the commentators began to force a pattern, or
perhaps, more accurately, the pattern emerged from the cases as it
became apparent that the courts were imposing liability for certain
types of conduct in some cases but not others. By 1969, a few percep-
tive 10b-5 buffs, the earliest of whom was a student writer, were
aware that several courts, regardless of what they were saying, were
not in fact woodenly applying or not applying a scienter require-
ment, but were intuitively applying differing standards dependent
on the circumstances. 34
(e) Fifth Stage.-The opinions of Judges Adams in Kohn v. Amer-
ican Metal Climax, Inc., Mansfield in Chris-Craft, and Hays in
Lanza v. Drexel & Co.
The Second Circuit, in determining liability of underwriters, in
two cases found their duties depended on the circumstances. In
Lanza v. Drexel & Co. 335 a member of an underwriting firm, sitting
as a director, and his firm were held to have no duty to disclose
unfavorable facts to persons with whom management was negotiat-
333. 266 F. Supp. at 188. See Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Information, 12
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 464 (1965). See also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d
147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1963).
334. E.g., 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcURITIEs LAW: FRAUD § 8.4 (513) (1971); Mann, Rule 10b-
5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and
Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206 (1970); Comment, Scienter in Private Damage Actions
Under Rule 10b-5, 57 GEO. L.J. 1108, 1115-17 (1969). For a critique of the current crude state
of the flexible duty standard, see Bateman, Flexibility and Precision in the Development of
a 10b-5 Standard of Culpability: A Refined Approach to Balancing Along a Continuum of
Conduct (unpublished seminar paper, U. of Colo. Law School; scheduled for publication in
revised form in 46 COLO. L. REV., 1975).
Judge Mansfield in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 395
(2d Cir. 1973) (concurring opinion), and Judge Adams in Kohn v. American Metal Climax,
Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 276-88 (3d Cir. 1972), both discussed at text accompanying notes 337-47
infra, perceive a truncated continuum of conduct stopping short of "mere negligence." In
Chris-Craft, however, the failure in the duty to investigate, held actionable there as "scien-
ter," would be described as negligence by some courts. E.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,
503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974). At any rate, the process is identical, contemplating a continuum
of conduct to satisfy the Rule, depending on circumstances.
335. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc; 6-4 decision).
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ing an acquisition when he was not a member of the negotiating
team .31
On the other hand, in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Air-
craft Corp. ,33 the underwriters of a target company's defensive
merger in a takeover battle were held liable under section 14(e) of
the 1934 Act when they failed to inquire into matters after being put
on notice of material undisclosed facts which, if discovered, they
would have had a duty to disclose. Here the underwriters were held
to have the duty to inquire on behalf of stockholders of the target
company. The facts were that the underwriter of a friendly tender
offeror had read minutes of the target company, Bangor Punta,
mentioning possible sale of the subsidiary Bangor & Aroostook Rail-
road for $5 million when it was being carried on the books as an asset
at $18.4 million. The underwriter asked management about the
matter and was told no sale was planned. Actually, the sale was
made after the defeat of the unfriendly takeover attempt and only
then was the loss recognized with the result that the target company
shareholders had been misled into overvaluing the company and
refusing the unfriendly tender offer. The court said the case was
analogous to the common law tort of unlawful interference with an
advantageous opportunity of the losing offeror. Hence, misleading
the target's shareholders also was a breach of duty to plaintiff, the
antagonistic tender offeror.
In squeezing the case into the conventional scienter mold, the
court spoke of and found "culpability" from the failure to investi-
gate the facts to the full extent of the duty, somewhere beyond oral
inquiry of management. It then held the underwriter liable for the
failure to investigate by imposing a duty to assure the accuracy of
the statements made by management to shareholders on the theory
that this is necessary to promote the policies of section 14(e).
All three judges differed in the process used to resolve the stan-
dard of knowledge, purpose, or care required. Judge Timbers fol-
lowed the conventional approach of first deciding whether scienter
or negligence was required and then defining scienter. Judge Gur-
fein, agreeing with the other two that scienter in some form was
required for all 10b-5 damage actions, but recognizing some discom-
fort with the Timbers process, said he did "not think a litmus paper
test of scienter will ever be found" and that "[i]n modern times
statutory construction grows case by case much as the common law
336. For the view that the court was incorrect in finding no duty, see Sonde & Freed-
man, "Seagulls on the Water-Some Ships in a Storm". A Comment on Lanza v. Drexel, 49
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 270 (1974).
337. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
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did when more general rules of law were involved." 38 Judge Mans-
field hinted at a recognition of the truncated duty analysis after
rejecting the Gurfein "I know it when I see it" view. He stated:
[The scienter standard] of course . . . might vary according to the existence
of a fiduciary relationship, the burden of proof and the nature of the relief
sought. It might also take into account the nature and duties of the corporate
posts held by the defendants, whether they are insiders or outsiders, and
whether they are active or inactive participants. See generally Mann, Rule
10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of
Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1206 (1970).'
Judge Hays, writing for the four dissenters in Lanza v. Drexel
& Co.3"' one month later, articulated what the Chris-Craft panel had
done, without referring to that case, in terms of a flexible duty
standard:
It is not profitable in considering a case such as this [i.e. Lanza] merely to
characterize the allegedly unlawful conduct as either negligent or wilful and
to impose liability only if the conduct was wilful. Neither the Act nor the Rule
creates such a simple dichotomy. The purposes of the Act and the Rule are
not furthered by a mechanical application of labels. The relationship of the
parties and the transaction involved must be analyzed in order to determine
whether the Act and the Rule impose a duty on one party with respect to the
other and the nature of that duty. In making this analysis Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 'must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively' so as to
further Congress's broad remedial purpose in enacting the statute.3 "
Judge Hays' opinion was relied on heavily in White v. Abrams.
In result, even the Lanza majority opinion and the Timbers
opinion in the Chris-Craft case illustrate the flexibility of duties
imposed on underwriters. And Chris-Craft further illustrates the
clumsiness of the common law deceit analogue although the court
struggled to the correct result. A straightforward statement of what
the court actually did, as set forth by Judge Hays in Lanza, would
have been a more satisfactory opinion and would have provided
better future guidance. Thus, the Chris-Craft opinion, reading
solely in terms of duty, might have said:
(1) Underwriters for a merger partner, joining with manage-
ment of the target company to fight a tender offer, have a duty
to disclose material facts to investors;
(2) Coupled with the duty to disclose is a duty to investigate
the facts and inquire into suspicious circumstances, because
investors expect that of underwriters;
338. 480 F.2d at 393.
339. Id. at 397.
340. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
341. Id. at 1317.
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(3) A failure of either duty coupled with causation and injury
makes the underwriter liable to the unfriendly tender offeror
since this is an appropriate way to promote the proper fulfill-
ment of duties.
Similarly, in finding no duty to convey in Lanza, the main
opinion might better have explained the decision by use of the duty
analysis instead of the cumbersome terminology of inapt cases .342
Judge Adams, in his oft-cited concurring and dissenting opin-
ion in Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc. ,33 found scienter was
required and concluded that a flexible duty approach was appropri-
ate. Like Judge Hays in his Lanza dissent, Judge Adams eschewed
the simplistic scienter-negligence dichotomy and considered the re-
lationship of the parties, the nature of the relief requested, the na-
ture of the transaction as a face to face transaction or otherwise, and
the realities of the business world.3 44
The slow dawning of the flexible duty standard suggests a com-
pelling logic more powerful than one court's view of the matter. It
has the ring of soundness to it. The beauty of the flexible duty
conception of 10b-5 is that it frees the mind from the struggle with
the sometimes ill-adapted analogy of common law deceit, which
courts had frequently found uncomfortable and often unworkable in
the past.345 Its alleged drawback is its unpredictability, because both
the question of duty and compensability for its breach require an
342. Another decision of the Second Circuit may best be understood in the framework
of a duty analysis. In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 N.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973), the court held that
an attorney may be held as an aider and abettor in an SEC injunctive case, first, on the
traditional ground that negligence is sufficient in cases where prophylactic relief is granted.
But the court further emphasized the significance of the special facts of the case. It stressed
the "unique and pivotal role" played by attorneys in the "effective implementation of the
securities laws," and the need for reliance of the public on attorneys in order to facilitate the
smooth functioning of the securities markets. It also noted carefully it was not passing on
questions involving more peripheral participants and criminal and damages suits.
343. 458 F.2d 255, 270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
344. This last factor was a powerful influence on the majority in Lanza, which thought
it would be undesirable to require all directors to review all of management's negotiations
with others. 479 F.2d at 1281-89.
345. Many securities frauds do not fit the stereotyped common-law deceit pattern. Yet
at first the courts strained to fit the cases into that pattern, usually reaching the right result,
but often in a way opening the decisions to easy criticism. The incongruities are apparent in
cases such as the following: Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir. 1973) (scienter found from underwriter's failure to observe a duty to investigate facts);
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965) (reliance of plaintiff based on mere
silence of defendant); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (scienter found when
accountants, learning of the fact that prior audited statements were incorrect, failed to act);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (deceit found from non-verbal
conduct in failing to pay dividends).
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ad hoc decision by the court in each case. 4' It may also be charged
that the standard will result in arbitrary decisions.
Taking the last objection first, the courts in deciding the ques-
tion of duty presumably will look to external sources such as cus-
tom, policy of the securities acts, expectations of the parties, culpa-
bility, morality, ability to spread the loss, the need of the defen-
dant's trade or profession for protective immunity, etc.347 Hence, it
will not be an arbitrary determination but will be supported by
reason.
What of the other objection? Is the flexible duty technique
unpredictable? The answer would seem to be yes, since courts must
weigh numerous factors in determining the existence of the duty,
and reasonable men may differ in the weight accorded each. But the
quality of the unpredictability should be noted. First, since the
question is straightforward-under the circumstances what, if any,
is the duty owing by the defendant to the plaintiff-it is one that
involves none of the intricate sophistication of the law of deceit. It
should be comprehensible to laymen, and the lawyer's task of pre-
diction will not depend on whether all the right turns are made in
an intricate maze. Secondly, as the cases accumulate, the unpredic-
tability will diminish.38 Thirdly, since the duty will be determined
from existing sources, any new 10b-5 liability will be for failure to
meet a previously known duty. This distinguishes the surprise and
unfairness of a liability imposed for a newly found duty.34'
It should be noted that the use of the flexible duty technique
may be said to be nothing more than a semantic exercise, while our
concern here is with finding an appropriate process for solving a
346. Professor Loss has said that the flexible duty concept is the "perfectly, logically
beautiful view, but it's impractical." Remarks at ABA National Institute, Advisors to Man-
agement, Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, in New York, Oct. 3-
5, 1974.
347. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974); White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
348. It may be charged that the unpredictability is permanent on the basis that the
weighing of the relevant factors is a matter for the fact-finder in each case. I do not concur
with that view. Neither White v. Abrams nor the cases preceding it seem to make the
weighing a factual determination although the presence or absence of a particular factor may
be a question of fact. See note 300 supra.
Moreover, today's factual determination may be tomorrow's law. For an illustration of
the reverse of this process, cf. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (motorist
is negligent as a matter of law for failure to stop, look, and listen at a railroad intersection)
and compare Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 287 U.S. 98 (1934).
For the intricacies of the law-fact-application-of-law trichotomy see H. HART & A. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PRocEss 373-85 (Temp. ed. 1958); and see W. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS §§ 35, 37
(4th ed. 1971).
349. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 69 (Temp. ed. 1958).
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legal problem. Of course, when semantics encumber reasoning, they
are bad and ought not to be countenanced; but when a semantic
device frees the mind from the cobwebs of inapt concepts, it is useful
and should be adopted. The flexible duty concept achieves that
result.
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst5 0 illustrates one application of the
flexible duty standard for accountant defendants and demonstrates
its suitability over the clumsy scienter-negligence analysis. It is
remarkably similar to Chris-Craft in its essential elements.
In the Hochfelder case, described earlier,351 the defendants re-
lied on the Restatement of Torts rule and argued that the accoun-
tants could only be held liable if they knowingly lent encouragement
or support to the principal wrongdoer. 52 After analyzing the prob-
lem in terms of an auditor's duties to investors, the court rejected
the Restatement rule, which after all was a rule intended to cover
all torts with little regard for special duties of such persons as audi-
tors, underwriters and others under the securities laws.353 Instead,
the court first determined that the auditors, pursuant to GAAS, had
a duty to investigate the internal countrol system of the client and
to disclose findings, and that these duties under federal law were for
the benefit of investors. Next, the court held that a jury should
determine whether either of the duties was violated and whether the
breach was causally connected with the plaintiff's injuries. The re-
sult is sound because the flexible duty standard provides direction.
This is in sharp contrast with the possible result that might have
been obtained had the sterile Restatement rule been examined and
aimlessly accepted or rejected.35
Given the Simon rule requiring application of lay standards to
accounting principles and perhaps even auditing standards, 355 the
enhanced duties to inquire into suspicious circumstances35 and to
investigate absent such circumstances,357 and the expansion at com-
mon law of the rights of third parties to recover for accountants'
negligence,5 ' together with the SEC's new leveraging approach to
350. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
351. See text accompanying notes 237-44 supra.
352. RESTATEMENT oF TORTS § 876 (1939).
353. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); note 342 supra.
354. See Speech by Commissioner Sommer to ABA Convention, Aug. 28, 1974 and
Sonde & Freedman, "Seagulls on the Water-Some Ships in a Storm:"A Comment on Lanza
v. Drexel, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 270, 296 (1974) for an endorsement by a Commissioner and
enforcement staff employees of the Commission.
355. See text accompanying notes 138-85 supra.
356. See text accompanying notes 225-38 supra.
357. See text accompanying notes 238-56 supra.
358. See text accompanying notes 257-304 supra.
1975]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
professionals' responsibilities under the securities acts, 59 one may
reasonably expect the flexible duty technique to operate expan-
sively to inflict even greater exposure to liability on accountants.
The ALI Federal Securities Code current draft completely re-
jects the flexible duties imposed by the cases in favor of a rigid
pattern of compartmentalization. The Code not only describes when
scienter or negligence will be required,"' but also defines
"knowledge""3 ' and for the first time in any United States statute,
so far as I know, defines "scienter, '3 12 apparently succumbing to the
Latin lure. 3 3 The admitted 364 compelling logic of the flexible duty
standard thus is rejected in favor of the conventional approach
without even the saving grace supplied by the ambiguities inherent
in terms like "scienter," which facilitated the common law develop-
ment. This kind of legislation does not commend itself to adoption.
2. A Footnote to the Flexible Duty Concept Under 10b-5: Concern-
ing Privity and Its Replacement
The tandem relationships between privity and scienter and the
flexible duty and balancing process techniques have already been
described. In less confusing terms, the two perspectives may be put
more straightforwardly:
(a) In the particular circumstances, what standard of conduct
is required by the law in question-scienter, negligence or some-
thing else? This is the "flexible duty" concept.
(b) By whom will that duty be enforceable-one in privity, an
actually foreseen plaintiff, or someone else? This is the "balancing
process."
This is a duty analysis, asking what duty is owed and to whom.
Because the policies of Rule 10b-5 are aimed at numerous wrongs
going far beyond insider trading, affirmative misrepresentation, tip-
ping, broker-dealer sharp dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty, an
intelligent and comprehensible answer to these two questions can be
derived only from one source under Rule 10b-5-the policies of the
Rule and its enabling act.
Just as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in Hochfelder 6l and
359. See note 7 supra.
360. ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 1402(c), 1403(e), 1404(a), 1405, 1406(a) (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1973).
361. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 251A (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974).
362. Id. § 296AA.
363. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 732 (9th Cir. 1974) where the court referred
to "convenient, differently interpreted, shorthand latin [sic] phrases behind which one can
sweep complex determinations."
364. See note 346 supra.
365. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
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White " finally have recognized these facts of 10b-5 life for the
standard-of-conduct question, so too, modern decisions already
have recognized them for the other question-by whom may the
duty be enforced.
Thus, for example, the decisions in Heit v. Weitzen,317 Mitchell
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.318 and Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,311 all have held that the duties in those cases
were enforceable by persons intended to be protected by the policies
of Rule 10b-5. This duty analysis is the same one used in Hochfelder
and White. No historical baggage for Rule 10b-5 requires a court to
show why the merely analogous common law of deceit is either an
apt or an inapt analogy. Since the common law of deceit, developed
for horse traders and used car dealers, is not enlightening for the
complex merchandise known as securities and the even more com-
plex securities markets, the common law was not useful and rightly
was discarded as a guide to decision-making.
Th& Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute,370 relied on so heavily by
the White v. Abrams court in its discovery of the flexible duty
technique, also is the fountainhead for the Second Circuit's decision
in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, which determined the process for de-
ciding who could enforce the duty not to trade or tip on the basis of
inside information. As in the determination of the standard of con-
duct, Affiliated Ute, as interpreted by Shapiro, shows that the way
to identify those who can enforce the duty is to determine the poli-
cies of Rule 10b-5 for the particular fact situation.
Thus, in Shapiro, after the court found a duty of the defendants
not to trade or tip on the basis of material non-public information, 371
it went on to consider whether the plaintiffs could enforce that duty
in an action for damages.3 12 It denied any requirement of a showing
either of privity or inducement by the defendants of the plaintiffs
to act in the transaction resulting in their injury. Instead, it said
"the proper test. . . is 'whether the plaintiff would have been influ-
enced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had dis-
closed to him the undisclosed fact.' ,,373 The court expressly stated
that its decision was "consistent with the underlying purpose of
366. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
367. 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
368. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
918 (1972).
369. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
370. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
371. 495 F.2d at 236-37.
372. Id. at 238-41.
373. Id. at 239.
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 'to prevent inequitable and unfair
practices and to insure fairness in securities transactions gener-
" J374ally ... .
Based on Affiliated Ute as interpreted in Shapiro, since the
policies of the securities acts consistently have been read to estab-
lish a special relationship between accountants and public inves-
tors, 3 75 any duty of accountants should be enforceable by those to
whom it runs without concern for lack of privity. The lower courts
now have come to embrace this process in cases against accoun-
tants. The most lucid illustration is the Seventh Circuit's recent
decision in Hochfelder, but the older decisions just cited followed
precisely the same process.
VI. DUTIES BEYOND AUDITED STATEMENTS INCLUDING "WHISTLE
BLOWING"
A. The Duty to Correct
It was held in Fischer v. Klet 376 that an auditor may have some
duty to correct prior audited statements, at least as a matter of
common law, when he later discovers that the statements were ma-
terially misleading when made. Based on the reasoning of the opin-
ion, it seems that the court also would have arrived at the same
conclusion if the statements, although not deceptive when made,
later became misleading.
3 7
One must be careful, however, when dealing with this second
type of case. Since audited statements speak as of a particular date
or period, the "facts" stated, for example, as to the amount of prof-
its for a year, if "true" when made cannot "become false" merely
because profits drop in the next quarter. Another type of case also
exists-an assertion made as to profits in the year may have been
based on estimations that turn out to be wrong. For example, a
year's profits may have been in part determined on the basis of
estimated collections on receivables, which estimates, after the aud-
itor's report, turn out to be grossly exaggerated. Would the Fischer
v. Kletz court impose a duty to "correct" in either of these latter
374. Id. at 240.
375. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974); Drake v. Thor
Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); In re American Finance Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962); In re Touche, Niven, Bailey
& Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957).
376. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also SEC v. Manor Nursing Center, Inc.,
458 F.2d 1082, 1096-97 (2d Cir. 1972) (duty to correct prospectus offering on an all or nothing
basis when terms are changed after the effective date).
377. 266 F. Supp. at 188-89.
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two situations? GAAP and GAAS would only require the accountant
to report the loss in the following year.378 The Fischer court, how-
ever, clearly stated in dictum that in both cases the accountant
would be held to a duty to correct. The court discussed Loewer v.
Harris,37 a case in which a brewery was sold after representations
of its profits were made. After the representations but before the
closing, subsequent profits dipped materially, but the seller said
nothing, and the court held the seller liable. In Fischer the court
held the accountants liable, saying:
It should be noted that, in Loewer, the information contained in one represen-
tation was made untrue as a result of a change in the performance of the
brewery; while, in the instant case, the representation was rendered false not
by a change in conditions but by a discovery that the information on which
the representation was based was itself false and misleading.'"
Despite the reliance on Loewer, it would seem that in a case
brought as in Fischer by a public investor rather than a contract
purchaser, the court would be likely to conclude the financial state-
ments are "stale" and the plaintiff is not as justified in relying on a
continuity of performance. Also, other circumstances of the parti-
cular case probably would be utilized to distinguish Loewer. For
example, little ground would be present for claiming misrepresen-
tation when profits for the prior several years in the company or
industry had fluctuated widely.
The Fischer court itself expressly noted that the issue of the
duration of the duty to correct will arise. The basic question would
seem to be whether the statements would be misleading to the lay
reader, under the Simon test. Another one of the questions expressly
left open in Fischer was, to whom and how should disclosure be
made? Presumably the courts will fashion a rule under which those
members of the public who likely would be affected by the original
statements should be given the best notice feasible. This too will be
a question dependent on the particular circumstances.
Assuming a duty to correct, GAAS provide a guide. SAS No.
111' says the auditor "should advise his client to make appropriate
disclosure of the newly discovered facts and their impact on the
financial statements to persons who are known to be currently rely-
ing or who are likely to rely on the financial statements and the
378. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 561.01-.03. AICPA, APB Statement No. 4.
379. 57 F. 368 (2d Cir. 1893).
380. 266 F. Supp. at 185.
381. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 561.06. Section 561, as previously noted, does
not recognize a duty to correct unless facts existed at the date of the auditor's report which
might have affected his report had he then been aware of such facts.
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related auditor's report." The auditor also should satisfy himself
that the client does make the disclosures, and if the client refuses
to do so, he should notify the board of directors, and depending on
the circumstances, take the following additional steps:
(a) Notify the client that the auditor's report must no longer
be associated with the financials;
(b) Notify regulatory authorities that the auditor's report
should no longer be relied upon;
(c) Notify each person known to the auditor to be relying on
the statements, to the extent practicable.
Hence, even GAAS establish a limited duty to "blow the whis-
tle" on a client. Fischer v. Kletz would extend it further to require
blowing the whistle when prior audited statements become mislead-
ing on any basis, although a court must carefully consider the cir-
cumstances to make certain the statements are indeed mislead-
ing.382
B. "Associated With," Unaudited Statements
Other duties of auditors also extend beyond their duties to per-
form careful and skillful audits. When one allows his name and
reputation to be used in lending prestige or credibility to an enter-
prise, he sometimes is held responsible for what he has done.383 The
accounting profession has recognized the special value given to fin-
ancial statements when an accountant's name is associated with
them. An accountant is associated with statements on which he has
382. See Shahmoon v. General Dev. Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,308 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) in which a court found statements to be so stale as
not to justify the plaintiff's reliance.
383. Cf. e.g., Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972); Black & Co. v. Nova-
Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Ore. 1971); Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Tex.
1960). But not always. Only recently have corporate directors become conscious of the fact
that when they lend their names to a corporation by sitting on the board of directors, they
may be held responsible for a fraction of the natural consequences of their acts. The following
is descriptive of the once prevailing view of a director's responsibilities. It is quoted in R.
STEVENS & H. HEsNN, STATUTES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS 657 (1965)
from TME, Oct. 5, 1962, at 96:
In Britain, where a company's list of directors often reads like a tear sheet from
Burke's Peerage, many a titled tycoon sits on more boards than he can count. Lord
Boothby, 62, a longtime Tory backbencher who is one of this happy breed himself (he
has 'eight or nine' directorships), explained last week just what directors do in return
for adding prestige to corporate letterheads. 'No effort of any kind is called for,' he told
an audience of Yorkshire clubwomen. 'You go to a meeting once a month in a car
supplied by the company. You look both grave and sage, and on two occasions say "I
agree," say "I don't think so" once, and if all goes well, you get $1,440 a year. If you
have five of them, it is total heaven, like having a permanent hot bath.'"
Consider also the franchising boom's use of movie stars and sports personalities to lend
prestige to hamburgers and corporate securities.
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made an audit report, and he also is deemed to be associated with
unaudited statements "when he has consented to the use of his
name in a report, document, or written communication setting forth
or containing the statements" or when he "submits to his client or
others, with or without a covering letter, unaudited financial state-
ments which he has prepared or assisted in preparing.""3 4
In every case in which the accountant is "associated with"
statements, his minimal obligation is to disclaim an opinion on the
statements. 85 He also has further duties that may best be consid-
ered by first analyzing two typical situations in which an accoun-
tant is "associated with" unaudited statements: (a) Unaudited in-
terim period statements in registration statements; and (b) Unau-
dited interim reports to shareholders.
Next a third situation will be examined-the publication of
financial data with which the accountant is not associated. We will
consider what duties, if any, an accountant has in that case. It may
be noted that these three cases are merely points on a continuum
ranging from maximum activity to minimum activity by the ac-
countant.
1. Unaudited Interim Statements in Registration Statements
When, as is often the case, unaudited interim financial state-
ments appear with audited statements in a prospectus, the auditor
will fit within the literal definition of being "associated with" the
unaudited statements. 86 The AICPA apparently intended this re-
sult since the same duties are imposed on the accountant with re-
spect to other, "associated with" statements as are imposed for
unaudited "stubs" in the prospectus. 7
384. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 516.03 reads:
.03 A certified public accountant is associated with unaudited financial statements
when he has consented to the use of his name in a report, document, or written communi-
cation setting forth or containing the statements. Further, when a certified public ac-
countant submits to his client or others, with or without a covering letter, unaudited
financial statements which he has prepared or assisted in preparing, he is deemed to be
associated with such statements. This association is deemed to exist even though the
certified public accountant does not append his name to the financial statements or uses
'plain paper' rather than his own stationery. However, association does not arise if the
accountant, as an accommodation to his client, merely types on 'plain paper' or reprod-
uces unaudited financial statements so long as he has not prepared or otherwise assisted
in preparing the statements and so long as he submits them only to his client.
385. SAS No. 1, supra note 20 at AU § 516.04. An exception is made for unaudited
interim statements ("stubs") filed with the SEC. Id. AU § 516.12. But other responsibilities
arise. See id. AU § 710 and the text above; Stanley L. Bloch, Inc. v. Klein, 45 Misc. 2d 1054,
258 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
386. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 516.03.
387. Compare SAS No. 1 AU § 710.09 with AU §§ 516.06 and 516.07.
19751
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
If the auditor is "associated with" unaudited stubs in a regis-
tration statement, what duties arise?
He, of course, may have contractual obligations to the client or
the underwriter of the registered offering by virtue of the "comfort
letter" engagement. Typically the contract will limit responsibility
of the auditor to the parties to that engagement and will limit use
of the comfort letter to the underwriter.
3 88
But what duties are owing to third parties on these unaudited
interim statements with which the auditor is associated? First, if
the auditor knows of violations of GAAP, GAAS require that he first
"insist upon appropriate revision; failing that, he should add a com-
ment in his report calling attention to the departure; further he
should consider. . . withholding his consent to the use of his report
on the audited financial statements in the registration state-
ment." 388 Although this express duty is limited to known deviations
from GAAP, it would seem that a similar legal duty to disclose
known unfairness in the unaudited statements might also exist.
AU § 710.09 reads:
.09 Because the independent auditor has not examined the unaudited financial
statements which may be included in the registration statement, he cannot be expected
to have an opinion as to whether such statements have been prepared in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles. However, if he concludes on the basis of facts
known to him that the unaudited financial statements are not in conformity with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles, he should insist upon appropriate revision; failing
that, he should add a comment in his report calling attention to the departure; further,
he should consider, probably with advice of legal counsel, withholding his consent to the
use of his report on the audited financial statements in the registration statement. (See
section 516.07.)
AU §§ 516.06-.07 read:
.06 Because unaudited financial statements, by definition, have not been audited
by the certified public accountant, he cannot be expected to have an opinion as to
whether such statements have been prepared in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles. However, if the certified public accountant concludes on the basis
of facts known to him that unaudited financial statements with which he may become
associated are not in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, which
include adequate disclosure, he should insist (except under the conditions described in
paragraph .05) upon appropriate revision; failing that, he should set forth clearly his
reservations in his disclaimer of opinion. The disclaimer should refer specifically to the
nature of his reservations and to the effect, if known to him, on the financial statements.
.07 If, under circumstances such as those described in paragraph .06, the client will
not agree to the appropriate revision or will not accept the accountant's disclaimer of
opinion with the reservations clearly set forth, the accountant should refuse to be asso-
ciated with the financial statements and, if necessary, withdraw from the engagement.
Further, a certified public accountant should refuse to provide typing or reproduction
services or to be associated in any way with unaudited financial statements which, on
the basis of facts known to him, he concludes are false or intended to mislead.
388. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); SAS
No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 630.
389. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 710.09. See also id. AU §§ 710.02, 516.04,516.06,
and 516.07.
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Thus, if the auditors in the Simon case knew of the deficiencies,
which instead of being in the audited statements were in unaudited
"associated with" statements, one would expect a court to impose
a duty to disclose."'
Presumably this duty will be enforceable by persons injured by
its breach, including at least those purchasing the registered securi-
ties and most likely, within the meaning of Heit v. Weitzen,39'
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,3" and Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,"' all those whose injury is caused in
fact by the breach of duty.94
Suppose, as in Fischer v. Kletz, the discovery of the misleading
nature of the statements is made after they have been published.
Does the accountant have a duty to correct unaudited "associated
with" statements like the Fischer v. Kletz duty to correct audited
ones?
It would be illogical not to impose the same duty for both. If a
duty arises with respect to unaudited "associated with" statements
to disclose and perhaps withdraw for deviations from GAAP just as
with audited statements, it would seem that the duties would be
identical for discoveries of misrepresentations after publication of
either audited or unaudited "associated with" statements.
This would be one basis for sustaining the SEC's claim against
the accountants in the National Student Marketing case.9 5 It was
alleged in that case that audited statements and unaudited "stubs"
appeared in a proxy solicitation for an acquisition and the accoun-
tants later discovered the stubs were false. Although they notified
the client and its attorneys, the Commission urges that they had a
further duty, when no one acted, to notify the Commission and
investors. Under Fischer this would have been an appropriate fulfill-
ment of the duty if audited statements were discovered to be false.
It seems appropriate to require the same for "associated with"
unaudited statements."
There are other grounds for requiring the auditor to correct
prior unaudited stubs in the registration statement. For SEC filings
390. Thus in SAS No. 1, AU § 630.13 n.1, unfairness discovered in the comfort letter
review must be taken "cognizance of" in the auditor's opinion and 1933 Act consent.
391. 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
392. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
393. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
394. See text accompanying notes 367-76 supra.
395. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Complaint T 33 & 48h, [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972).
396. But see Isbell, An Overview of Accountants' Duties and Liabilities Under the




a statutory duty direct to investors is present, which is not found
at common law."7 Moreover, an affirmative duty to disclose infor-
mation known to one in a special relationship to the person with
whom the relationship is held, is one of the well-developed princi-
ples of both the common law"'s and the securities laws."' Thus, with
respect to unaudited statements, an auditor in a securities-act spe-
cial relationship with investors would seem to have an affirmative
duty to correct those statements regardless of whether he is asso-
ciated with them. Therefore, it seems that a duty probably exists
to notify investors of deviations from GAAP and perhaps of unfair-
ness, as well as a duty to correct later-discovered misrepresentations
in unaudited "associated with" statements in a registration state-
ment.
Does an auditor also have a duty of care to detect misrepresen-
tation in the unaudited stubs? Perhaps he does. Because under
section 11 of the 1933 Act auditors must conduct an S-1 review,4®
including limited review of the stubs, they have a duty to use care.
BarChris°1 teaches that, for purposes of section 11, the S-1 review
is relevant only to due diligence in detecting misrepresentations in
the audited statements. If a failure occurs in carrying out the section
11 duty to catch an error in the stubs, since the auditor is "asso-
ciated with" those stubs, it would not be too great a step to make
the duty enforceable by private action in keeping with the policy of
the Supreme Court to enlist private plaintiffs to enforce securities
law duties. 2 The same would seem to hold for failures in the com-
fort letter review.40 3
397. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974) and text
accompanying note 274 supra.
398. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 551 (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551
(Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
399. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Chasins v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). The finding of no duty to disclose errors in the unaudited interim statements
in Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. at 195, is distinguishable because those statements were
not in SEC filings and therefore the special relationship under the securities acts was not
present in the view of the court. One may question whether the court properly ignored the
special relationship established for securities law purposes just because the particular unau-
dited statements were not themselves required by the securities laws. Cf. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973) (re underwriter's duties).
400. See text accompanying note 206 supra.
401. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
402. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). See also Shapiro v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241 (2d Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus. Inc.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 356 (2d Cir. 1973); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235
F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
403. See note 390 supra.
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Finally, suppose an auditor, associated with unaudited stubs in
a registration statement, becomes aware of suspicious circumstan-
ces, but not more. Does he have a duty to probe to determine
whether the suspicions are well founded, or to inform anyone?
GAAS seem to encompass expressly only known deviations from
GAAP in the unaudited statements."4 Facts known to the accoun-
tant that reasonably would have aroused suspicions are not men-
tioned. A widely noted common-law case is relevant here. In 1136
Tenants' Corp. v. Max Rothenberg & Co.,4"5 the court held that even
when an accountant was hired merely to perform a "write-up" of
financial statements from the clients' books, and not to perform any
audit procedures, if he discovered that certain claimed payments
were not evidenced by invoices, he had a duty "at least" to notify
the client of his discovery. In fact none of these payments were made
but the clients' manager had falsified them in order to facilitate his
embezzlements. Although the duty in this case was to inform the
client of circumstances that might evidence employee defalcations,
the concomitant and higher duty to be wary of management misre-
presentations to investors"' would seem to imply a duty to inform
investors of suspicions concerning management's representations.
2. Unaudited Interim Reports to Shareholders
At the opposite extreme from unaudited stubs in registration
statements are statements with which the accountant has abso-
lutely no association." 7 Between these extremes are all variations of
participation by the accountant. Thus, the accountant may perform
an extensive review of financial statements without applying audit
procedures to the normal full extent, or he may have a much lesser
involvement, as in a write-up engagement, and still be "associated
with" the statements. The kind of data of concern here is extremely
important because for many reasons current financial information
is of greater significance than old information,0 ' and audited state-
ments typically appearing two or more months after year end are
not only old when first published but are even older when someone
needs financial data during the subsequent year. Probably more
404. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU §§ 710.09 and 516.07.
405. 36 App. Div. 2d 804, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1971), affd men., 30 N.Y.2d 585, 281
N.E.2d 846, 330 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1972).
406. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 110.05. See text accompanying notes 220-25
supra.
407. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 421-45 infra.
408. See, e.g., Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 856 (1952).
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injuries occur from the use of unaudited data than from audited
data.
In the immediate future we may expect much more participa-
tion by accountants in the publication of unaudited data. The Coo-
pers & Lybrand firm recently announced a new service that it de-
scribes as a "limited review" of interim reports and unaudited data
in annual reports to shareholders."' The AICPA also is considering
interim statement reviews. 10 Further, the SEC has just proposed
that a note be added to annual statements requiring for each quar-
ter of the prior two years disclosure of data concerning net sales,
gross profit, and income before extraordinary items.4" ' Because the
note will be part of the audited statements, the audit will of
necessity extend to such quarterly data, albeit the report will be
made only annually. The effect, of course, will be to disclose, after
the event, defects in the quarterly information, and to red-flag
claims for potential plaintiffs. Hence most companies may be ex-
pected to clear the data with their auditors prior to publication.
Because of the brevity of the quarterly period in relation to the
typical operating cycle, distinctive problems arise involving GAAP
for interim statements.41 Therefore, substantial expense will be in-
curred, estimated by the chairman of Arthur Andersen & Co. at
twenty-five percent of the present annual audit fees."3
All this increased activity for unaudited statements will in-
crease the actual volume of data with which an accountant may
become associated. Part of the pressure to expand into this area
doubtless was the fact that many laymen presumed auditors to be
associated with much unaudited data and some evidence indicates
409. See Wall Street J., Sept. 24, 1974, at 6, cols. 2-3 (Pac. Coast ed.); J. OF
AccouNTAcy, Nov. 1974, at 16. According to the Wall Street Journal article, "The new
Lybfand procedure calls for it to review a company's proposed quarterly statements and
supporting documents. In particular, the accounting firm would check whether accounting
principles and procedures were 'appropriate' and applied consistently with past periods. If
satisfied, Lybrand would give the company a letter for publication describing the review and
concluding 'we have no adjustments to propose,' or words to that effect." Lybrand "also
proposed to extend its annual audit to 'historical', or past, financial data included in the
'president's letter' and other unaudited portions of annual reports."
It has developed a forty-page manual of procedures for the new services.
410. See CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., Report Letter No. 564, at 10 (1974).
411. SEC Release 33-5549 (1974); [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,030
(1974).
412. See Republic Technology Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1973);
Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952);
APB Op. No. 28 (1973) amended by FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 3, Reporting Accounting Changes in Interim Financial Statements (1974).
413. Wall Street J., Dec. 23, 1974, at 2, cols. 2-3 (Pac. Coast ed.). This compares to the
estimated 10-15% for the more limited Lybrand review. See Wall Street J., note 409 supra.
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that legal duties might be premised on these lay expectations. For
example, SAS No. 1414 speaks in terms of unaudited statements
"with which he may become associated," intimating that a subjec-
tive standard may have been intended-the appearance of being
"associated with" statements is enough to invoke the standards for
"associated with" statements. Also, of late much discussion of an
"auditor of record" concept has occurred, 15 which may impose "as-
sociated with" status in certain situations. For example, an auditor
engaged for several consecutive audits may become known as the
company auditor and when he sometimes comments on unaudited
data or is known to be consulted frequently with respect to those
statements, he may be held to be "associated with" them. One
recent example of a case in which the auditors played it safe by
commenting on unaudited data subsequent to the balance sheet
date may have been based on this consideration.416
Because of the wide variances in review of unaudited data rang-
ing along the continuum previously mentioned, standards for the
reviews have not been determined. When they are, however,
presumably they too will vary.41 For example, the trial court in 1136
Tenants' Corp. v. Max Rothenberg & Co.,418 according to a reliable
414. SAS No. 1, supra note 20, at AU § 516.06.
415. See, e.g., Speech of Commissioner Sommer, The Four Musts of Financial
Reporting, Jan. 8, 1974, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE. 79,620;
Speech of John Burton, Chief Accountant of the SEC, 138 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Nov. 1974, at
16. Dr. Burton stated:
Increasingly it is being recognized that the auditor has some responsibility beyond
an annual visit to the corporation in order to audit the financial statements of a particu-
lar year. I think that the auditor has to recognize that he has a public responsibility in
the broad framework of public financial reporting by corporations. This means that as
long as he is the auditor of record, which in the case of a public company means that
there has been no 8-K filed with the Commission that indicates he has resigned or been
fired, he should feel some responsibility to review all public financial reporting to that
company on a continuing basis. It is apparent that what has to be done in this respect
is to develop meaningful standards for auditor responsibility. I do not contemplate, for
example, a quarterly audit. But on the other hand, it seems to me that public accoun-
tants with their public orientation and reporting expertise should have greater impact
on interim statements than has been the case traditionally.
416. See Report of Arthur Andersen & Co. in Precision Polymers, Inc. 1973 Ann. Rep.:
We have not examined any financial statements as of any date subsequent to De-
cember 31, 1973, and accordingly express no opinion thereon. We advised management
that it is our opinion that income with respect to certain transactions . . . should be
recorded as product is delivered, and therefore, should not be included in the March 31,
1974 financial statements. Accordingly, if we were to render a report on such financial
statements, our report would include an adverse opinion thereon.
417. See Carmichael, The Assurance Function-Auditing at the Crossroads, 138 J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1974, at 64; Terrell, Minimum Standards for Unaudited Financial
Statements, 135 J. OF AccouNTANcy, May 1973, at 54.
418. No. 10575-1965 (Sup. Ct. 1970); aff'd on other grounds, 36 App. Div. 2d 804, 319
N.Y.S. 1007 (1971), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 585, 281 N.E.2d 846, 330 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1972).
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source,419 held that "a certain amount of auditing procedures is re-
quired even in a write-up." Even if this is so, the same may not be
true when the determination of the accountant being "associated
with" the statements is grounded on facts not including the per-
formance of services by the accountant.
If the auditor is held to be "associated with" statements, pre-
sumably he will be held, as a minimum, to the standards of GAAS,
which require at least disclosure of known deviations from GAAP.2 °
Perhaps the previously described duties to disclose known unfair-
ness of suspicious circumstances, to correct later discovered
misrepresentations and to use reasonable care in the "associated
with" activity also will be imposed. In any event, any duties ulti-
mately imposed probably should be flexibly established so that the
policies of the law can be applied to accommodate the varying inter-
ests in the best way possible.
C. Situations Involving Non-"Associated With" Statements and
No Financial Statements Whatsoever
Does an auditor owe any duties to investors with respect to
statements with which he has no association or for matters not
involving even unaudited data? The question is too broad for a
complete answer but it seems probable that in some cases, an audi-
tor may have duties to investors even when he has no association
with the financial statements. Three categories of cases will be
briefly considered: (a) currently ongoing misrepresentations or non-
disclosures, (b) past misrepresentations whose harmfulness has
been spent, and (c) anticipated frauds. This will not exhaust the
possibilities although given the dearth of decisions, it will reach to
the extent of seemly speculation.
1. Currently Ongoing Misrepresentations or Nondisclosure
Keeping in mind that in this part we are not considering audi-
tor's duties concerning audited or unaudited "associated with"
statements, when the auditor's client itself has no duty to disclose
a known fact, it would seem inappropriate to require a higher duty
from the auditor.
The client has duties not to issue material misrepresen-
tations,4 1' or trade itself on the basis of material inside information,
419. Gormley, Accountants' Professional Liability-A Ten Year Review, 29 Bus.
LAWYER 1205, 1212-14 (1974).
420. See text accompanying notes 388-94 supra.
421. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
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or tip others.4 12 The client also has a duty to disclose when it is aware
of misrepresentations by another, at least when it is itself some-
how benefiting 23 or the representation by the other manifestly will
be relied upon by the public.4 4 Even when the client is not affirma-
tively misrepresenting, engaging in insider trading or tipping, or
benefiting from or acquiescing in material misrepresentations of
others, it may have an affirmative duty to disclose material non-
public information adjudged ripe by management,425 at least absent
a valid business purpose for nondisclosure.28 If the client has a duty
in any of these circumstances, does the auditor also have some duty,
other than with respect to audited statements or "associated with"
unaudited statements?
Even when the accountant is aware of the facts, the American
courts so far uniformly have held that no duty is required of
accountants to police their clients beyond their duties in connection
with audited or "associated with" financial statements,412 which
they have reason to believe will reach the investing public.42 1
The bases for the decisions have not included any suggestion
that the accountants' ethical duty to maintain client confidences 2
is relevant. Perhaps this is as it should be. In the analogous case of
attorneys who have knowledge that their client has perpetrated a
fraud on any person, there is no duty to maintain confidences.43 The
principle probably applies to continuing as well as past frauds.,'
The general opinion, however, seems to be that the fraud should be
404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969).
422. "An issuer making a tender offer for its own shares looks like the most inside of
insiders. . . ." 1 A. BROMBERG, SECuRITEs LAw FRAuD 125 (1973).
423. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
424. Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 413, 419-20 (D. Ore. 1973). But there is not a
duty to dispel every false statement no matter by whom made. Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948-51 (2d Cir. 1969); Green v. Jonhop, Inc., supra
at 420.
425. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
426. Id. See note 166 supra.
427. Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971); Gold v. DCL, Inc., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 94,036 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); In re Seeburg-
Commonwealth United Litigation, 362 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Fischer v. Kletz, 266
F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
428. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973) (no duty where statements were
supplied solely for directors' use and not publication); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th
Cir. 1971).
429. AICPA, ConE OF PROFESSiONAL ETmcs, Rule 301, 2 CCH AICPA PROF. STANDS. ET
§ 301 (1974).
430. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmmL, DR 4-101(C)(2), DR 7-102(B)(1).
431. Remarks by Bialkin, ABA Nat. Inst. on Advisors to Management, Responsibilities
and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, in New York City, Oct. 3-5, 1974.
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fairly clear.432 The precise status of the accountants' ethical code
may differ from that for attorneys, although in some states ethical
rules of conduct have been enacted into positive law433 that are
similar to the attorneys' code of ethics." 4
Instead of resting on the ethical ground of maintaining client
confidences, the cited cases rely on the fact that the accountant
should not be answerable for client actions having nothing to do
with audited or "associated with" financial statements even when
the accountant is aware of the misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
What of the fact that under the securities laws accountants
have a special relationship with investors435 and in other special
relationships an affirmative duty to act or inform has been held to
exist?36 Is the special relationship of auditor and investor in exist-
ence only with respect to audit reports or "associated with" state-
ments? Fischer v. Kletz seems to be premised expressly on that
basis and the other cited cases would support it. This view does
seem somewhat inconsistent with the "auditor of record" concept
previously described.
37
At any rate, if additional facts were present, it may be that a
duty to inform investors would be found when the accountant is
aware of its client's misrepresentations. For example, in Gold v.
DCL Inc.,4 38 the auditor, Price-Waterhouse, informed its client,
DCL, that the 1971 audit report would have to be qualified by a
statement that profits were subject to DCL's ability to renew leases
of its computers when some danger was present that DCL's comput-
ers would become obsolete and not easily leased. The auditors were
discharged but not before DCL issued unaudited interim statements
without mentioning Price-Waterhouse's intention to qualify its re-
port. Plaintiff purchased some shares in DCL after the interim
statements but before disclosure of the dispute between the auditor
432. 4 PLI ON SECURmY REGULATIONS 224 (1973); Remarks by Bialkin, ABA Nat. Inst.
on Advisors to Management, Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, in
New York City, Oct. 3-5, 1974.
433. According to a Memorandum of Covington & Burling addressed to the AICPA
dated April 5, 1974, some 44 State Boards of Accountancy have adopted requirements of
confidentiality. Attachment to AICPA, PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF AICPA VOLUNTARY PRO-
GRAM FOR REVIEWS OF QUALrY CONTROL PROCEDURES OF MULTI-OFFICE FiRMs (1974).
434. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 32-237 (1956) and Amz. Sup. CT. R. 29; CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6076 (1964) and Rules of Professional Conduct following that section (both the
Arizona and California schemes empower the governors of the state bar associations to formu-
late and enforce rules of professional conduct with the approval of the state supreme court);
PA. Sup. CT. R. 17-3 (1974).
435. See note 274 supra.
436. See note 395 supra.
437. See note 415 supra.
438. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,036.
[Vol. 28
ACCOUNTANTS RESPONSIBILITIES
and DCL. He then sued Price-Waterhouse but the court found no
breach of duty.
It must be noted, however, that the plaintiff testified he did not
know Price-Waterhouse was the company's auditor, nor did he con-
sider or care whether the figures were audited. More importantly,
the court stated, in finding no basis for holding that the auditor had
by its silence aided and abetted the client's wrong:
[Flar from there being a tacit agreement not to disclose because of mutual
benefit (as, say, in the case of an accountant agreeing to certify false figures
in order to retain its client), it is undisputed that Price-Waterhouse was fired
by DCL because of the parties' disagreement over the validity of the intended
qualification.' 3'
This language suggests the question of what the court would
have held in the more likely (than Gold) case in which misleading,
unaudited statements are published without the auditor's partici-
pation, but he knows they are misleading and says nothing, and
evidence is present to sustain the allegation that his silence was
motivated by the fear of losing his client.4" Grounds for concern
arise here because inaction in certain situations may be a basis for
finding liability as an aider and abettor. " ' If a director of a corpora-
tion who sits silently through a misleading speech by a codirector
may be held as an aider and abettor,4" an auditor who sat on the
same stage would seem equally guilty. Should he have to be physi-
cally present to be liable? Whether accountants thus have a duty
to blow the whistle on misleading statements or omissions by their
clients is not as clear as the reported decisions would seem to indi-
cate.
2. Past Wrongs Whose Hamfulness Has Been Spent
The salient characteristic of old wrongs in the disclosure area
is that they neither die nor fade away. Because of the current report-
ing requirements of the securities acts, an old misrepresentation or
nondisclosure, unless reported, often causes a new misrepresen-
tation or nondisclosure.4 3 When an auditor on an audit engagement
or on becoming associated with unaudited statements learns of
some old securities law violation, the strong presumption favors
439. Id. at 94,168.
440. See Sterling, Accounting Power, 135 J. OF AccouNTANcy, Jan. 1973, at 61, 63
(indicating that fear of losing clientele from being too independent may be a common pheno-
menon.)
441. See, e.g., 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrrms: LAw FRAUD § 8.5 at 533 (1973).
442. Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
443. 4 PLI oN SECURrrY RFGULATONS 233-37 (1973).
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disclosure. But suppose the accountant discovers a client's unlawful
misrepresentation or nondisclosure, which under the circumstances
raises no Fischer v. Kletz type duty to correct prior financial state-
ments. Does he have a duty to disclose his new found data on some
other ground if he is not yet reporting on audited statements?
A lawyer may have some ethical duties if it is clearly estab-
lished that a fraud has been perpetrated.44 Both the original Disci-
plinary Rule quoted in the margin (which did not contain the excep-
tion clause) and the exception clause have been the subject of con-
siderable puzzlement, 45 but that is a matter for another day. The
point is that some authority exists for compelling a lawyer to blow
the whistle on fraud, and this presumably includes clear securities
law frauds4"-but perhaps not violations not resulting from clearly
intentional harms.
No such injunction is present in the accountants' code of ethics,
although there is the previously mentioned ethical duty to maintain
client confidences,"' which would argue for observance by courts,
since by our hypothesis no one will any longer be harmed by the
prior fraud. Nevertheless, the original victims of the old fraud have
been harmed. This dilemma between encouraging client confidence
in accountants and repairing a fraud apparently has not been liti-
gated.
A recent bit of terrorizing on the continuing education circuit
has occurred, perhaps aided by the popular knowledge of misprision
of felony engendered by the Watergate events. Title 18, U.S.C. §
4,445 it is suggested, may make professionals guilty of the crime of
misprision if they fail to report past crimes of their clients. That
section has never been interpreted in this way, however, and always
444. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RsFsPONsIBiT, DR 7-102(B)(1):
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon
a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and
if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication.
445. See 4 PLI ON SEcuarIEs REGULATION 224 (1973); Remarks by Bialkin, ABA Nat.
Inst. on Advisors to Management, Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and
Accountants, in New York City, Oct. 3-5, 1974.
446. Remarks by Bialkin, ABA Nat. Inst. on Advisors to Management, Responsibilities
and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, in New York City, Oct. 3-5, 1974.
447. See note 429 supra.
448. "Whoever having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same
to some judge or some other person in civil or military authority under the United States,
shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years or both."
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has required some affirmative act in furtherance of the cover-up to
establish guilt.44 ' Thus there seems to be no cause for alarm.
3. Anticipated Fraud
A further brief bit of speculation is in order; this one concerns
the accountant's duty to warn potential victims of threatened
crimes or breaches of duty. The lawyer may not counsel a threat-
ened crime or fraud45 and he may reveal the intention to commit a
crime and the information to prevent its commission without violat-
ing ethical rules.45" ' But he has no such express license in the ethics
code to reveal anticipated frauds that are not crimes, and he has no
express ethical duty to reveal either an anticipated crime or a fraud.
The accountants' code of ethics is silent on all of these matters.
The recent California Supreme Court decision in Tarasoff v.
Regents of U. of Calif.,45 2 is illustrative of these matters. In that case,
the court applied a flexible duty analysis and held that a failure of
a psychotherapist to warn a homicide victim of a patient's threat
to kill the victim that was disclosed in the course of therapy is a
violation of a duty to warn giving rise to an action for damages.
While there are numerous obvious distinctions from the accounting
case under discussion, two significant similarities exist. First, the
court expressly held that the duty would exist despite the absence
of any special relationship between doctor and victim; thus the
absence of a relationship between accountant and investor under
the law of many states would be irrelevant. Secondly, the policy of
maintaining patient confidences was required to yield to the societal
interest in protection of the victim. Similarly, in accounting, the
duty to maintain confidences may be found subordinate to the in-
terest in protecting investors.
Still another ground for auditors' liability may be the pre-
viously described special relationship of accountants to both clients
and investors under the federal securities laws. The Tarasoff court
referred to previous decisions recognizing a duty to warn when there
was a special relationship between the doctor and both the victim
and the patient whose threatened conduct is involved. In criminal
cases quite unrelated to the type of white collar crime involved here,
special relationships have established the duty to prevent crimes.
449. The leading case is Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939). One case
did involve an accountant acting in a somewhat unprofessional manner. Lancey v. United
States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1966) (concealing a bank robber).
450. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILTy, DR 7-102(B)(1).
451. Id. at DR 4-101(C)(3).
452. 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
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For example, when a mother threatened a father with drowning
herself and their children as they argued next to a pond, and the
father walked away, heard a splash and did nothing, he was held to
be criminally liable because the obvious had occurred and mother
and children perished.453 The alliterative analogy of mother to man-
agement and investors to infants may not seem strange to future
courts.454
Closer, although not totally persuasive, analogies exist in the
area of physical crimes. The following suggests some interesting
applications in the accounting area:
Duty based upon contract. The duty to act to aid others may arise, not out of
personal relationship or out of statute, but out of contract. A lifeguard em-
ployed to watch over swimmers at the beach, and a railroad gateman hired to
safeguard motorists from approaching trains, have a duty, to the public they
are employed to protect, to take affirmative action in appropriate
circumstances ...
A more difficult problem concerns the duty, not of the one who is em-
ployed to safeguard the public in a particular way, but rather of his fellow
employee, whose employment contract does not specifically require him to act
in that way. What if, for instance, a locomotive engineer standing near a
crossing sees a train and car approaching the crossing; does he owe a duty to
the motorist to wake up the sleeping gateman, in view of his employment by
the railroad to operate trains? It would seem that a duty to act might be
imposed on him, though there is authority to the contrary.
[Citing for this last statement, Anderson v. State, 27 Tex. App. 177, 11
S.W. 33 (1889) (brakeman has no duty to signal engineer to stop train when
he sees child on the tracks.) Perhaps a distinction might be drawn, in the
railroad crossing situation, between a railroad employee on duty and one off
duty; and between an engineer, whose general duties include affording safety




Rather than summarizing the foregoing, a few brief words may
be said in conclusion. It seems that accountants are now on the
453. Rex v. Russell, [1933] Viet. L.R. 59. See also W. LA FAvE & A. ScoTT, CRimINAL
LAw § 26 (1972).
454. Still another ground, which may sometimes be present in the accounting cases, is
also suggested in Tarasoff. There the court held, alternatively, that where the psychotherap-
ist's prior conduct has created or contributed to the danger, he bears a duty to warn. In that
case, the therapist had reported the threats to the police, who picked up and detained the
patient but released him, and the patient therefore discontinued therapy. The court reasoned
that continuance of therapy might have caused the patient to abandon his plan and that
therefore the doctor's conduct contributed to the danger. One need not ponder very hard to
imagine many situations in which an auditor's conduct might increase the risk of client
misrepresentations to investors. E.g., prior "fudging" by an auditor may have encouraged the
later fraud.
455. W. LA FAvE & A. ScoTr, CRImINAL LAW § 185. Contra, Isbell, An Overview of
Accountants' Duties and Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Laws and a Closer Look at
Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIo-ST. L.J. 261 (1974).
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verge of being held legally liable for all the services they claim to
provide. They have.three unresolved institutional difficulties that I
have described as first, the modular, not real, nature of accounting,
secondly, individual independence, and thirdly, impartiality of the
profession. Nevertheless, the courts, impatient with the accoun-
tants' inability to overcome those difficulties, have exacted from
accountants a duty to communicate fairly, so that a layman will not
be misled, and perhaps a duty to establish auditing standards and
procedures that a jury may find supportable by learned reason.
Moreover, accountants have substantial duties to anticipate the
possibility of fraud and management misrepresentation, and these
and other duties may be enforceable at common law by persons well
beyond the tie of privity. It has been suggested that those persons
whom a court finds entitled to enforce the duties by applying a
balancing process should be able to sue.
Further, we have seen that under Rule 10b-5 the flexible duty
standard plus the balancing process are the most suitable tech-
niques for determining, respectively, the appropriate standard of
conduct and parties to whom duties are owed and liability for dam-
ages will lie.
Finally, we have seen that accountants have very substantial
obligations beyond audited statements. They have a duty to correct
newly discovered misrepresentations in previously published au-
dited financials. And, because auditors are associated in the public
mind with numerous unaudited statements, they have certain du-
ties when they know of falsities in them. They also may have duties
to inform investors of suspicious circumstances in connection with
unaudited statements and to correct prior misrepresentations, as
well as certain duties of care.
Even when no audited or unaudited, "associated with" state-
ments are involved, accountants may have certain duties to "blow
the whistle" on a client who is engaging in misrepresentations to the
knowledge of the accountant or who is planning some fraud.
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